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 Multifunctionality refers to the ability of agricultural systems to produce an array 
of non-market goods and services in addition to market commodities.  This thesis focuses 
explicitly on the provision of environmental benefits, through reduced soil erosion and 
fertilizer applications, by agricultural producers.  Soil erosion and nutrient contamination 
from agricultural production are the foremost contributors to ground and surface water 
degradation in the United States.  Reducing their production implies gains in social 
welfare, but may generate significant private losses to producers.  The objective of this 
analysis is to quantify the tradeoff between environmental improvements and producer 
welfare and to examine the extent to which public policy can influence that tradeoff. 
 To address this objective, a land use allocation model is constructed using slope to 
reflect terrain heterogeneity.  The model is formulated as a mathematical programming 
problem, with the objective of maximizing producer welfare subject to an exogenous land 
endowment and a series of production constraints.  The model developed in this thesis 
differs from previous empirical models in several substantive ways.  First, crop and 
livestock production activities are explicitly modeled as either separable or nonseparable 
activities.  The advantage to doing so is that it gives the model the flexibility to choose 
the optimal degree of integration between the two.  The model also diverges from 
previous studies by incorporating a common set of variables that affect the economic and 
environmental aspects of commodity production.  Specifically, the spatial allocation of 
land use practices impacts economic and environmental outcomes via a yield damage 
function and differentiated rates of soil erosion.  These two aspects are expected to 
improve the model’s predictive ability.     
 One of the primary benefits of the model is that it can be used to identify the 
economic factors driving landscape-level production patterns.  The analysis demonstrates 
that the land use allocation is relatively insensitive to changes in commodity prices.  
Therefore, altering the level of commodity-based income support payments is insufficient 
to attain environmental improvements.  Several hypothetical “green” policy instruments 
are simulated to estimate the cost to producers of reducing environmental damages.  The 
results indicate that limiting soil erosion to an environmentally acceptable level with 
either a regulatory standard or a tax reduces the average return to land by ten percent.  A 
program of green subsidy payments for less erosive land management practices cannot 
attain the same standard with less cost to producers.  Overall, the inelastic response of 
land use change to commodity prices indicates that targeting the use of productive inputs, 
as opposed to commodity outputs, may be a more efficient means of encouraging 
agricultural producers to provide environmental benefits. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 While the United States has a tradition of supporting domestic agricultural 
producers, the magnitude and diversity of support mechanisms have reached 
unprecedented levels in recent years.  The amount of direct government payments 
disbursed to U.S. farmers more than doubled between 1990 and 2000, peaking at over 
$22 billion.  This historically high level of support is projected to persist well into the 
future: the Economic Research Service forecasts that direct payments will exceed $20 
billion annually through 2005, and will remain above $15 billion per year through 2011.  
These support payments are currently administered via 75 Farm Service Agency 
programs, foremost of which are fixed direct and counter-cyclical payments.  A host of 
indirect support mechanisms, such as crop insurance premium subsidies, export credit 
guarantees, and ad hoc emergency assistance, further increase the level of income support 
received by domestic producers.     
Considering their magnitude and variety, it is not surprising that agricultural 
subsidies tend to create a number of perverse incentives.  The worst offenders are those 
payment programs that are “coupled;” i.e. the amount of payments received by a 
producer depends on the production of a specific commodity.  Currently, marketing 
assistance loans and crop-specific payments (for peanuts, dairy, cotton, sugar, and 
tobacco) are examples of coupled policy mechanisms.  Such subsidies alter the relative 
return to program commodities, skewing agricultural production patterns towards those 
outputs.  In so doing, these mechanisms may generate a number of undesirable outcomes.  
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For example, by influencing aggregate commodity production, coupled subsidies may 
subvert their own ability to support producer income by causing an endogenous decline 
in commodity prices.  In addition, subsidies that significantly impact production levels 
may fall outside of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) “green box” and be subject to 
international sanction (Adams et al., 2001).   
Over the last two decades, in response to the problems generated by coupled 
support payments, there has been a movement towards “decoupling” subsidy programs.  
Decoupling removes the linkage between payments received and the production of a 
specific commodity.  Examples include fixed direct and counter-cyclical payments.  
Theoretically, these subsidies should have no impact on the relative return to program 
crops.  However, they may indirectly affect production decisions by creating wealth 
and/or insurance effects (Westcott, Young, and Price, 2002; Young and Westcott, 2000; 
Hennessy, 1998).  The former occur when payments augment farmer wealth, encouraging 
increased investment.1  The consequence of the wealth effect is an increase in aggregate 
production.  The insurance effect arises when subsidy payments alter the relative risk 
associated with program commodities.  Policies that reduce the revenue variability of 
specific crops will skew production towards those crops if producers are risk-averse 
(Hennessy, 1998).2  However, these effects are expected to have a relatively minor 
impact on aggregate production practices, and thus avoid the price endogeneity and trade 
problems created by their coupled counterparts. 
                                                 
1 The increase in investment may come about through reduced credit constraints, i.e. if lenders are more 
willing to finance, or offer lower interest rates to, farmers with a guaranteed higher income.  Alternatively, 
an increase in liquidity may lower the effective cost of capital and increase investment. 
2 Crop insurance premium subsidies, considered coupled, also impact producers’ perception of risk.  
Because insurance subsidies are generally positively correlated with risk, they tend to encourage the 
production of riskier crops in relatively risky production regions. 
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Although decoupling can eliminate some of the negative side effects associated 
with commodity-based subsidies, it does little to address the environmental impacts of 
commodity production.  Whether coupled or decoupled, agricultural subsidies tend to 
contribute to environmental degradation by encouraging the extensification and/or 
intensification of production systems.  Extensification refers to the expansion of 
production onto marginal land.  Intensification involves activities designed to increase the 
yield of a given parcel of land.  These generally include the use of high-yield crop 
varieties, the application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and increased irrigation 
and mechanization.  The potential negative impacts of intensification and extensification 
are many: they may increase soil erosion, reduce soil fertility and biodiversity, contribute 
to the pollution and eutrophication of ground and surface water supplies, and impact 
climatic trends. 
Since the 1930s, agri-environmental policy instruments have been employed to 
encourage the use of less environmentally degrading agricultural production practices.  
Prior to 1990 these programs focused on soil conservation to enhance productivity.  
However, with the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bills, the scope of agri-environmental policy 
expanded to include improvements in water quality, air quality, and wildlife habitat 
(Claassen et al., 2001).  These programs have focused almost exclusively on attaining 
environmental improvements through land retirement (Claassen, 2003).  As of January 
2003, the largest land retirement initiative, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), 
enrolled nearly 34 million acres of cropland nationwide, with payments of over one and a 
half billion dollars.   
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Recently, however, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 
“2002 Farm Act”) shifted the focus of conservation spending away from land retirement 
programs and into policies targeted towards working lands.  The 2002 Farm Act 
introduced the Conservation Security Program (CSP), which fully finances the adoption 
and maintenance of approved management practices.  These practices include nutrient 
management, integrated pest management, crop residue management, and changes in 
cropping rotations.  Although the CSP was enacted, it has yet to be implemented on a 
large scale because of budgetary concerns. 
There are several factors driving the shift in conservation spending.  First, by 
targeting a much greater land area, working land programs may be able to attain greater 
environmental improvements than land retirement programs.  Second, working land 
provisions may be more cost-effective than land retirement.  Specifically, because 
agricultural commodity production continues, the opportunity cost of providing 
conservation benefits on working land is lower than that of removing land from 
production entirely (Feng et al., 2004) 3.   Finally, depending on how they are 
administered, working land programs may be able to provide conservation benefits and 
support producer income without influencing aggregate commodity production.  This 
offers the advantage that producer support may be provided without violating WTO 
specifications.  The possibility that environmental benefits can be provided on working 
lands provides the motivation behind this analysis.     
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The authors note that the relative cost-effectiveness of working land programs may be an empirical 
matter: it may depend on the conservation practices adopted, land characteristics, and the details of 
implementation. 
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1.1.  The Study Area 
 
Nationally, producers specializing in oilseeds and grains receive over half of all 
direct government payments (Economic Research Service [ERS], “Briefing Room”).  
Iowa, the dominant producer and exporter of soybeans and feed corn in the U.S., is also 
one of the foremost recipients of Federal support payments.  In 2003, the state of Iowa 
collected over one billion dollars in Farm Service Agency payments, second only to 
Texas.  Data from the 2002 Census of Agriculture illustrate the dominance of these 
program crops on the landscape: over 92 percent of harvested cropland statewide is 
planted to grain corn and soybeans.   
The land use pattern in Crawford and Shelby counties is no exception, with over 
95 percent of arable land used to cultivate corn and soybeans.  However, these two 
counties are located in western Iowa, a region characterized by heterogeneous terrain and 
loess-derived soils.  The combination of loess soils and highly variable terrain increases 
the potential for soil erosion and nutrient runoff.  Producing row crops, which generally 
involves tilling, reduced vegetative cover, and increased chemical inputs, further 
exacerbates rates of environmental damage.  The consequences of intensive row crop 
production on this landscape include productivity losses from topsoil erosion, as well as 
the degradation of water supplies from increased sedimentation and nutrient 
contamination. 
The juxtaposition of a heavily subsidized homogeneous production pattern on 
such environmentally sensitive land offers a unique case study opportunity.  On the 
Crawford and Shelby county landscape, slight changes in regional production practices 
may yield significant environmental benefits.  For example, there are a number of 
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potential environmental benefits to incorporating legume forage crops into a corn-
soybean rotation (ERS, 2000).  Legumes provide weed control and increased nitrogen 
fixation, reducing the need for commercial pesticides and fertilizers.  In addition, the use 
of legumes or other small grains establishes vegetative cover and reduces the amount of 
tilling required over the length of the rotation.  The inclusion of legumes can therefore 
reduce average rates of soil erosion and nutrient runoff/leaching.   
Despite the environmental benefits associated with extending crop rotations, 
doing so is not economically rewarding under current conditions.  The basic economic 
problem arises from the fact that environmental goods and services are non-market 
commodities.  As such, their social value is not explicitly determined on the market and 
is therefore not reflected in producer land management decisions.  This type of market 
failure is often used to justify public policy intervention.  The general objective of current 
agri-environmental policy instruments, including the CSP, is to provide an incentive for 
individual producers to internalize the social value of environmental conservation.  This 
thesis assesses the economic and environmental impacts of conservation programs for 
agricultural working land. 
 
1.2.  Study Objectives and Approach 
 
This study empirically analyzes the tradeoff between social welfare, in the form 
of reduced environmental degradation, and private producer welfare, derived from 
commodity production.  The basic question addressed is whether, and to what extent, 
public policy can be used to address the dual objectives of providing environmental 
benefits and supporting producer welfare. There are three specific policy-driven 
objectives, as follows: 
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 1. To identify the economic factors that influence landscape-level 
agricultural production patterns in the study area.   
2. To evaluate the tradeoff between economic and environmental policy 
objectives. 
3. To determine the relative efficiency with which various public policy 
instruments attain environmental goals.  
 
Within the context of Crawford and Shelby counties, commodity production and 
environmental benefits jointly depend upon the spatial location of land management 
practices.  The approach taken to address the above objectives is to build a land use 
allocation model.  While this approach is an established method of addressing these types 
of questions, the model developed in this analysis differs from those used in previous 
empirical studies.  
While previous land use analyses have focused on modeling either land use or 
livestock activities, this analysis incorporates both.  Crop and livestock outputs, feed and 
manure nutrients, can be allocated in one of two ways: they can be used as intermediate 
inputs into livestock and crop production, respectively, or they can be sold on the market 
(crops) or disposed of with no nutrient redemption (manure).  By including both 
activities, the model is given the flexibility to choose the optimal degree of separability 
between the two activities.  A completely separable, or nonintegrated system, is one in 
which all crops are sold on the market and all feed and nutrient inputs are purchased.  
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Nonseparability, or full integration, implies that all feed and nutrients necessary for 
livestock and crop production are directly exchanged on-farm or between producers. 
A second advantage to the model used here is that the production of 
environmental goods and services is incorporated as an endogenous variable in the 
producer choice set.  Specifically, the spatial allocation of land use activities determines 
economic and environmental outcomes via a yield loss and soil erosion functions.  While 
the biophysical component of this model is not as sophisticated as many of the ecosystem 
models available today, this analysis marks a preliminary step towards building an 
integrated model with a common set of exogenous and endogenous variables for the 
system’s environmental and economic components.  The land use allocation model 
therefore has several methodological advantages that improve its ability to accurately 
predict the impact of hypothetical policy instruments on land use patterns.   
 
1.3.  Thesis Organization 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  Chapter two reviews the literature 
relevant to the development of this analysis.  Chapter three outlines the conceptual 
framework underlying the spatial land allocation model and presents a mathematical 
description of the model’s structure.  The fourth chapter describes, in detail, the technical 
coefficients used to parameterize the model.  The fifth and sixth chapters jointly present 
and discuss the policy analysis results.  Chapter 5 describes the baseline model solution 
and conducts a series of sensitivity analyses used to assess objective (1).  Chapter 6 
analyzes the policy simulations used to address objectives (2) and (3).  The concluding 
chapter draws general policy implications from the analysis, discusses the model’s 
analytical weaknesses, and suggests directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 It has long been recognized that agricultural systems produce both commodity 
outputs and an array of non-commodity goods and services.  The term 
“multifunctionality” captures the intuition that “an activity can have multiple outputs and 
therefore may contribute to several objectives at once” (Abler, 2004, p. 8).  Agriculture’s 
non-commodity outputs are varied, including, among others, open space amenities, 
preservation of rural traditions, and the degradation of environmental goods and services.  
The focus of this analysis is on the latter, with particular attention to the water 
contamination and soil erosion that occur with the production of agricultural 
commodities.   
Before proceeding, it is useful to define the phrase “ecosystem services.”  The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defines an ecosystem as “a dynamic complex of 
plant, animal, and microorganism communities and the nonliving environment interacting 
as a functional unit” (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment [MEA], 2003).  Broadly, 
ecosystem services are the flow of benefits that people derive from various ecosystems.  
These services can be classified according to the type of benefit they provide, including 
provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting services.  Provisioning services refer to 
the final goods produced by ecosystems and include agriculture’s commodity outputs.  
Examples of regulating services are flood control, climate regulation, and water 
purification.  Cultural services are the “nonmaterial” benefits obtained from ecosystems, 
such as recreation and ecotourism, spiritual and religious benefits, and cultural heritage 
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(Ibid.).  Ecosystem supporting services include those services that can be thought of as 
intermediate goods in the production of provisioning, regulating, and cultural services.  
Examples include soil formation and nutrient cycling.   
The majority, if not all, of the supporting ecosystem services associated with 
agricultural commodity production are non-market commodities.  Because the market 
fails to price these services, their value is not fully reflected in producer land use and 
management decisions.  This type of market failure is frequently invoked as a 
justification for public policy intervention.  Theoretically, to correct the resource 
allocation distortion, “one need only place explicit values on the non-commodity outputs 
so that farmers are…penalized for producing those that impose social costs” (Peterson, 
Boisvert, and de Gorter, 2002, p. 426).  Doing so forces producers to internalize the 
social costs of producing externalities.  If all non-market outputs were valued, the end 
result would be a pattern of production that maximizes social welfare.  This theoretical 
solution assumes that non-commodity services are observable and that their value can be 
estimated, assumptions that may not hold in practice.  However, the above argument 
provides the theoretical foundation for exploring public policy as a means of altering 
agricultural production practices to improve social welfare. 
 
2.1.  Multifunctionality and Product Jointness 
The degree of jointness between the production of agricultural commodities and 
negative externalities has implications for the design of public policy to correct the 
aforementioned market failure.  Jointness in production can arise from technical 
interdependencies and/or economic linkages.  A technical linkage is one that arises from 
“inherent features of the production process governed by biological, chemical, and 
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physical relationships” (Abler, 2004, p. 10).  Economic linkages are generated by non-
allocable, allocable fixed, or allocable quasi-fixed inputs.  Non-allocable inputs are those 
that produce more than one output but the contribution to each output cannot be 
discerned.  Allocable fixed factors are those for which “outputs are produced in separate 
processes and inputs can be allocated across the processes, but they compete for inputs 
that are fixed at the firm level (e.g. producing several crops on a fixed land base)” 
(Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter, 2002, p. 425).4  If the production of non-commodity 
outputs differs by commodity, the allocation of these inputs to different commodities can 
be varied in such a way as to encourage the provision of specific non-commodity outputs.  
According to Abler, the negative externalities associated with agricultural 
production are best characterized by a technical relationship: “Problems such as soil 
erosion, nutrient runoff and leaching, and methane from livestock manure are all 
governed by biophysical processes, although they can be mitigated using alternative 
production or abatement technologies” (2004, p. 10).  However, there may also be 
economic linkages between the production of commodities and externalities.  For 
example, non-allocable polluting inputs, such as pesticides or fertilizers, contribute 
simultaneously to commodity production and environmental degradation, although it is 
difficult to determine their contribution to each.  Regardless of the source, “the fact that 
farmers currently produce these commodity and non-commodity outputs jointly even 
though they receive an effective price of zero for the public outputs is strong evidence of 
joint technology” (Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter, 2002, p. 426).   
                                                 
4 Allocable quasi-fixed inputs are similar to allocable fixed, except that their supply is not perfectly 
inelastic, i.e. they have an upward-sloping supply curve. 
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Randall (2002) examines two extreme cases of joint production: one in which 
multifunctional outputs are strictly separable in production, and one in which they are 
produced in fixed proportions.5  In the former case, there is no justification for targeting 
the production of multifunctional outputs through commodity policies; the equilibrium 
prices and quantities of commodity and non-commodity outputs are best set 
independently.  In contrast, when the outputs are produced in fixed proportions, 
purchasing solely the commodity output(s) at a price that incorporates the value of the 
corresponding non-commodity products can maximize social welfare.  In reality, the 
relationship between agricultural outputs is likely to lie on the continuum between these 
two bounds.  The primary implication of production jointness is that it creates 
“economies of scope”, i.e. producing the outputs separately is more costly than producing 
them together (Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter, 2002, p. 425).  Therefore, it may be 
more efficient to use agricultural policies to reduce environmental degradation than to 
address economic and environmental objectives with separate instruments. 
 
2.2.  Modeling Implications of Multifunctionality 
 
 Despite the recognition that agriculture’s economic (commodity) and ecological 
components are related, it is extremely difficult to characterize the linkages between the 
two.  Specifically, agricultural/ecological systems are often context-specific, complex, 
possess a vast number of interconnected components, and may be subject to nonlinear 
behavior (Arrow et al., 2000; Antle and Capalbo, 2002). 6  For these reasons, Antle and 
                                                 
5 Both of the cases discussed here also assume a closed economy.  For a discussion of the outcome in an 
open economy, see Randall, 2002, pp. 291-2. 
6 A system is defined as “a set of interrelated processes, such as crop growth and economic decision 
making” (Antle and Capalbo, 2002, p. 5).  A complex system is one in which behavior is dictated by the 
interactions of two or more subsystems.   
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7Capalbo argue that it is essential to view agriculture as a managed ecosystem.   Doing so 
will increase the efficiency with which agricultural outputs, both commodity and non-
commodity, are provided by “full[y] accounting for all of the inputs and outputs of the 
system over the relevant dimensions of time and space” (Antle and Capalbo, 2002, pp. 
11-12).  Moreover, accurately specifying the relationships between agricultural economic 
and ecological inputs and outputs improves the ability of a model to accurately predict 
system behavior, especially outside of the range of observation.  
Broadly speaking, there are two methods of modeling an agroecosystem: an 
integrated or a “coupled” approach.8  An integrated model employs a common set of 
exogenous and endogenous variables for the system’s biophysical and economic 
components.  Antle and Capalbo argue that integrated models are preferable to coupled 
systems because they are able to represent agriculture “as a complex, dynamic system 
with spatially varying inputs and outputs which are the result of interrelated physical and 
biological processes and human decision-making processes” (Antle and Capalbo, 2002, 
p. 5).  Integrated models are advantageous insofar as they incorporate dynamic feedback 
processes and nonlinearities, as well as considering spatial scale.  However, their greater 
predictive ability is likely to come at a much higher cost in terms of data collection. 
Coupled models are those in which the biophysical and economic components of 
the system are modeled independently.  They can be classified according to the degree of 
integration between interdisciplinary models.  A “loosely coupled” model is one in which 
the endogenous outputs of one disciplinary model are used as an exogenous input into 
                                                 
7 A managed ecosystem and a natural system differ in that the latter may be affected by human activity, but 
the former are purposefully manipulated.   
8 The use of the term “coupled” with respect to modeling differs from the earlier use of “coupled” 
pertaining to income support payments.  
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another.  Therefore, each model has its own distinct set of driving factors.  This approach 
is used in the majority of the empirical literature to date.  For example, in their analysis of 
the upper-Mississippi river basin, Wu et al. (2004) simulate producer decisions to adopt a 
longer-term crop rotation or no-till management practices.  The output of the economic 
decision-making model is then used to simulate the environmental impacts using a 
separate model, the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC).   
In contrast, a “closely coupled” model contains a subset of driving factors that 
link the system’s economic and environmental components.  A coupled framework 
therefore attempts to more accurately represent the linkages between economic and 
environmental phenomena.  Although closely coupling marks a step towards integrating 
disciplinary components, it suffers from several key disadvantages relative to an 
integrated model.  By imposing an artificial separation between systems, a coupled model 
may be driven by the design of the framework rather than the true underlying processes.  
Specifically, by failing to describe all of the linkages between economic and 
environmental processes, a coupled model may “impose arbitrary constraints on the 
dynamic properties of the system” (Antle and Capalbo, 2002, p. 7).  Thus, separately 
modeling interdisciplinary components that are integrated in reality limits the predictive 
accuracy of coupled frameworks.   
The modeling approach used in this analysis is of the closely coupled type.  
Specifically, economic land use decisions are linked to biophysical aspects, such as soil 
erosion and nitrogen absorption, through their spatial allocation on heterogeneous terrain.  
Both economic and environmental outputs of the system are therefore determined by the 
producer’s endogenous choice of land management practices.  This approach does not 
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reflect the complexity of the interaction between production practices and ecological 
phenomena that may be represented in an integrated approach.  However, it marks an 
improvement over a loosely coupled modeling framework.    
Despite the difficulty associated with precisely describing the relationship 
between economic and ecological systems, the mere existence of interdependence 
between the two systems has important policy implications.  Jointness in the production 
of agricultural commodities and ecological services implies that a policy that alters 
commodity production is not environmentally neutral.  The next section discusses the 
possibility of addressing economic and environmental concerns with a single policy 
instrument, as well as the issues surrounding the design and implementation of such a 
policy. 
 
2.3.  Green Payments 
 
In practice, green payments are one mechanism proposed to alter agricultural 
producers’ incentives to reflect the value of non-commodity outputs in production 
decisions.  A payment is considered “green” if it is applied based on actions considered to 
improve environmental outcomes.9  Although these payments are based on 
environmental criteria, they can be used to target multiple policy goals.  Specifically, 
“they have the potential to provide environmental benefits as well as an alternative source 
of producer income relative to traditional commodity programs” (Horan, Shortle, and 
Abler, 1999, p. 2).  A green payment program designed to address both objectives will 
therefore combine the goals of traditional commodity-based income supports and a pure 
                                                 
9 Lynch and Smith (1994) make a distinction between  “green support programs” and “green payment 
programs.”  A green support program is defined as one that provides environmental benefits while 
supporting producer income.  A green payment program makes no explicit provisions for financial support.  
Here, the term “green payments” is used synonymously with “green support programs.” 
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environmental improvement policy.  Because there exists jointness in the production of 
agricultural commodities and negative externalities, it is plausible that a single green 
payment instrument may more efficiently achieve both farm income and environmental 
quality targets. 
  There are several issues that complicate the design of a program of green 
payments.  Among these are the problems associated with addressing nonpoint source 
pollution.  Because there are multiple, heterogeneous contributors to the pollution 
problem, and because there is a stochastic element to natural systems, it is difficult to 
observe and measure the environmental impacts associated with an individual’s specific 
actions.  As a result, “relationships among management practices on specific farms, 
effects on environmental services, and benefits derived from these services are often 
complex and not completely understood” (Claassen and Horan, 2000, p. 15).  This 
complicates the monitoring of environmental performance and the targeting of payments 
to reflect each producer’s marginal contribution to damages.  
Equity concerns also complicate the design of green payment mechanism.  For 
example, a potential complication arises if the distribution of current income support 
payments does not coincide geographically with the distribution of the most 
environmentally sensitive land.  In this situation, a policy that places a relatively heavier 
weight on income support objectives will tend to reinforce the current income 
distribution, whereas policy weighted towards environmental objectives may alter the 
current distribution of payments.10  Therefore, “such dually targeted programs…beg the 
                                                 
10 In addition to the geographical issues discussed here, Claassen et al. (2001) point out that less than half 
of total rainfall erosion, wind erosion, and nitrogen runoff occur on small or moderately unprofitable farms, 
which suggests that targeting payments based on financial criteria may not be the most efficient means of 
ensuring environmental improvements. 
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question of how farm income support would be achieved on farms or in areas that do not 
present high potential for environmental improvement” (Lynch and Smith, 1994, p. 9).  
Moreover, the payment distribution may also depend on the environmental objective 
emphasized: payments to improve water quality would be concentrated in the eastern 
U.S., while payments to reduce wind erosion would be distributed across the Plains states 
(Batie, 1999).   
 Based on an analysis of current agri-environmental policy instruments, Claassen 
et al. identify a number of factors that are expected to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of green payments in practice.  Coordination across farm programs is 
necessary to minimize incidences of duplication and/or contradiction in incentives.  They 
recommend that attention be paid to the tendency for subsidy programs to create a 
perverse incentive to expand crop production, negating the environmental benefits of 
agri-environmental payments.  In addition, spatial targeting to ensure that payments 
reflect contextual heterogeneity is crucial in ensuring that payments are cost-effective in 
attaining environmental improvements.  The following section discusses a number of 
empirical studies that examine the implementation of green payments and their ability to 
provide environmental benefits while sustaining producer welfare. 
 
2.4.  Empirical Analyses of Green Payments 
 
 To begin, two studies that assess the tradeoffs between economic and 
environmental objectives are discussed.  The section proceeds from there with an outline 
of the empirical literature that analyzes the effect of green payments on that tradeoff.  
These studies can be divided into three sub-groups based on their focus.  The first group 
includes analyses of subsidy payments that target land use change directly.  The second 
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sub-group simulates the environmental and economic impacts of green payments based 
on management practices, such as the adoption of no-till technology or long-term crop 
rotations.  The final class of analyses confronts issues surrounding the current system of 
commodity-based income support payments in the United States.  More specifically, 
these studies analyze the impact of government payments on the return to cropland, the 
effect of eliminating current subsidy payments on aggregate land use patterns, and the 
transfer of current support payments into a program of green subsidies.   
  
2.4.1.  Economic and Environmental Tradeoffs 
  
 Both Segarra et al. (2003) and Coiner, Wu, and Polasky (2001) examine the 
extent to which improving environmental quality involves a tradeoff with social welfare.  
The former formulates a non-linear programming model of Ecuadorian agriculture to 
maximize social welfare subject to a reduction in pesticide applications.11  The authors 
conclude that the extent to which welfare and environmental objectives are 
complementary depends on whether a change in production generates endogenous price 
effects.  Specifically, they find that reducing pesticide loads has no effect on the surplus 
generated by those crops for which Ecuador is a small producer in the international 
market.  In contrast, in the case of bananas, for which Ecuador is a large producer, a 30 
percent reduction in the degradation caused by pesticides causes producer surplus and the 
consumer surplus from all crops to fall by 7.9 and 19.5 percent, respectively, due to an 
increase in the price of bananas (Segarra et al., 2003).  Therefore, the extent to which 
                                                 
11 The authors construct a degradation of the environment index (DEI) associated with current production, 
from which six scenarios of decreased degradation are derived.  The DEI is constructed from an estimation 
of the Environmental Impact Quotient, which takes into account the short and long-term impacts of 
pesticide use on humans, aquatic, avian, and insect life, ground water, and soil. 
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environmental and economic objectives are complements or substitutes may depend on 
assumptions regarding price endogeneity. 
 Coiner, Wu, and Polasky (2001) likewise focus on the tradeoffs between 
economic and environmental objectives, but limit the scope of their analysis to a single 
watershed.  Commodity prices are therefore assumed exogenous.  The study compares 
total returns to agricultural land and four environmental indicators (nitrate 
runoff/leaching, and wind/water erosion) across several land use scenarios.  The 
scenarios emphasize distinct economic and environmental objectives, namely increased 
producer profitability, water quality improvements, and the maintenance and restoration 
of biodiversity.  Holding commodity prices constant, the two environmentally focused 
land use scenarios generated a decline in the total return to land of 24 and 5.5 percent, 
respectively.12  This result illustrates that some environmental objectives may be 
obtained at less cost to producers than others.  Moreover, they find that no one scenario 
results in an improvement in all four environmental indicators, indicating that there may 
be tradeoffs between addressing differing environmental objectives.  These two analyses 
highlight the importance of considering price endogeneity and multiple environmental 
impacts in an analysis of the tradeoff between economic and environmental objectives.  
  
 2.4.2.  Green Payment Simulations 
  This section is divided into three subsections based on the analytical focus.  The 
first section examines the use of green policy for agricultural land retirement.  The 
second looks at analyses of policy instruments that target environmental improvements 
on working lands.  The final sub-section includes studies that analyze the impact of 
                                                 
12 The latter estimate is sensitive to the assumptions made about the price of seed inputs into one of the crop 
rotations considered, and may be as low as 1.7 percent. 
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current commodity payments on agricultural production, and their interaction with green 
payment mechanisms.   
   
  2.4.2.1.  Green Payments for Land Use Change 
 
 Each of the analyses in this sub-section analyzes the effect of green payments on 
agricultural land use decisions, while setting aside concerns about social welfare.  
Plantinga and Wu (2003) consider a uniform subsidy to convert agricultural land in 
southeastern Wisconsin to forest, in order to develop carbon sinks.  They calculate the 
subsidy value necessary to achieve various levels of land use change, i.e. 5 to 25 percent 
of baseline agricultural land.  By combining an econometric model of producer land use 
choices with environmental survey data, the authors are able to predict the location of 
converted parcels, and estimate the corresponding changes in several environmental 
indicators.13  They then apply benefits estimates from previous studies to assign a 
monetary value to each of the ecosystem goods provided.  Assuming exogenous 
commodity prices, and accounting for a number of the environmental benefits obtained 
from an increase in forestland, the benefits of a carbon sequestration program are 
expected to exceed the costs.14  This analysis highlights the importance of considering all 
impacts when evaluating a program of green payments. 
 Claassen and Tegene (1999) emphasize the role of adjustment costs and rigidities in 
agricultural land use change in response to green payments.  Specifically, “agricultural 
assets, such as land, [may] become ‘fixed’ to a specific sector, resulting in chronic 
overproduction” (Claassen and Tegene, 1999, p. 26).  To test this hypothesis, they 
                                                 
13 Including carbon sequestered, soil erosion, and nitrogen and atrazine pollution. 
14 Endogenous price changes will increase the opportunity cost associated with taking agricultural land out 
of production, necessitating an increase in the subsidy rate to convert the same amount of land to forest.   
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examine the probability of conversion from cropland to pasture and from cropland to 
CRP in Iowa between 1980 and 1987.  They find that land conversion probabilities 
depend on the relative returns to each land use and on land quality.  Specifically, 
landowners are less likely to convert land from cropland to pasture than vice versa, as 
land quality increases.  The authors find evidence that the CRP successfully encouraged 
the conversion of eligible cropland beyond that which would have been converted to 
pasture in the absence of the program.  These results once again emphasize the 
inelasticity of agricultural land, and the corresponding difficulty of achieving 
environmental benefits through land use change.   
 
  2.4.2.2.  Green Payments for Management Practices 
 Zhang, Horan, and Claassen (2003) assess the effect of implementing policy 
instruments designed to reduce nitrogen loading across the “Heartland” production 
region.15  The two subsidy instruments examined are a payment based on reductions in 
estimated runoff and a nutrient management subsidy based on reduced nutrient use.  In 
each case, a targeted and non-targeted approach to administering the payment is 
simulated.  Non-targeted subsidies are those that are applied uniformly, while targeted 
subsidies are administered to reflect heterogeneity in marginal environmental damages 
across producers.  The authors find that, targeting aside, payments based on reductions in 
estimated runoff are more efficient in attaining a given standard than those based on land 
management practices.  Specifically, “altering nitrogen use is by far the most efficient 
approach for reducing nutrient loads, whereas altering land use to confront the problem 
would be a comparatively costly measure” (Zhang, Horan, and Claassen, 2003, p. 9).  
                                                 
15 The “Heartland” consists of Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, large portions of Missouri, Minnesota, and Ohio, and 
small portions of Kentucky, Nebraska, and South Dakota (Zhang, Horan, and Claasen, 2003). 
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However, in either case, the targeted instrument is more efficient than the non-targeted 
version. 
 Because the subsidies are administered regionally, the authors also analyze the 
impact of price endogeneity on producer welfare.  Without accounting for the social 
welfare gain from environmental improvements, they conclude that producers, as a 
whole, gain at the expense of consumers when commodity prices are variable.  This 
transfer occurs because producers who undertake abatement measures reduce their 
commodity output, generating an increase in price.  That price increase benefits those 
producers who have not undertaken the same degree of abatement.  The authors explain 
that the endogenous price increase necessitates an increase in the subsidy rate to 
overcome the initial output and price effects.  While the subsidy benefits producers as a 
whole, some clearly gain at the expense of others.  This result indicates that equity could 
be an important concern when choosing from various policy instruments to attain the 
same environmental end.  
 Green payments in the form of cost-share subsidies are often employed to 
encourage the use of “complementary technologies,” defined as those that improve the 
effectiveness of input use, thereby providing both economic and environmental benefits.  
Khanna, Isik, and Zilberman (2002) examine the social welfare effect of cost-share 
and/or input reduction subsidies applied to the control of irrigation drainage from cotton 
production in the San Joaquin Valley.  A nonlinear programming model is used to solve 
for the levels of policy variables, optimal input use, and adoption decisions for individual 
producers that maximize gross social welfare while constraining aggregate pollution.  
The results suggest that the efficiency with which green payments achieve a given level 
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of abatement depends on whether they are restricted to current producers.  When a 
subsidy payment is not restricted to current producers, it may augment producer 
profitability, which, in a competitive industry, induces firm entry.  As a result, when an 
unrestricted cost-share subsidy is administered, all available marginal land is optimally 
pulled into production.  An unrestricted subsidy is the most costly in terms of social 
welfare, but generates a significant transfer to private producers.  They conclude that, 
“programs that have small entry effects and achieve abatement primarily by subsidizing a 
reduction in input use have much smaller effects on aggregate farm income levels” 
(Khanna, Isik, and Zilberman, 2002, p. 170).  In addition to emphasizing the importance 
of restricting the subsidy base, this study lends further support to the finding that policies 
that target the use of productive inputs are more efficient than those that target land use 
activities directly. 
 Within the context of the upper-Mississippi River basin, Wu et al. (2004) examine 
green payments to reduce agricultural runoff into the Gulf of Mexico.  Micro-level data is 
employed to determine each farmer’s choice of crop and tillage practices in response to 
payments that decrease the costs of adopting conservation tillage or increase the expected 
profit from a more diversified crop rotation.  The estimated acreage response under 
varying levels of payments for these two practices is highly inelastic.  Also, while the two 
payment mechanisms differentially impact environmental indicators, neither generates a 
significant decrease in overall runoff and leaching.16  This result may be attributed to the 
limited number of crop choices in the region and to the relatively small improvement in 
nitrogen leaching and runoff resulting from the adoption of the management practices 
considered.  The authors conclude that the marginal cost curves associated with reducing 
                                                 
16 The environmental indicators considered are nitrogen leaching and runoff and wind and water erosion. 
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nitrogen runoff and leaching through changes in management practices are nearly 
vertical.  In the upper Mississippi river basin, this implies that improving water quality 
using incentives for management practices may be ineffective. 
 The results across these three studies indicate that changes in land use practices 
may not be the most effective means of encouraging an improvement in environmental 
outcomes.  The technical and economic interdependencies in the production of non-
commodity and commodity outputs, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, do 
not necessarily imply that the commodities and non-commodity outputs are joint with 
each other. 
Econometric evidence indicates that the elasticity of supply of land to agriculture 
as a whole is very low, and elasticities of supply to individual crops and livestock 
products are also very low.  At the same time, elasticities of substitution between 
land and purchased inputs, particularly fertilizer, are relatively high.  The result is 
that changes in agricultural output are accomplished primarily through changes in 
purchased inputs rather than changes in land. (Abler, 2004, p. 11) 
 
However, even among those policies that target inputs, rather than land management 
practices (e.g. a runoff reduction policy [Zhang, Horan, and Claassen, 2003] or an input 
reduction subsidy [Khanna, Isik, and Zilberman, 2002]), the form of the policy 
instrument matters.  The studies in this section indicate that targeting to reflect producers’ 
heterogeneous contributions to environmental degradation and restricting the subsidy 
base are likely to improve the efficiency of a green payment instrument.   
  
  2.4.2.3.  Current Income Support and Green Payments 
 All of the studies discussed hence hold current government payments constant 
while simulating the impact of green payments on agricultural production patterns.  If 
current income support mechanisms reward relatively more environmentally degrading 
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production practices, it may be possible to shift production out of those activities simply 
by eliminating current subsidy payments.  Gray et al. (2004) test whether current 
government payment instruments impact the returns to farmland by increasing the 
expected return to, or by altering the risk associated with, agricultural production.  Using 
a stochastic budgeting model, they simulate the impact of subsidy payments with and 
without crop revenue insurance.  While the impacts differ across types of subsidies, they 
find that, in total, agricultural subsidies increase the mean return to land from $80.50 per 
acre to $135.58 with crop insurance, or $136.69 without insurance.  In addition, they 
show that agricultural subsidies substantially reduce the variance and skewness of the 
distribution of returns to land, reducing the overall risk associated with the production of 
program commodities.   
 Plantinga (1996) examines the effect of reducing current price support levels on 
agricultural land use and environmental quality.  Because higher commodity output 
prices generate an incentive to utilize marginal land for agricultural production, price 
supports may encourage an increased rate of environmental damage.  Therefore, 
“agricultural policy reforms may yield a significant environmental dividend, particularly 
in the case of policies which encourage the expansion of agricultural acreage” (Plantinga, 
1996, p. 1082).  Using a dynamic programming model of 14 counties in southwestern 
Wisconsin, the author simulates the impact of policy changes on the land use choice 
between crop production and forestry.  The results indicate that an increase in the timber 
to milk price ratio yields a nearly identical percentage increase in forest area.  That 
increased acreage consists primarily of land with lower soil quality.  The land use change 
therefore yields substantial environmental benefits.  The analysis suggests that a 
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reduction in current subsidies could more efficiently attain the environmental objectives 
of land retirement programs.   
 Both Gray et al. (1994) and Plantinga (1996) find that removing current subsidy 
payments reduces the return to cropland, which may induce land conversion and 
environmental benefits.  It follows that these subsidy payments may be retargeted to 
provide even greater environmental benefits while supporting producer income.  
Callaway and McCarl (1996) assess the environmental and welfare impacts associated 
with shifting current government payments into a subsidy for carbon sequestration.  To 
do so, they use the Agricultural Sector Model (ASM), a national non-linear mathematical 
programming model that accounts for price endogeneity.  Holding constant current 
government payment programs and without accounting for the social benefits of carbon 
sequestration, they find that any level of carbon sequestration is associated with a loss in 
net social benefits.  However, this result is not disaggregated to determine the impact on 
consumers and producers. 
 The authors approach the subsidy transfer analysis from both a Marshallian and a 
Hicksian perspective.  In the former, government payments are held constant while net 
welfare is allowed to fluctuate.  The latter analysis permits government payments to 
adjust while holding total welfare constant.  Under the Marshallian approach, they find 
that shifting about 30 percent of government expenditures into carbon payments results in 
carbon sequestration of 133 million tons per year, at a cost of $1.6 billion in social 
welfare.  In the Hicksian analysis, if all farm program payments are shifted into payments 
for carbon sequestration, welfare could be maintained for $6.2 billion less than current 
federal expenditures, with total carbon sequestration of 115 million tons per year.  
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Because it is difficult to assign a value to carbon sequestration it is not possible to 
compare the costs and benefits under these two payment transfer scenarios.  While the 
authors do not proffer any conclusions about the efficiency of subsidy shifting, the study 
establishes an empirical precedent for examining the welfare and environmental impacts 
of transforming current subsidies into a program of green payments. 
 
2.5.  Implications for the Current Study 
 The theoretical discussion in the first section of this chapter provides the 
conceptual framework for exploring the use of public policy to encourage the production 
of agriculture’s multifunctional outputs.  Abler notes that,  
In any analysis of agricultural/environmental policy and multifunctionality, it is 
essential to consider not only public goods and beneficial externalities associated 
with agriculture but also negative externalities.  Failure to consider both positive 
and negative external effects can lead to erroneous policy conclusions.  (2004, p. 
10)  
 
To correct the resource distortion generated by the production of public goods and 
negative externalities, it is necessary to identify and assign a value to all of the non-
commodity outputs of agricultural production.  However, fully assessing the social cost 
of agricultural production is a formidable task and is outside of the scope of this analysis.  
This study focuses on evaluating policy mechanisms to address two specific negative 
externalities, excess fertilizer applications and the production of soil erosion.  Both of 
these practices contribute to significant water quality problems and have attracted 
increasing attention from Iowa policymakers.17  This thesis analysis is not an assessment 
                                                 
17 Currently, excess nitrogen applications are regulated by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources.  A 
new regulatory instrument, based on the Phosphorous Index (P-Index), is also being considered by the 
state.  The P-Index is designed to limit phosphorous applications in excess of crop needs, and to limit soil 
erosion production, on lands that are ranked as contributing significantly to water contamination. 
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of public policy to encourage multifunctionality.  Rather, it addresses one component of 
the larger issue. 
 The empirical analyses discussed in this chapter highlight a number of important 
issues relevant in the development of this thesis analysis.  First, they point out the 
inelasticity of the supply of agricultural land, crops, and livestock products.  In terms of 
public policy, this result implies that instruments that target productive inputs are likely 
to be more efficient in encouraging reduced environmental degradation than those that 
attempt to influence commodity production directly.  Further, there are a number of 
important issues to consider in the design of a program of green payments.  These include 
targeting, restricting the subsidy base, addressing capital rigidities, and prioritizing 
environmental objectives.  In addition, it is essential to consider the endogeneity of 
commodity prices.  For a policy administered on a large scale, price exogeneity may have 
implications for the magnitude of the tradeoff between environmental and economic 
objectives. 
 This thesis analysis expands upon the existing literature in several formidable 
ways.  The majority of prior analyses focus on either a micro-level assessment of farmer 
decisions or on a large-scale analysis (e.g. watershed, regional, or national).  The study 
area considered in this empirical analysis consists of two counties, and therefore 
constitutes an intermediate-level approach, relative to previous analyses.  As such, it adds 
a new perspective to a growing body of literature.  In addition, former studies of green 
payments and production practices have considered only crop production.  Implicitly, 
these studies assume that crop and livestock production are separable activities.  
However, the potential exists for the exchange of outputs between crop and livestock 
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production (i.e. crops for feed and manure for fertilizer), which implies that the two 
activities may be to some degree nonseparable.  Therefore, livestock production may 
have an impact on the allocation of land use activities that has not yet been explicitly 
modeled.  Finally, the model developed here is a “closely coupled” model of both 
economic and biophysical processes.  Crop yield, soil erosion, and nutrient requirements 
are all biophysical aspects that are incorporated into the economic model.  They are 
linked to the economic component through the spatial allocation of land use activities 
across heterogeneous terrain.  The incorporation of livestock production activities and 
environmental processes are expected to improve the model’s ability to accurately predict 
the land use outcome under various policy scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE LAND USE MODEL 
 
  The approach chosen to evaluate the impact of public policy on the tradeoff 
between economic and environmental objectives is to build a model of land use 
allocation.  This approach is often employed in empirical studies of spatial price and 
allocation problems, such as the distribution of livestock manure to cropland (Feinerman, 
Bosch, and Pease, 2004; Ribaudo et al., 2003) and the regional allocation of commodity 
production and conservation activities (Segarra et al., 2003; Callaway and McCarl, 1996).  
The conceptual framework underlying this methodology is established by Takayama and 
Judge (1971).  Generally, the problem is one of allocating productive activities over 
space and solving for a set of internal prices given an exogenous resource endowment 
and a set of commodity prices.  In this analysis, the specific problem is to allocate the 
production of commodities and environmental externalities over space in order to 
maximize the rental rate of arable land.   
  This chapter begins with a general overview of the model, which includes a 
discussion of its scale and the relationship between the spatial allocation of commodity 
production and the creation of environmental externalities.  The second section details the 
algebraic formulation of the model’s constraints and objective function.  Chapter 4 
follows with a detailed presentation of the technical information used to parameterize the 
programming model.  A copy of the detailed mathematical programming code is included 
in the appendix.   
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3.1.  Model Overview 
  The model study area is Crawford and Shelby counties, Iowa.  A two-county area 
of observation is an intermediate scale relative to previous studies, which have analyzed 
land-use decisions at either the individual farm level or on a larger scale (e.g. watershed, 
regional, or national).  Beyond contributing a novel perspective to the body of empirical 
literature, there are several advantages to using a sub-regional scale.  Aggregating up 
from the individual producer facilitates the comparison of private producer welfare with 
environmental outcomes that operate on a broader scale.  Focusing on a sub-regional 
scale also simplifies the model because it is reasonable to assume price exogeneity.  
Another key advantage is that a majority of the secondary data on agricultural production 
practices is available at the county level.  
  There are also a number of disadvantages to using a county-level scale of 
analysis.  One disadvantage to aggregating is that it tends to obscure individual equity 
issues, particularly those related to the spatial distribution of income support payments.  
There are also disadvantages to assuming exogenous commodity and input prices.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, using this assumption may tend to overstate the 
complementarity between environmental and economic objectives.  Moreover, the model 
cannot accurately predict the impacts of a policy applied on a broader scale.  Finally, 
using a study area defined by political boundaries may be objectionable because it does 
not correspond to the scale at which environmental systems operate.  The appropriate 
scale at which to jointly examine economic and environmental phenomena is complex, 
and no one recommendation emerges from the literature.       
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  The model is designed to assign production activities across a heterogeneous 
landscape to maximize the average return to land.  Therefore, the land use activities 
considered must be related to economic and environmental outcomes through both their 
production processes and their placement in space.  The former is accomplished by 
representing land use activities as land management strategies, e.g. a two-year corn-
soybean rotation or continuous pasture, rather than as individual crops.  Soil erosion and 
the amount of nitrogen fertilizer input are both dependent on long-term crop rotations.  
The land use allocation is related spatially to environmental and economic outcomes 
through slope, a physical land attribute.  In the model, per-acre crop yields, nutrient 
requirements, and rates of soil erosion are expressed as functions of the management 
practice and slope.  These functions relate land use activities directly to environmental 
phenomena and allow the economic return to cropping activities to decline on marginal 
agricultural land. 
  The number of acres in each land use activity by slope is an endogenous variable, 
defined as one for which the model solves.  There are a number of other endogenous 
variables, including the number of livestock marketed per year, the total amount of crops 
sold, the amount of crops used as livestock feed, and the amount of livestock manure 
used as crop fertilizer.  Total revenue and government payments received by producers in 
the two counties depend on crop and livestock production, and are therefore endogenous.  
Similarly, the two environmental indicators examined – excess nitrogen and total soil 
erosion – depend on the endogenous assignment of land use and livestock activities.  The 
model is annual, such that all of the endogenous variables represent the allocation for one 
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year of production.  The next section describes the model constraints and objective as 
functions of these endogenous variables and a number of exogenous parameters.   
 
3.2.  The Mathematical Programming Model  
  This section describes the structure of the MP model and the algebraic 
formulation of the technical constraints and objective function.  To begin, the first sub-
section outlines the constraints that pertain to the production of land use activities.  The 
second describes the linkages between crop and livestock production created by the 
exchange of feed and nutrients.  The final sub-section defines the accounting identities 
used to build the model’s objective function.  Throughout the chapter, a number of sets 
are used to index the model variables and equations.  These indices are summarized in 
Table 3.1, below.   
 
 
Table 3.1.  Indices Used in Mathematical Programming Equations 
Index Description Range 
Land Use Indices 
y land use activities 1,…,6 
c cropping activities 1,…,7 
f(c)* feed crops 1,…,5 
n slope (% grade) 1,…,49 
Livestock Indices 
l livestock type 1,2 
m livestock production cycle 1,2 
k livestock production method 1,2 
r feed ration 1,…,3 
Land-Livestock Indices 
v crop/livestock production inputs/outputs 1,…,10 
j(v)* nutrient inputs/outputs 1,…,3 
s(v)* other inputs/outputs 1,…,6 
*Indices are a subset of index in parentheses. 
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 3.2.1.  Land Use Constraints 
 
  The acreage devoted to each land use activity by slope class (YACRES) is an 
endogenous variable in the optimization problem.  As previously discussed, indexing the 
acreage variable across slope is essential to linking the land use allocation with variables 
that are slope-dependent, such as crop yields, nutrient requirements, and soil erosion.  
The following identity is used to summarize the total amount of acres assigned to each 
land use activity across the landscape: 
3.1         ∑ =
n
yyn LANDUSEYACRES
where LANDUSE is the total acreage in each land use activity. 
  The first land use allocation constraint limits the total acreage assigned by the 
model to be less than exogenous endowment of arable land in the two counties.  The 
constraint is indexed across slope, such that there are 49 total equations limiting acreage 
utilized in each slope class by land available in that slope class: 
3.2     ∑ ≤
y
nyn TLANDYACRES
where TLAND is the total acreage available for production by slope class. 
 There are two land use constraints related to livestock production.  They are both 
stocking density equations, which ensure that adequate housing and pasture acres are 
assigned to satisfy the needs of livestock produced.  The constraints are as follows: 
3.3       ( )∑∑∑ ≤
l m k
LHlmklmk LANDUSEHREQHEAD *
3.4     ( )∑∑∑ +≤
l m k
GLPTlmklmk CACRESLANDUSEPREQHEAD *
where HEAD is the number of livestock produced for marketing, indexed by type of 
livestock, production cycle, and production method (confinement or pasture-based).  
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HREQ and PREQ are the housing and pasture requirement for each type of animal in 
acres. The subscripts in capital letters denote specific land use and cropping activities: 
LH denotes livestock housing, PT is continuous grass-legume pasture, and GL is grass-
legume pasture in rotation.  Notice that livestock housing and continuous grass-legume 
pasture are land use activities, while grass legume in rotation is a cropping activity.  One 
of the land use activities considered in the model is a six-year rotation that involves two 
years of grass-legume production for grazing.  Therefore, the proportion of acreage 
within that land use activity available for grazing must be included in the total pasture 
constraint.  The variable CACRES distinguishes cropping acres from land use acres, for 
the purpose of including that portion of the rotation in the constraint.  
 The final land use constraint limits the amount of Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) acres assigned by the model to current enrolled acres.  Because of the relative 
difficulty of enrolling land in the CRP, and because of limited program funding, it is 
unreasonable to allow the model to assign an unlimited number of acres to this land use 
activity.  Therefore,  
3.5          ENROLLLANDUSEER ≤
18where the subscript ER indicates the land use activity “ecoreserve.”   The scalar 
ENROLL is equal to 22,526 acres, which was the CRP enrollment in Crawford and 
Shelby counties as of July, 2003 (Iowa Farm Service Agency [FSA]). 
 
 3.2.2.  Land Use – Livestock Balances 
 The second series of constraints involves the use of inputs in crop and livestock 
production activities.  These constraints allow for the purchase of feed and nutrient inputs 
                                                 
18 The term “ecoreserve” is used synonymously with Conservation Reserve Program. 
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or for their exchange between crop and livestock production activities.  Specifically, land 
use activities involve the production of crops that can be used as feed in livestock 
production (i.e. grain corn).  Livestock production generates waste that contains nutrients 
that can be spread on land for crop fertilization.  These linkages permit the model to 
select the optimal degree of integration between crop and livestock production activities.   
 The first equation is a crop production demand-supply balance.  It prevents the 
amount of crops demanded, consisting of those sold on the market and those used for 
livestock feed, from exceeding the total amount of crop production.  The balance is 
indexed across cropping activities, such that there are seven total constraints. 
( )∑∑≤+
y n
ycnyncc YIELDYACRESCFEEDSCSALES *3.6      
where CSALES is the total amount of a crop sold and CFEEDS is the total amount of a 
crop used as livestock feed.  The units of production vary across crops produced: corn, 
oat, and soybean production are measured in bushels, while alfalfa hay/forage and grass-
legume hay production are measured in tons.  As written, the model is permitted to split 
non-feed crops into sales and feed supply.  To prevent this from occurring, the variable 
CFEEDS is fixed at zero for soybean and oats, the two non-feed crops.  The variable 
YIELD, in either bushels or tons per acre, is indexed by land use activity, crop, and 
grade.  It is indexed by both land use activity and by crop because, within each rotation 
(or land use activity), each crop constitutes a different percentage of the whole.19   
                                                 
19 For example, for one acre in a corn-soybean rotation, in any one year, corn occupies half of the acre (and 
soybeans the other half).  Therefore, corn yield is half of a full acre yield.  For one acre in a six-year crop 
rotation, corn occupies one third of the acre in any one year (corn is grown in two out of six years), so that 
corn yield for that land use activity is one third of a full acre’s corn yield.   
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 The feed balance is formulated so that feed may be supplied by crop production or 
purchased in order to supply the feed requirement for livestock production.  The feed 
balance is indexed across the ration set (r).  There are three feed balances of the form: 
( ) ( )∑ ∑∑∑≥+
f l m k
lmkrlmkff RATIONREQHEADPRFEEDCFEEDS *3.7    
where CFEEDS is the endogenous supply of feed from crop production, PRFEED is 
purchased feed, and RATIONREQ is the feed ration requirement for each head of 
livestock produced.  CFEEDS is the same variable as in equation (3.5), but is indexed 
across only those crops that are used for livestock feed.  The left-hand side of equation 
3.6 is indexed across the feed set, which is a subset of cropping activities.  However, feed 
required is indexed across the ration set.  This is necessary so that more than one crop 
may satisfy a given ration requirement.  For example, the forage requirement may be 
satisfied with either alfalfa hay or grass-legume hay.20  To write the equation as above, it 
is necessary to map the feed set onto the ration set.  This mapping is described in Table 
3.2.   
 
 
Table 3.2.  Mapping of the Ration Set to the Feed Set 
Set Name Ration (r)  Feed (f) 
Grain maps to Corn 
Alfalfa Hay 
Forage maps to Set Members Grass-Legume Hay 
Pasture in Rotation 
Graze maps to 
Continuous Pasture 
 
                                                 
20 For simplicity, it is assumed that any crops used to satisfy the same ration requirement are perfect 
substitutes in feed.  This is an oversimplification, as feeds differ in nutritional value. 
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 The production of pasture acres for feed presents an additional complexity in the 
model.  Because the unit of production for pasture is one acre, the sale of pasture would 
indicate that an acre of pasture is being rented for livestock production, perhaps by a 
producer located outside of the two counties.  That producer bears the cost of establishing 
and maintaining improved pasture on those rented acres, and collects the revenue earned 
from the sale of livestock.  Similarly, if a producer located within Crawford and Shelby 
counties were to rent an acre of pasture, they would bear the cost of producing pasture for 
livestock production.  For simplicity, this type of acreage exchange is not considered.21  
Therefore, it is necessary to fix the values for pasture sales and purchases, CSALES and 
PRFEED, equal to zero.  The model implicitly avoids this pitfall for all other crops 
because production is specified as the crop yield per acre. 
 Like the feed balance, the nutrient balance ensures that the amount of nitrogen 
(N), phosphate (P O ), and potash (K2 5 2O) supplied by livestock and purchased as fertilizer 
inputs satisfy crop nutrient requirements.  Equation 3.8 requires that total demand for 
each of the three nutrients not exceed the total supplied.  The constraint is indexed across 
the fertilizer set, which is a subset of all crop and livestock production inputs and outputs.  
The three nutrient balances are as follows: 
( )
[ ]∑∑∑
∑∑
−+
≤
l m k
lmkjlmkjlmkj
y n
ynyn
MLOSSMNUTRHEADPRNUTR
NUTRREQACRES
)1(**
*
3.8   
where NUTRREQ is the nutrient requirement by land use activity and grade, PRNUTR is 
the amount of nutrient input purchased, MNUTR is the amount of each nutrient in 
livestock manure, and MLOSS is the nutrient loss from manure storage and application. 
                                                 
21 Producer surplus calculated by the model is therefore similar to a measure of net domestic product 
(NDP). 
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 3.2.3.  Accounting Identities 
  The objective of the mathematical programming model is to maximize the return 
to land across Crawford and Shelby counties, subject to the series of technical constraints 
described by equations (3.1) through (3.7).  The following accounting identities are used 
to relate the return to land to the set of endogenous variables.  There are three primary 
components used to formulate the objective function.  They are total revenue, 
government payments, and total production costs. 
 
  3.2.3.1.  Total Revenue 
  The revenue earned by producers in the two counties is composed of the annual 
sale of crops and livestock.  Total revenue can be expressed as follows: 
3.9      
( )
(∑∑∑
∑
=
+
l m k
lkllmk
c
cc
TREVLPRICEWEIGHTHEAD
CPRICECSALES
**
*
)
where CPRICE is the producer price of each crop per unit of production and LPRICE is 
the price per pound of each type of livestock marketed.  Note that the model solves for 
the number of head marketed from each livestock enterprise in a year.  The number of 
inventory animals, and their sale and purchase, are not explicitly considered.  The model 
focus is on the flow of livestock through the system, rather than on the stock. 
  
  3.2.3.2.  Government Payments 
  There are several types of support payments available to crop producers in the 
two-county area.  The payments considered in the model are fixed direct payments, 
counter-cyclical payments, loan deficiency payments (LDPs), and Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) payments.  Each of the following payment accounting identities is 
 39 
 
formulated based on a description of their calculation and published payment rates 
(United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2003). 
  The amount of fixed direct payments disbursed is based on the number of acres of 
each program crop cultivated in the two counties, and the direct payment rate for eligible 
commodities.22  Published direct payment rates are indexed by commodity.  To index the 
direct payment rate by land use activity, a weighted average of the per-acre payment rate 
by commodity is constructed using the proportion of each program commodity in each 
land use activity: 
( )∑ =
c
yccyc DPRDPRBYIELDRWT **  3.10 
where RWT is the proportion of each program crop on one acre of a land use activity, 
BYIELD is the base yield for each crop, calculated as a historical average of mean annual 
yield by county, and DPR is the published direct payment rate per unit of production.23
  The total amount of direct payments received by producers in the two counties is 
therefore: 
( )∑ =
n
yyyn DPDPRYACRESBASE **3.11      
where BASE is the proportion of base acres eligible to receive payments.   
  Counter-cyclical payments are determined similarly to direct payments, but are 
disbursed only when the market price of a program commodity falls below the target 
price.  It is necessary to specify the counter-cyclical payment rate in order to calculate the 
total amount of counter-cyclical payments received.  The payment rate is based on the 
                                                 
22 In reality, direct and counter-cyclical payments are calculated using the base acres registered by 
producers.  However, here they are calculated based on the amount of land allocated to each crop for 
modeling simplicity (see Chapter 4 for further discussion). 
23 Average yield differs from yield used to determine production in the model: it does not vary by slope. 
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difference between the published target rate and the effective price of each commodity.  
The effective price (EFP) is conditional on the commodity’s market price: 
3.12    
⎩⎨
⎧
=+
>=+
otherwiseEFPDPRLNR
LNRCPRICEifEFPDPRCPRICE
ccc
ccccc
where LNR is the national loan rate for each commodity.  All payment rates are 
expressed in dollars per unit of production.  To calculate the per-acre counter-cyclical 
payment rate by land use activity, a weighted average is constructed, where the weights 
are identical to those used to calculate the direct payment rate above:  
3.13  
[ ]
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
>=−∑
otherwiseCCPR
EFPTGRifCCPREFPTGRBYIELDRWT
y
ccy
c
cccyc
0
)(**
where TGR is the pre-set target rate for each program commodity.   
  The total amount of counter-cyclical payments received by producers in the two 
counties is calculated using the formula:  
( )∑ =
n
yyyn CCPCCPRYACRESBASE **3.14     
where CCPR is the per-acre counter-cyclical payment by land use activity, and all other 
variables are as previously defined. 
  Loan deficiency payments (LDPs) are similar to counter-cyclical payments in that 
they are distributed only when the market price of a commodity falls below a pre-
specified level.  The payment rate is determined as follows:   
3.15    
⎩⎨
⎧
=
>=−
otherwiseLDPR
CPRICELNRifLDPRCPRICELNR
c
ccccc
0
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where LNR is the national loan rate, CPRICE is the average annual producer price 
received for each commodity, and LDPR is the loan deficiency payment rate by 
commodity.24   
  LDPs differ from counter-cyclical payments in that they are not distributed based 
on acreage of program commodities.  Rather, they are based on the amount of a program 
crop produced that a farmer uses as collateral for a loan payment.  For simplicity, it is 
assumed that producers in the two counties use all acres of production as collateral when 
the market price falls sufficiently for LDPs to apply.  The payment rate per acre, by land 
use activity, is based on actual yield, as opposed to the historical average used to 
calculate fixed direct and counter-cyclical payments.  The per-acre LDP rate is calculated 
as: 
3.16      ycncycn LDPRLDPRYIELD =*
The total amount of LDPs received by land use activity is: 
( )∑∑ =
c n
yycnyn LDPLDPRYACRES *3.17     
This formulation represents the maximum amount of LDPs that producers in the two-
county area can collect if a program commodity’s market price falls below the national 
marketing loan rate. 
  Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) payments are calculated as a simple 
product of the number of acres enrolled in the CRP and the per-acre CRP payment rate: 
3.18        ( CRPCRPRYACRES
n
ERn =∑ * )
                                                 
24 In reality, the market price used to determine the loan deficiency payment rate is the posted county price, 
which varies daily.  
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where CRPR is the average per-acre Conservation Reserve Program payment rate, and 
the subscript ER denotes the land use activity “ecoreserve.”25
  Total government payments received by producers in Crawford and Shelby 
counties is the sum across payment programs for all land use activities: 
( )∑ =+++
y
yyy GPAYCRPLDPCCPDP3.19     
  
  3.2.3.3.  Total Costs of Production 
  The total costs of production consist of variable production costs and ownership 
(fixed) costs.  The variable costs associated with crop and livestock production are 
disaggregated into three categories: feed costs, nutrient costs, and all other variable costs 
(e.g. seed, fuel, and veterinary costs).  The feed and nutrient cost identities are structured 
to differentiate the price of purchased inputs and those inputs that are exchanged between 
crop and livestock production activities.  Because this analysis is concerned with 
landscape-level production patterns, no assumptions are made regarding the form of 
integration, i.e. whether feed and nutrients are exchanged on an inter- or intra-farm basis.  
Rather, it is assumed that the prices of any feed or nutrients produced within the two-
county area and used as an input into livestock or crop production are valued at their cost 
of production, rather than their consumer prices.  For those variable inputs that are 
purchased, it is assumed that they are available in perfectly elastic supply.  The feed and 
nutrient cost identities are: 
( ) ( )[ ]∑ =+
f
ffff TCFEEDPPFEEDPRFEEDPLFEEDCFEEDS **  3.20 
                                                 
25In practice, CRP contracts are awarded based on a bidding process, so the per-acre payment rate can vary 
substantially across producers. 
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( ) ( )[ ] TCNUTRPPNUTRPRNUTRPMNUTRLNUTRS
j
jjjj =+∑ **  3.21 
where PLFEED is the price of feed produced locally, PPFEED is the price of purchased 
feed, LNUTRS is the supply of crop nutrients from livestock manure, PMNUTR is the 
price of nutrients in livestock manure, and PPNUTR is the price of purchased nutrients.  
TCFEED and TCNUTR are the total cost of feed and nutrient inputs in the two-county 
area. 
  The fixed costs of crop and livestock production include the cost of land in 
livestock housing and all other ownership costs of production.  To calculate the former, it 
is assumed that land in livestock housing is converted from prime cropland.  Therefore, 
the cost of land conversion represents an upper bound on the opportunity cost of 
converting land from cropland to livestock housing: 
3.22 LHLHLH LCOSTPLANDLANDUSE =*     
where PLAND is the per-acre rental rate of land in livestock housing, which is assumed 
equal to the rental rate of land in a corn-soybean rotation, the highest value land use in 
Crawford and Shelby counties. 
  The ownership costs of production are those costs that are fixed in the short-run, 
including depreciation, interest, taxes, and insurance on factors of production.  One 
accounting identity is used to calculate the costs of other variable inputs and ownership 
costs in crop and livestock production.  The equation is summed over the set s, which 
consists of all variable and ownership costs of production aside from feed, nutrient, and 
land costs: 
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( ) TCOTHERPINPUTSLINPUTSHEAD
PINPUTSYINPUTSACRES
l m k s
slmkslmk
y n s
sysyn
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+
∑∑∑∑
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3.23   
where YINPUTS and LINPUTS are the variable and fixed inputs, other than feed and 
nutrients, into crop and livestock production, PINPUTS is a vector of the prices of inputs 
into crop and livestock production, and TCOTHER is the total cost of other variable 
inputs and ownership costs. 
  The total cost of production is expressed as the sum of the cost identities: 
3.24 TCOSTTCOTHERPLANDTCNUTRTCFEED LH =+++     
  The equations for total revenue (equation 3.9), total government payments (3.19), 
and total cost (3.24) are used to formulate the model’s objective function, described in the 
following section. 
 
 3.2.4.  Objective Function  
  The net return to land and management (NRLM) is the sum of total revenue and 
government payments received by producers in the two counties, less the total costs of 
production described in the preceding section: 
3.25 NRLMTCOSTGPAYTREV =−+      
The distinction between aggregate profit and the NRLM lies in the land cost accounting.  
By excluding the per-acre rental rate by land use activity from the total costs of 
production, with the exception of land in livestock housing, the above identity measures 
the NRLM.  Dividing the NRLM by total available acreage yields the average per-acre 
return to land (ARL): 
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TLAND
NRLM
n
n
=∑3.26       
  The model’s objective is to maximize the average per-acre return to land subject 
to the constraints described in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.  Because the objective is a linear 
function of endogenous variables, the model is specified as a linear programming 
problem. 
 
3.3.  Comments on the Model  
  The objective function and constraints outlined in this chapter form the structural 
framework of the linear programming model used in this analysis.  The next chapter 
presents the technical details that are the foundation for these equations.  However, 
before proceeding, there are several important points to mention concerning the model 
formulation.  Given a set of technical parameters, the model solution represents the long-
run equilibrium land use allocation that maximizes the average return to land.26  The 
model developed in this study is static and therefore does not describe the path of 
transition to that end result.  Moreover, the specified set of parameters is assumed 
invariant during that transition. 
  There are also several issues that center around the use of a single objective 
function.  Modeling agricultural producers as simple profit-maximizers offers the 
advantage of modeling simplicity.  The corresponding disadvantage is that the model 
implicitly maintains several assumptions concerning producer behavior that may be 
unrealistic.  For instance, producers are assumed to be risk-neutral.  When producers are 
risk-averse, an objective function that seeks to maximize the expected return to land may 
                                                 
26 The solution is the long-run allocation because the objective function includes both the variable and fixed 
costs of production.   
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be more appropriate (Tomek and Robinson, 1990).  Moroever, there are a number of 
other unidentified factors omitted from the model that may influence producer decisions.  
Examples include capital adjustment rigidities and socio-cultural issues, such as the 
accumulation of social capital.27  These factors may influence the transition to, and the 
form of, the long-run land allocation.  However, incorporating these complexities is 
outside of the scope of this analysis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 The definition of social capital, as adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) is as follows: “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that 
facilitate cooperation within or among groups” (OECD, 2002). 
 47 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
TECHNICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODEL 
 
 
 This chapter complements Chapter 3 by providing a detailed description of the 
technical information used to parameterize the mathematical programming model’s 
constraints and objective function.  The chapter is organized into two sections.  The first 
outlines the representative land use activities chosen and explains the technical 
coefficients of crop production.  This section also includes a brief description of the 
subsidy payment rates for those Federal income support programs considered in the 
analysis.  The second section covers information related to the production and sale of 
livestock, as well as the nutrient content of manure.  The technical information presented 
is meant to be representative of current production activities, and therefore does not 
represent the heterogeneity in production practices observed in reality.  However, the 
purpose of the model is not to account for all aspects of reality, but to present a stylized 
representation that can be used as a tool for analyzing changes in aggregate land use 
patterns.   
 
4.1.  Land Use Activities and Data 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the representative land use activities used to formulate 
the model are long-term management strategies, not annual cropping activities.  The 
advantage to specifying land use activities as such is that the level of environmental 
inputs into crop production, specifically nutrients and soil erosion, depend on the long-
term rotation.  There are six land use activities included in the MP model.  These were 
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chosen to represent the predominant production pattern in the study area, and to represent 
land use alternatives that yield greater environmental benefits than current practices.   
Included among the representative land use activities is a two-year corn-soybean 
rotation, which is the predominant land use activity in Crawford and Shelby counties.  
According to the 2002 Census of Agriculture, corn and soybeans occupy 95.7 percent of 
total harvested cropland, accounting for 50.4 and 45.3 percent, respectively.  The ration 
of corn to soybean acres indicates that corn and soybeans are predominantly grown in 
rotation with one another.28  This supposition is supported by regional data from the 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS): in 2001, soybeans preceded 80.5 
percent of corn acreage across the Corn Belt states (Economic Research Service [ERS]).   
In addition to the two-year corn-soybean rotation, two hypothetical six-year crop 
rotations are considered in the model.  They were chosen by a team of interdisciplinary 
researchers at Iowa State University on the basis of the environmental benefits they 
provide.  Both six-year rotations incorporate legume crops, which reduce erosion and 
increase nitrogen uptake, which reduces runoff and leaching, over the course of the 
rotation.  The first rotation, denoted “six-year alfalfa,” is a corn-soybean-corn rotation 
followed by three years of alfalfa.  In its establishment year, alfalfa is planted with an oat 
leader crop.  Using an oat leader eliminates the need for an herbicide application to 
establish the alfalfa crop.  In all three years, alfalfa is harvested for use as livestock 
forage.  The second six-year rotation, denoted “six-year grass-legume,” is a corn-
soybean-corn rotation followed by three years of a 75-25 grass-legume mixture.  In its 
                                                 
28 A corn-soybean acreage ratio of one implies that all corn and soybeans are produced in a two-year 
rotation.  The slight discrepancy between the proportions indicates that some corn producers use alternate 
rotation patterns, i.e. continuous corn or corn following wheat. 
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29establishment year, grass-legume is harvested for hay.   In the subsequent two years, the 
grass-legume crop is used as pasture for livestock grazing.   
In addition to the rotations described above, there are three land uses considered 
that do not involve crop production.  They are continuous pasture, ecoreserve, and land in 
livestock housing.  Continuous pasture is assumed to consist of a 75-25 grass-legume 
mixture, and is physically identical to the grass-legume used for pasture in the six-year 
grass-legume rotation.  However, continuous pasture is grown in back-to-back five-year 
cycles with renovation every fifth year.  Because cultivating pasture acreage requires 
productive inputs, including labor, seed, and chemicals, it is considered “improved” 
pasture.30  Land in ecoreserve is retired from production and is therefore not used for 
either grazing or crop production.  Acreage in ecoreserve earns revenue only through 
Conservation Reserve Program payments.31  Land in livestock housing includes the area 
occupied by all structures used to house and contain livestock, excluding pasture.  As 
previously discussed, including housing as a land use activity reflects the opportunity 
cost associated with converting cropland to a permanent structure. 
There are several assumptions regarding the production of these land use 
activities that are maintained throughout the analysis.  While corn and soybeans in the 
six-year rotations are produced using no-till practices, it is assumed that land planted to 
the corn-soybean rotation is produced using conventional tillage practices.  According to 
the ARMS, the adoption of no-till practices has increased significantly since 1990 (ERS).  
Across the Corn Belt, 39.2 and 14.3 percent of all soybean and corn acres were cultivated 
                                                 
29 Hay is produced when the grass is harvested when dry; forage is produced when grass/alfalfa is harvested 
when wet. 
30 As opposed to “native” pasture, which does not involve the use of productive inputs. 
31 This assumption may be erroneous when landowners are able to charge for hunting or other recreational 
uses on reserve land.   
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using no-till.  Of those acres that are considered “highly erodible,” no-till is used on 55.2 
percent of soybean acres, and 29.6 percent of corn acreage.32  The effect of excluding a 
no-till corn-soybean option from the model is that it biases upward the cost of producing 
corn and soybeans by $8.63 per acre (2.5 percent of the total per-acre cost of production). 
All cropland in the model is assumed non-irrigated.  This is a reasonable 
assumption, as the use of irrigation in the two counties is negligible: only 5 farms out of a 
total of 1795 in Crawford and Shelby counties reported using irrigation technology 
(National Agricultural Statistics Service [NASS], “2002 Census”).   
  While the MP model is constructed to assign land use activities across the 
landscape, the majority of the technical information used to parameterize the 
programming model applies to the production of individual crops.  In order to phrase 
these technical coefficients in terms of land use activities, it is necessary to define each 
land use activity as a vector of crop production activities.  Table 4.1 presents the 
composition of each land use acre as a relative proportion of that acre in each crop.   
Notice that sum of the relative proportions in the six-year alfalfa land use is 
greater than one.  Because alfalfa is established with an oat leader crop, an acre of 
establishment year alfalfa yields two crops annually.  The proportions in Table 4.1 are 
used to calculate crop production (yield), revenue, and government payment parameters 
for the six-year alfalfa land use.  However, the costs of producing establishment year 
alfalfa, obtained from Iowa State University Extension budgets, include the costs of 
producing the oat leader crop.  Therefore, the proportions in the above table must be  
                                                 
32 Highly erodible land (HEL) is defined as that with an erodibility index (EI) of greater than eight, which 
indicates that, if cover or conservation measures are not used, the soil will erode at a rate of eight times the 
tolerance level.  Fields with at least 1/3 of their acreage (or 50 acres, whichever is less) designated as HEL, 
are subject to HEL Conservation Provisions (ERS, “Glossary”). 
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Table 4.1.  Proportion of Each Land Use Acre in Each Crop  
Land Use Activity 
Corn-
Soybean 
Six-Year 
Alfalfa 
Six-Year 
Grass-Legume 
Continuous 
Pasture Crop 
Corn 1/2 1/3 1/3  
Soybeans 1/2 1/6 1/6  
Oats  1/6   
Alfalfa  1/2   
Grass-Legume in Rotation     
     Harvested for Hay   1/6  
     Pasture   1/3  
Continuous Grass-Legume    1 
  
adjusted to calculate the costs of producing the six-year alfalfa rotation.  The vector used 
to calculate the cost of production is: one-third of an acre in corn, one-sixth in soybeans, 
one-sixth in establishment alfalfa with an oat leader, and one-third in established alfalfa.  
All other proportions are as described in Table 4.1 throughout the analysis. 
The crop grass-legume is listed separately for land in rotation and land in 
continuous pasture.  While the physical crop is identical (75-25 grass-legume mixture), 
the costs of production are different due to both the length of the production cycle and 
because grass-legume in rotation is harvested for hay in its establishment year, while 
continuous grass-legume is used only as pasture.   
 
 4.1.1.  Land Supply 
  To determine the total land area available for agricultural production, two data 
layers created by Mike Burkhart and David James of the National Soil Tilth Laboratory at 
Iowa State University are manipulated using ArcMAP software.  The first is a layer of the 
crop cover in Iowa in 2001 from the National Agricultural Statistics Service annual 
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cropland database.  The second layer describes the topography of Crawford and Shelby 
counties.  Both are raster datasets, with a resolution of 30m2.  There are a total of 
3,759,910 cells in each raster data layer.  To derive the number of arable acres by slope 
class, the crop cover data layer is reclassified into two categories: cropland and all non-
arable land, i.e. land in artificial cover or waterways.  This layer is then combined with 
the topography layer using the “Raster Calculator” function.  Doing so creates a unique 
identifier for arable land by slope degree.33  Using the ratio of 30m2 pixels to one acre 
(4.49 pixels per acre), the number of arable acres in each slope category is derived using 
the count of pixels in each land-slope class. 
  The total number of acres calculated using these data layers is slightly greater 
than the total amount of land in cropland and pasture in the two-county area, as reported 
in the 2002 Census of Agriculture.  According to the Census, a significant amount of 
arable acreage is in failed/abandoned crops, house lots, ponds, roads, and wasteland.  The 
discrepancy between the two acreages may exist because the GIS cropland data layer 
does not differentiate these types of non-productive land from land in production.  
Assuming that non-productive land is evenly distributed across the landscape, the total 
amount of land in each grade can be scaled down by a factor of 7.53 percent so that the 
total supply of arable acreage in the model corresponds to the amount reported in the 
Census.  After the adjustment, the total land area available for production is 745,794 
acres.  Figure 4.1 shows the cumulative distribution of arable land by degree slope.  The 
bulk of the land available for production is concentrated on slopes less than 20 degrees, 
with land between 20 and 49 degrees accounting for only one percent of the total. 
                                                 
33 For example, an ID of 1035 would indicate cropland (with an ID of 1000) on a 35 degree slope.   
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Figure 4.1.  Cumulative Distribution of Arable Land by Degree Slope 
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 4.1.2.  Prices and Yields 
  The per-acre revenue associated with each land use activity is calculated as the 
per-acre crop yield multiplied by the per-unit price of each crop.  Average annual 
producer price data are obtained from the NASS Agricultural Statistics Database for the 
years 1994-2003.  The price assigned to grass-legume hay is that for “all hay.”34  As a 
starting point, the ten-year median price for each commodity is used to parameterize the 
MP model.  Producer prices by crop are reported in Table 4.2.  The median, rather than 
the mean, is used because commodity prices were unusually high in 1996.  Using the 
 
34 Hay prices in the NASS Agricultural Statistics Database are disaggregated into three categories: alfalfa 
hay, other hay, and all hay.  Because grass-legume is a mixture of grass hay and alfalfa hay, the price for 
“all hay” is used. 
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average would tend to bias crop prices upwards from their most likely level because of 
these outliers. 
  Two sets of crop yield data are used in the model:  county average yields, and a 
slope-dependent yield function.  The former are obtained from the Iowa NASS for the 
years 1994-2003.  These estimates are used in the government payment formulas 
described in Chapter 3.  Slope-dependent yield data were constructed by Mike Burkhart 
and David James of the National Soil Tilth Laboratory at Iowa State University from the 
Iowa Soil Properties and Interpretation Database (ISPAID).  This data is used to estimate 
average yield by slope class as a function of slope.  A simple linear relationship between 
slope and yield is assumed: 
(SLOPEYIELD ccc )βα +=4.1          
where SLOPE is an integer ranging from zero to 49 representing slope degree.  
 The regression intercept is the crop’s base yield, and the slope coefficient represents 
the yield loss with an incremental increase in the slope degree (the “yield loss” a 
  
Table 4.2.  Median Producer Price and Estimated Per-Acre Yield Regression 
Coefficients, by Crop 
Yield Regression Parameters Cropping 
Activity Unit 
Median Price 
($ per unit) cβˆcαˆ   
Corn bushels 2.16 134.58 -1.3861 
Soybeans bushels 5.79 45.17 -0.4645 
Oats bushels 1.58 74.03 -0.7626 
Alfalfa Hay tons 87.63 4.19 -0.0458 
Grass-Legume 
Hay tons 84.75 3.92 -0.0370 
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coefficient).  While data is available for the mean yield for each slope class (ranging from 
zero to 49), yield observations for slope classes greater than 30 are excluded from the 
regression.  There are a limited number of observations in these slope classes, and, as 
result, the yield estimates are highly variable.  Because each regression is run on 
only 31 observations, the estimation is subject to the problems associated with small 
sample bias.  A regression based on all yield observations by slope class, rather than the 
mean of the observations within a class would likely yield more accurate results.  
However, due to time and data limitations, the small-sample regression estimates are used 
to parameterize the MP model.  The coefficient estimates by crop are reported in Table 
4.2.   
  The following formula is used to calculate yield by land use activity: 
( )[ ]nccycycn SLOPERWTYIELD βα ˆˆ* +=4.2        
where RWT is the proportion of each crop in each land use activity (from Table 4.1), and 
the right-hand bracketed term is the estimated crop yield by slope based on the regression 
results reported in Table 4.2. 
 
 4.1.3.  Nutrient Requirements and Soil Erosion 
  The nutrient requirements by crop depend directly on the crop rotation and 
indirectly on slope, via the yield functions estimated in equation 4.1.  The three nutrient 
inputs into crop production are nitrogen (N), phosphate (P O ), and potash (K2 5 2O).  The 
base nutrient requirements by crop, in pounds per unit produced, are taken from the Iowa 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Manure Management Plan Form for 2004.  
Non-legume crops, such as corn and oats, require a nitrogen fertilizer input, while legume 
crops utilize nitrogen in the soil and therefore require no additional nitrogen input.  The 
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nutrient requirements for the grass-legume crop are calculated as a weighted average of 
the requirements for orchardgrass (75 percent) and alfalfa (25 percent).   
  When a non-legume crop follows a legume crop in rotation, the non-legume crop 
requires less nitrogen fertilizer.  The amount of this nitrogen “credit” differs across 
legume crops.  The Iowa DNR allows a producer to take a credit equivalent to one pound 
per bushel of soybeans produced in the previous year, not to exceed a total of 50 pounds.  
For each acre of a non-legume crop following an alfalfa crop, the legume credit is 140 lbs 
per acre.  If alfalfa is grown two years prior to a non-legume crop, an additional credit of 
30 pounds per acre is earned.  A credit of 55 pounds of nitrogen per acre is earned for a 
75-25 grass-alfalfa mixture grown in the year prior to a non-legume crop. 
  The total nitrogen requirement for each land use activity is a function of per-acre 
crop yield, nutrient requirement by crop per unit of yield (bushel or ton), and the total 
nitrogen credit earned from incorporating legume crops into the rotation: 
( ) ( )yyn
c
cycnyn LNCREDITSNCREDITNREQYIELDTNREQ +−= ∑ *4.3     
where TNREQ is the total nitrogen requirement, NREQ is the requirement by crop, 
SNCREDIT is the soybean nitrogen credit earned in the rotation, and LNCREDIT is the 
legume nitrogen credit earned in the rotation.  Notice that SNCREDIT is indexed by land 
use and grade, while LNCREDIT is indexed by land use only.  This reflects that the 
nitrogen credit earned from soybeans is yield-dependent, while that earned from legumes 
is not.  For phosphate and potash, the input requirement by land use activity is: 
( )∑=
c
cjycnynj NUTRREQYIELDTNUTRREQ *4.4    
where TNURREQ is the total nutrient requirement and NUTRREQ is the nutrient 
requirement by crop.  Because nutrient requirements vary by slope and land use activity,  
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Table 4.3.  Estimated Per-Acre Soil Erosion Regression Coefficients* 
y1βˆ y2βˆ yαˆ    
Corn-Soybean 0.9289 -0.0115 0.1304 
Six-Year Alfalfa, 0.2713 0.0507 0.0194 Grass-Legume 
Continuous Pasture 0.0507 0.0042 0.001 
*Soil erosion is in tons per year. 
 
the parameters are not reported in table format here.  The mathematical programming 
code in the Appendix reports the base nutrient requirements by crop, the nitrogen credit 
parameters, and the above equations. 
  Soil erosion production is also estimated as function of land use activity and 
slope.  Mike Burkhart and David James developed estimates of soil erosion for each of 
the land use activities using NRI data for all watersheds affected by production activities    
in Crawford and Shelby counties.  The resulting dataset contains 2,485 observations 
 
across slopes ranging from zero to 23 degrees.  The estimated relationship is assumed to 
hold for slopes greater than 23 degrees.  A quadratic relationship between erosion and 
slope is assumed: 
( ) ( )221 SLOPESLOPEEROSION yyyy ββα ++=4.5      
The estimated parameters are reported in Table 4.3.   
 
 4.1.4.  Costs of Production 
  Cost of production data for corn, soybeans, and alfalfa are obtained from the Iowa 
State University Extension publication, Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa – 
2004 (Duffy and Smith, 2004).  Costs of production for grass-legume hay and pasture are 
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taken from the Iowa State University Extension publication, Estimated Costs of Pasture 
and Hay Production (Barnhart, Duffy, and Smith, 2004).     
  The variable production costs associated with each land use activity consist of 
labor, nutrient, and other variable costs.  Farm labor in Crawford and Shelby counties is 
primarily composed of operator, family, and permanent hired labor.  This implies that 
labor is a fixed cost of production at the farm level.  However, labor costs are considered 
variable for the purpose of choosing among alternative land use activities (Duffy and 
Smith, 2004).  “Other” variable input requirements include annual seed, lime, herbicide, 
insecticide, crop insurance, pre-harvest and harvest machinery, interest on pre-harvest 
variable costs, and other miscellaneous costs.   
  Each of these inputs is assumed to be available in perfectly elastic supply.  
Therefore, the cost of each is calculated by multiplying the amount of input used by a 
fixed price per unit.  A constant wage rate of $9.50 per hour is assumed.  The input prices 
for purchased nutrients are $0.25, $0.28, and $0.15 per pound for nitrogen, phosphate, 
and potash, respectively.  The “other” variable costs of production are aggregated into 
one category and reported in Table 4.4 in dollars per acre.  
  The ownership or fixed costs are the costs of depreciation, interest, and 
maintenance that do not vary with the level of crop production.  These costs are 
aggregated into one category and are reported as a fixed expenditure in dollars per acre.  
The rental rate of an acre of cropland is also considered a fixed cost of production.  
However, cropland rental rates are excluded from the total cost accounting, such that the 
model’s objective function reflects the average return to land.  The rental rate of  
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prime cropland (that in corn and soybeans) is included as a fixed cost of allocating land to 
livestock housing.  
 The costs of production for several crops require calculation beyond the technical 
production parameters in the published enterprise budgets.  Alfalfa and grass-legume 
pasture are both produced over multiple year cycles.  There is a cost of production 
associated with establishing each of these crops, as well as harvesting them, in the first 
year of production.  After the establishment year, the costs of production are simply  
maintenance and harvesting costs.  To reflect the opportunity cost of investing in the 
production of these crops, the establishment costs are amortized over the length of the 
production cycle.  The production cycle is three years for both alfalfa and grass-legume 
pasture in rotation, and five years for continuous grass-legume pasture.  Throughout, a 
real interest rate of 4.7 percent is assumed.  In each of the years following the  
 
Table 4.4.  Per-Acre Labor Requirement and Costs of Production, by Crop 
Other Variable 
Costs ($) 
Ownership 
Costs ($) Cropping Activity Labor (hours) 
Corn 2.6 129.49 39.78 
Soybeans 2.45 84.92 27.04 
Alfalfa*    
     Year 1 4 51.70 40.86 
     Years 2,3 1.33 27.65 72.79 
Grass-Legume*    
     Year 1 4.85 46.08 35.15 
     Years 2,3 1.5 2.55 39.30 
Continuous Grass-Legume 1.57 5.38 22.04 
*Alfalfa and grass-legume costs of production reflect amortized establishment costs.  
Source: Duffy and Smith (2004), Barnhart, Duffy, and Smith (2004). 
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establishment year, the amortized costs of establishment are included as a fixed cost of 
production.  The establishment labor costs are not amortized over the production cycle: 
the labor requirement in hours is added to the labor requirement for the establishment 
year.35  The labor, variable, and fixed costs of producing each crop are reported in Table 
4.4. 
  The cost of each input used in the production of each land use activity can be 
derived using the per-acre crop input requirement, the market price of inputs, and the 
composition of each land use activity (from Table 4.1).36  The formula is: 
( )∑=
c
vcvycyv PINPUTINPUTRWTCINPUT **4.6        
where v is the set of all crop production inputs, RWT is the vector of crops in each land 
use activity, CINPUT is the cost of each input for each land use activity, INPUT is the 
level of each input required for production, and PINPUT is the market price.  Because the 
level of “other” variable and “ownership” costs is reported as a dollar amount, PINPUT 
for those inputs is set equal to one. 
 
 4.1.5.  Government Payments 
  The three primary commodity-based payment vehicles for farm income support 
are fixed direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and loan deficiency payments 
(LDPs).37  Fixed direct payments are calculated using a base acreage, a historical average 
yield, and a pre-defined direct payment rate per program commodity.  A producer’s base 
                                                 
35 Because the ratio of years in establishment and maintenance are fixed within a given land use activity, 
including the total establishment labor requirement in the first year of production does not affect the land 
use allocation. 
36 The exception is the six-year alfalfa rotation.  The vector of crop proportions used to calculate the cost of 
producing the six-year alfalfa rotation is described in section 4.1. 
37 LDPs are administered under the broader heading of marketing assistance loans.  The other three types of 
benefits available that are not considered in the model are marketing loan gains, certificate exchange gains, 
and forfeiture gains.   
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acreage is the total amount of acres in commodity production that the producer registers 
for direct payments.  Payment acres are equal to eighty-five percent of the registered base 
acres.  Direct payment base acreage is not linked to a specific commodity, i.e. a producer 
may claim all farm acres as corn base acreage, even if those acres are planted to 
soybeans.  However, for simplicity, it is assumed that direct payments received 
correspond to the crop cultivated.  For example, for an acre allocated to the corn-soybean 
rotation, it is assumed that half of the acre is registered as corn base acreage and half is 
registered as soybean base acreage.  The direct payment yield per-acre is a historic farm 
average, which is approximated using the average yield, by commodity, across Crawford 
and Shelby counties from 1994-2003 (Iowa NASS).   
 The amount of counter-cyclical payments received depends on the same base and 
payment acres used to determine direct payments.  The total payment is based on the 
counter-cyclical payment yield, the effective price, and the target price.  The counter-
cyclical payment yield assumed is the two-county historical average, as described in the 
previous sub-section.38  The effective price is the greater of the sum of the commodity’s 
 
 
Table 4.5.  Support Payment and Marketing Assistance Loan Rates for Select 
Crops, in Dollars per Bushel 
Direct 
Payment Rate 
Counter-Cyclical Target 
Prices 
National Marketing 
Assistance Loan Rates 
Crop 2002-07  2002-03  2004-07  2002-03  2004-07  
Corn 0.280 2.60 2.63 1.98 1.95 
Oats 0.024 1.40 1.44 1.35 1.33 
Soybeans 0.440 5.80 5.80 5.00 5.00 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (2003). 
 
                                                 
38 In reality, the counter-cyclical yield may differ slightly from the direct payment yield because producers 
were allowed the opportunity to update the yield estimate in 2002, based on yields from 1998-2001.   
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direct payment rate and its producer price, or the sum of the direct payment rate and the 
national loan rate.   
In order to receive a loan deficiency payment, a producer must specify the amount 
of the current year’s production to be used as collateral.  In practice, the LDP rate is 
determined daily as the difference between the national loan rate and the daily posted 
county price for a program commodity.  Therefore, the day on which a producer chooses 
to apply for the loan determines the total amount of the loan.  However, the model, as 
constructed, cannot account for daily commodity price fluctuations.  Therefore, total 
LDPs are estimated based on the difference in the annual commodity price and the 
national loan rate.  The direct payment rate, target prices, and the national loan rate 
defined by the 2002 Farm Act are reported in Table 4.5. 
  Conservation payments received in Crawford and Shelby counties were 
administered primarily through the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP).  In 2003, total EQIP payments to 
Crawford and Shelby county producers amounted to $124 and $60 thousand, 
respectively, less than a tenth of the payments received through the CRP.  Because total 
EQIP payments are so small in magnitude and because it is a cost-share program that 
cannot be linked directly to specific land use activities, this conservation program is not 
considered in the model.   
  The CRP is a voluntary program administered by the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency (FSA).  When a producer chooses to enroll cropland 
in the program, that land is taken out of production and planted in long-term ground 
cover.  To be eligible, the cropland must have been devoted to the production of an 
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agricultural commodity for at least four years between 1996 and 2001, or it must be 
marginal pastureland suitable for use as a riparian buffer. 39  The land must also be 
classified as highly erodible, be expiring CRP acreage, or be located in a national or state 
CRP conservation priority area.  CRP bids for contracts are accepted based on their 
ranking on the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI).  The EBI is based on the land’s 
potential for wildlife habitat benefits, water quality benefits from reduced erosion, 
nutrient runoff, nutrient leaching, on-farm benefits from reduced erosion, air quality 
benefits from reduced wind erosion, the likelihood that benefits will persist after the 
contract expires, and cost. 
   The FSA offers four types of payments for land enrolled in the CRP.  For 
enrolled acres, the FSA distributes a payment equal to the land rental rate, which is based 
on the relative productivity of the soil within the county and the average dryland cash 
rent or cash-rent equivalent.40  Producers may offer to retire land for a lower rental rate to 
increase the likelihood that their enrollment bid will be accepted.   
 
 
Table 4.6.  Average Rental Payment for Conservation Reserve Program Land in 
2002, by County 
County Acres Enrolled 
Total Rental Payment 
($1000) 
Avg. Rental Payment 
per Acre ($) 
Crawford 11432 1357 118.70 
Shelby 7961 951 119.46 
Total 19393 2308 119.01 
Source: Acres enrolled, USDA FSA; Total payments, NASS, 2002 Census of Agriculture 
 
                                                 
39 The land must also be “physically and legally capable of being planted in a normal manner to an 
agricultural commodity” (USDA, 2003). 
40 In addition, the FSA administers maintenance incentive payments of up to $5 per acre per year, cost-
share assistance of no more than 50 percent of the cost of establishing an approved cover practice, and 
additional incentives of no more than 20 percent of the annual rental payment for additional conservation 
practices. 
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  There are several simplifying assumptions used to calculate CRP payments in the 
model.  It is assumed that a uniform payment is received for each acre of land retired 
from production.  The average per-acre payment rate is derived from the total amount of 
payments received according to the 2002 Census of Agriculture and the total number of 
enrolled acres as of July of 2002 (Iowa Farm Service Agency [FSA]).  The payment rate 
is reported in Table 4.6.  In this analysis, the costs of establishing CRP approved 
practices on enrolled land are not included due to the variety of potential CRP practices 
producers may undertake.41  The relative profitability of enrolling land in the CRP may 
therefore be overstated.  In addition, because slope is the only form of land heterogeneity 
allowed in the model, ecoreserve (CRP) acres are assigned based solely on topography.  
Therefore, the spatial allocation of ecoreserve acres may not coincide with their actual 
location.  For example, CRP acres in the model may be placed on marginal land, which is 
that on higher slopes.  However, land on the lowest slopes is adjacent to waterways, and 
may be retired for use as a riparian buffer.  This section concludes the discussion of the 
technical coefficients of land use production. 
 
4.2.  Livestock Enterprises 
 
 This section begins with a brief description of the representative livestock 
production activities chosen for inclusion in the mathematical programming model.  In 
the first subsection, the technical details of livestock production are outlined, including a 
representative production timeline for each type of marketed animal.  The final 
subsection presents the technical assumptions and coefficients used to parameterize the 
                                                 
41 These include, among others, the planting of grasses or trees, establishment of wildlife habitat, the 
construction of field windbreaks, diversions, erosion control structures, grass waterways, vegetative filter 
strips, contour grass strips, shelter-belts, living snow fences, alley cropping, riparian/wetland buffers, cross 
wind trap strips, or the restoration of wetland or introduction of salinity reducing vegetation. 
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model, including revenue and cost of production data, livestock housing requirements, 
and manure nutrient production.   
 Livestock production in Crawford and Shelby counties is predominantly focused 
on finished swine and beef cattle.  There are several points during the maturation of these 
animals at which they can be sold: immediately after weaning, after an intermediate stage 
of growth, or upon reaching finished market weight.  Using data from the 2002 Census of 
Agriculture on the number of breeding swine and cattle and the total number of swine 
and cattle marketed in 2002 in the two counties, it is estimated that over half of all swine 
(51 percent), and nearly two-thirds (66 percent) of all beef cattle marketed from the two 
counties were earlier imported as feeder animals (I-FARM).  These estimates indicate 
that, on the whole, livestock production in Crawford and Shelby is focused on finishing 
animals, rather than on producing feeder animals to be sold for finishing elsewhere. 
The livestock activities that best characterize current livestock production patterns 
are therefore those that carry animals through to their final market weight.  There may be 
an exchange of immature animals between producers within Crawford and Shelby 
counties.  However, it is assumed that there is no sale before maturity outside of the two 
counties.  Four representative livestock activities, two each for swine and beef cattle 
production, are included in the model.  For swine, a farrow-to-finish and a finishing 
enterprise are included.  Similarly, the beef cattle enterprises considered are cow-calf 
production and finishing.  The farrow-to-finish swine and the cow-calf beef cattle 
production enterprises require investment in and maintenance of a breeding herd.  There 
is therefore both a stock and a flow element to livestock production.  The model is 
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constructed to assign the number of head marketed from each enterprise, and therefore 
explicitly focuses on the flow of livestock through Crawford and Shelby counties.   
For each of these enterprises, there are two methods of production considered: an 
intensive method, which corresponds to a confinement or grain-fed production system, 
and an extensive or pasture-based system.  The exception is the finishing stage of hog 
production for which only a confinement enterprise is considered.  There are alternatives 
to confinement finishing hog production, namely finishing in hoop structures.  However, 
this option is not included in the model because reliable data on the costs of production 
for such systems are not sufficiently developed at this time.   
While pasture-based systems are the exception, rather than the rule, the inclusion 
of this option has important implications with respect to land use scenarios that require or 
encourage the expansion of pasture acreage.  Specifically, if the production of pasture-
based livestock becomes more profitable, it may encourage the production of pasture, 
which would generate ecological benefits, in terms of reduced soil erosion and fertilizer 
applications.  Rewarding the production of extensively produced livestock may provide a 
means, aside from land-use based payments, of encouraging the provision of 
environmental goods and services.  This potential will be explored in Chapter 5 by 
examining the impact of a price premium on the production of pasture-based livestock.   
  
 4.2.1.  Swine and Cattle Production 
 
  For each swine and beef cattle enterprise, there are several stages of production.  
The following text, along with Figures 4.1 and 4.2, describes the length of each stage of 
production and the assumed growth rate of livestock during each stage.  The technical 
parameters described rely heavily on the information provided in the livestock enterprise 
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budgets published by the Iowa State University Extension, and on the parameters used in 
the I-FARM Integrated Crop and Livestock Production and Biomass Planning Tool 
formulated by researchers at Iowa State University.   
 
  4.2.1.1.  Swine Production Cycles 
 
  After insemination, sows are in gestation for 111 days.  At the end of the gestation 
period, the sow farrows (gives birth to a litter of piglets).  Piglets are weaned from the 
lactating sow at a weight of 20 pounds each.  The average growth rate of a piglet during 
this production period is 0.45 pounds per day.  The assumed litter size for sows farrowing 
in confinement and on pasture are 9 and 8 piglets per sow, respectively.  After weaning, 
piglets are raised from 20 to 50 pounds, at an average growth rate of 0.81 pounds per day.  
During this period piglets are referred to as “nursery” pigs.  Upon reaching 50 pounds, a 
pig enters its “finishing” stage, and is raised to a market weight of 250 pounds, with an 
average daily gain of 1.61 pounds.  At this point, the animal is sold.  The total length of a 
farrow-to-finish cycle is 202 days.42  For simplicity, it is assumed that all piglets 
produced per litter, as above, are marketed.  By making this assumption, the piglet 
mortality rate and the number of animals recycled into the breeding inventory are set 
equal to zero.  In reality, about one piglet per litter is not marketed.  The assumption of 
zero loss is one that is made for all livestock considered in the model, and is meant to 
simplify the calculation of parameter estimates.  The effect of maintaining this 
assumption is that it tends to overstate the total revenue earned per livestock enterprise.  
  The finishing hog enterprise involves purchasing a 50-pound feeder pig and 
raising it to its full market weight.  The production cycle of a finishing hog enterprise is  
                                                 
42 Length of cycle is calculated as the sum of days to raise lactating sows and piglets (41), nursery/feeder 
pigs (37), and finishing feeder pigs (124). 
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Figure 4.2.  Stages of Swine Growth, Including Mean Growth Rate by Stage 
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identical to the finishing stage for farrow-to-finish hogs, whether produced in 
confinement or on pasture.  Figure 4.2, below, illustrates the stages of hog production 
graphically.  There is no difference in the growth rate of hogs farrowed on pasture and in 
confinement.  The two production systems differ only in terms of litter size. 
 
  4.2.1.2.  Cattle Production Cycles 
  Each cow-calf unit is assumed to produce one calf per year.  The first stage of 
growth takes a calf from 100 lbs (birth weight) to 500 lb at a rate of 2.92 pounds per day.  
This is the “calf stage” referred to in Figure 4.2.  At 500 pounds, a calf is considered a 
feeder animal.  The period during which a feeder calf is raised from 500 pounds to 720 
pounds is termed the “backgrounding stage,” during which the calf grows at an average 
rate of 2.43 pounds per day.  Throughout these two stages, all calves are assumed to be 
 69 
 
grazing pasture, and identical growth rates are assumed across extensive and intensive 
production systems.  The distinction between intensively and extensively produced cattle 
enters when a calf reaches its finishing stage.  Cattle finishing may take place either in a 
feedlot (grain-finished) or on pasture (grass-finished).  The growth rate of calves raised 
on pasture is assumed to be 2.43 pounds per day, while that of cattle finished on grain is 
3.13 pounds per day.  The finished weight of beef cattle produced using either method is 
1150 lbs per head.  The total length of the production cycle for grass-finished cattle from 
birth to sale is 405 days and that for grain-based cattle is one year (365 days).     
 
Figure 4.3.  Stages of Cattle Growth, Including Mean Growth Rate by Stage 
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  The finishing cattle enterprise differs from a cow-calf operation in that feeder 
calves are purchased from outside Crawford and Shelby counties, at a weight of 500 
pounds, and are raised to their finished market weight.  Finishing cattle may be produced 
in a feedlot or on pasture.  The production cycle length and growth rates are identical to 
the finishing stage of an animal produced from a cow-calf enterprise.  Figure 4.3 
illustrates the three stages of cattle growth. 
 
  4.2.2.  Livestock Data 
  Annual head of livestock marketed by producers in Crawford and Shelby counties 
is an endogenous variable in the MP model.  The technical livestock coefficients used to 
parameterize the model are therefore stated on a per-head-marketed basis.  Because the 
data pertaining to livestock production are culled from a number of sources, they are 
stated in a variety of units.  The assumptions made about livestock production cycles in 
the previous subsection are used to convert the coefficients into units that are consistent 
with the model formulation.  The data, sources, and equations used to calculate livestock 
parameters are discussed in the next three sub-sections. 
  
  4.2.2.1.  Feed Requirements 
  The livestock feed requirements per head produced are divided into three rations: 
a grain ration, a forage ration, and a grazing ration.  The grain ration can be satisfied by 
corn, the forage ration can be filled by alfalfa hay/forage and/or grass-legume hay, and 
the grazing ration may be satisfied by continuous grass-legume pasture and/or grass-
legume pasture in rotation.  The mapping of the feed rations to specific crops was 
described in Table 3.2, in Chapter 3.  The feed requirements for each animal, with the 
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exception of grass-finished beef cattle, are taken from the Iowa State University 
Extension Publication, Livestock Enterprise Budgets for Iowa – 2004 (May, Edwards, 
and Lawrence, 2004).  The feed requirements for the swine farrow-to-finish enterprises 
reported in the ISU Extension budgets require further calculation to convert them from a 
per-litter to a per-head requirement.  To do so, the total feed requirement is divided by the 
weaning average per litter for each production system.43   
  The feed requirement for grass-finished beef consists of a pasture requirement 
and, because the production cycle lasts for over a year, feed required to winter the animal.  
The wintering feed requirement for grass-finished cattle is estimated as one-third of the 
number of acres of pasture needed per year (the winter is assumed to last four months) 
multiplied by the grass-legume hay yield.  The hay requirement is added to the feed 
requirements published in the ISU Extension enterprise budgets.  The feed requirements, 
in units per head marketed, are outlined in Table 4.7, below. 
  As described in Chapter 3, livestock feed may come from one of two sources: 
feed crops may be exchanged between crop and livestock production activities within the 
two-county area, or they may be purchased on the market.  To calculate the total 
expenditure on feed, feed crops produced within the two counties are valued at their cost 
of production, while purchased feed is valued at the feed crop’s producer price (reported 
in Table 4.2) plus ten percent to account for transportation and storage costs.  As was 
previously discussed, the grazing feed requirement is equivalent to a stocking density 
limitation, and must therefore be satisfied by pasture acres produced within the two-
county area. 
                                                 
43 The weaning averages, as opposed to the final number marketed, are used because mortality and 
inventory replacement rates are already incorporated into the published requirements. 
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Table 4.7.  Livestock Feed and Housing Requirements per Head Marketed, by 
Livestock Type, Enterprise, and Production System 
Feed Ration 
Housing 
(acres x 10
Grain 
(bushels) 
Forage Graze 
-4Livestock Enterprise ) (tons) (acres) 
Swine     
 Farrow-to-Finish     
  Confinement 105.0   3.87 
  Pasture 97.0  0.2 2.73 
 Finishing     
  Confinement 9.6   2.02 
Beef Cattle     
 Cow-Calf*     
  Feedlot 64.0 2.50 2.5 20.16 
  Pasture 4.0 2.12 2.5 12.60 
 Finishing     
  Feedlot 61.0 0.65  13.90 
  Pasture  0.02 2.5 6.30 
*All calves born domestically are raised on pasture before entering the finishing stage.  At that point, the 
calf either continues grazing pasture (pasture-finished), or is moved to a feedlot, where it is finished on a 
grain/hay ration. 
Sources: May, Edwards, and Lawrence (2004); Lawrence, et al. (2001); Minnesota Institute for 
Sustainable Agriculture (MISA) (2001); Schuster, et al. (2001); Honeyman and Weber (1996) 
 
  4.2.2.2.  Housing Requirements 
 A housing requirement per unit of livestock produced is included to relate 
livestock production to the land use allocation.  Housing may take the form of a physical 
building, as for confinement hog production, or it may be an open shelter or feedlot, as 
for cattle production.  Housing does not include pasture required for livestock 
production.44   
  The housing requirements per unit of livestock are compiled from two sources.  
Cattle requirements are taken from the ISU Extension Publication Beef Feedlot Systems 
                                                 
44 For pasture-farrowed hogs, housing is included in the pasture requirement. 
 73 
 
Manual (Lawrence et al., 2001).  To parameterize the model, an intermediate value is 
chosen from a variety of cattle housing alternatives.  All cattle are assumed to require 25 
square feet of space inside a shelter.  Cattle in a feedlot require 55 square feet of shelter 
and lot space, combined.  For cow-calf units, 25 square feet of space is required per unit 
before the calf reaches its finishing stage, after which separate barn and feedlot space are 
required.  Swine confinement housing requirements are found in the publication Hogs 
Your Way (Minnesota Institute for Sustainable Agriculture [MISA], 2001).  In each stage 
of its production cycle, a hog is located in a different housing facility.  The total housing 
requirement per head is calculated as the sum of the requirement in each phase.  Sows 
require a 35 square foot area during farrowing and while lactating with their litter of 
piglets.45  In the grower stage, piglets are moved to a nursery facility, where they require 
2.85 square feet of space each.  In the finishing stage, hogs require eight square feet in a 
confinement facility.  The square footage housing requirements for all animals are 
multiplied by 1.1 to account for land area around buildings and area within buildings that 
animals do not occupy, such as walkways and storage rooms.  The housing requirements 
are converted to acres using a conversion factor of 43,650 square feet per acre, and are 
reported in Table 4.7. 
 
  4.2.2.3.  Prices and Costs of Production 
 As in the land use component, the median producer price per finished animal is 
used to parameterize the baseline mathematical programming model.  Producer price data 
for each county are obtained from the Iowa National Agricultural Statistics Service (Iowa 
NASS) for the years 1994-2003.  The prices are reported in dollars per hundredweight.  
                                                 
45 To calculate space per head marketed, the total area per litter is divided by the weaning average per litter.  
This estimate applies only to confinement farrow-to-finish enterprises. 
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The assumed weight of each animal is used to convert the price per hundredweight into 
price per head.  The price received per head of livestock is reported in Table 4.8. 
Feeder pigs and calves are variable inputs into the production of finishing swine 
and cattle.  The price per feeder calf is calculated as the product of its weight, in 
hundredweight (cwt.), and the median producer price (in dollars per hundredweight) as 
documented in the Iowa NASS.  While price data is available for calves, is not available 
for feeder piglets.  The price per piglet assumed in the ISU Extension budgets is used as 
the baseline producer price.  While the prices of all other inputs into livestock  
production are fixed, it is unreasonable to assume that the prices of feeder animals remain 
constant when the prices of finished animals vary.  Therefore, the cost of each type of 
feeder animal is varied by the same percentage as the prices of finished animals when 
conducting price sensitivity analyses.   
The variable and fixed costs of livestock production are obtained from the same 
ISU Extension publication as the feeding requirements (May, Edwards, and Lawrence, 
2004).  Each input into livestock production, excluding feeder animals, is assumed to be 
available in perfectly elastic supply.  The costs of livestock production are calculated as 
the input requirement per head multiplied by a fixed price for that input.  The labor 
requirement, in hours per animal produced, is reported separately from all other variable 
costs of production.  The assumed wage rate for labor in livestock production is $9.50 per 
hour.  “Other” variable costs include supplements and minerals, veterinary and health, 
machinery, equipment, marketing, and miscellaneous expenditures, as well as the interest 
on feed and other costs.  The ownership (fixed) costs of livestock production include the 
depreciation and interest payments on fixed factors of production, including housing.   
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Table 4.8.  Median Price, Labor Requirement, and Costs of Production per Head 
Marketed, by Livestock Type, Enterprise, and Production System 
Other 
Variable 
Costs ($) 
Median Price Labor Ownership 
Costs ($) Livestock Enterprise ($ per cwt.) (hours) 
Swine 41.10    
 Farrow-to-Finish     
  Confinement  1.25 43.96 20.31 
  Pasture  1.67 47.39 12.95 
 Finishing     
  Confinement  0.50 31.87 13.04 
Beef Cattle 64.05    
 Cow-Calf     
  Feedlot  10 130.41 152.70 
  Pasture  12.69 134.81 168.80 
 Finishing     
  Feedlot  3 79.28 21.00 
  Pasture  0.625 56.29 21.00 
Sources: Iowa National Agricultural Statistics Service; May, Edwards, and Lawrence (2004)  
 
 “Other” variable costs and ownership costs are reported as a fixed dollar amount per 
head of livestock marketed.  For farrow-to-finish swine, the labor input and costs of 
producing each head of livestock marketed are derived using the average litter size per 
enterprise, as in the feed requirement derivation.  The labor requirement, variable costs, 
and ownership costs per head of livestock marketed from each enterprise are reported in 
Table 4.8.   
 
  4.2.2.4.  Manure Production and Nutrient Content 
  Livestock manure production is a key component of the land use model.  
Allowing manure nutrients to substitute for purchased fertilizer inputs allows for 
integration between crop and livestock production activities.  Moreover, the application 
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of manure nutrients to cropland affects the system’s environmental impacts.  Specifically, 
by ensuring that manure nutrient applications do not exceed crop nutrient requirements, 
excess nitrogen applications can be limited.  Doing so will reduce nitrate runoff and 
leaching, both of which are sources of water contamination.      
  To specify the amount of nutrients produced per head of livestock, data from the 
American Society of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE) Manure Production and 
Characteristics Manual are used (ASAE, 2004).  The manure nutrient production 
estimates are in total pounds per head per finishing animal and by pounds per day-animal 
for inventory breeding animals.  Conversion of the parameters is required to ensure that 
the manure nutrient production coefficients correspond to the modeled unit of livestock 
allocation.  The manure produced by inventory animals involved in the production of 
each head of marketed livestock must be calculated and added to the amount produced by 
the marketed animal. 
  For each inventory animal used in the production of one head of marketed 
livestock, the pounds of nutrient production per day are multiplied by the number of days 
in the stage of the marketed animal’s production cycle during which the inventory animal 
is used.  For example, a lactating sow is used in the production of a litter of piglets for a 
total of 41 days.  To obtain the total amount of nitrogen produced by that lactating sow, 
nitrogen production in pounds per day per lactating sow is multiplied by 41 days.  The  
total nitrogen produced by a lactating sow is divided by litter size to derive the amount of 
nitrogen per head produced during that portion of a hog’s production cycle.  The same 
exercise is completed for a gestating sow.  The total amount of nitrogen produced by each 
hog marketed from a farrow-to-finish enterprise is the amount produced by lactating and 
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Table 4.9.  Manure Nutrient Production in Pounds per Head Marketed, by 
Livestock Type, Enterprise, and Production System 
Manure Nutrient Content 
Total N 
Lost (%) 
Potash Nitrogen Phosphate 
(PLivestock Enterprise (N) 20 ) (K O) 5 2
Swine     
 Farrow-to-Finish     
  Confinement 12.90 2.40 6.02 26.5 
  Pasture 13.15 2.48 6.19 35.7 
 Finishing     
  Confinement 10.00 1.70 4.40 26.5 
Beef Cattle     
 Cow-Calf     
  Feedlot 126.31 22.99 87.76 51.1 
  Pasture 142.21 25.10 98.74 55.0 
 Finishing     
  Feedlot 54.45 7.23 37.62 61.5 
  Pasture 70.35 9.34 48.60 55.0 
Source: American Society of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE) (2004). 
 
gestating sows (divided by pigs per litter) plus the amount produced by a pig in its 
nursery stage and in its finishing stage.  The same calculation is performed for each 
livestock enterprise.  Table 4.9 summarizes the amount of manure nutrients produced by 
each head of livestock marketed.   
  The nutrients available for crop production from manure differ from the 
coefficients presented in Table 4.9 because of losses from storage and application.  For 
simplicity, the predominant storage and application systems for each type of livestock are 
assumed to be used by all producers in the study area.  The storage and application losses 
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46utilized in the model apply only to nitrogen (N).   It is assumed that all confinement 
swine manure is stored in a pit with 25 percent N losses.  Swine manure is most 
commonly applied via injection, with an additional N loss of two percent.  Manure 
excreted and stored on the ground, as is the case for pasture-farrowed swine, feedlot 
cattle, and pasture-based cattle, loses 45 percent of its original N content.  Cattle manure 
from feedlots is most often applied using the dry broadcast method, which results in an 
additional N loss of 30 percent.  Because pasture-based animals are essentially applying 
manure while grazing, there are no additional N losses beyond those from storage.  For 
those animals that are on pasture for part of their production cycle and are in confinement 
for the remainder, a weighted average of the manure N losses is calculated.  The weight 
used is the number of days in each portion of the production cycle, as a proportion of the 
entire production cycle.  The total losses from storage and application for each head 
marketed, calculated as the product of storage and application losses, are presented in 
Table 4.9. 
  This section concludes the presentation of the technical parameters of crop and 
livestock production.  The coefficients in this chapter were reported in great detail 
because their validity is crucial in determining the predictive ability of the mathematical 
programming model.  The next chapter begins the model analysis by describing the 
baseline model allocation and testing its sensitivity to changes in the returns to 
commodity production. 
 
  
                                                 
46 While there may be some phosphate and potash losses, estimates suggest that they are orders of 
magnitude less than nitrogen storage/application losses.  Moreover, regulations pertaining to manure 
nutrient spreading apply only to nitrogen, at present. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BASELINE MODEL RESULTS 
AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 define the algebraic structure and the technical parameters of the 
mathematical programming (MP) model that forms the foundation of this analysis.  This 
chapter focuses on developing an understanding of the economic determinants of 
landscape-level production patterns in the study area.  To facilitate the discussion, the 
chapter is divided into two sections.  The first describes the baseline solution of the MP 
model, with an analysis of the extent to which the baseline replicates observed production 
practices.  This section is used primarily to establish the validity of the baseline model.  If 
the model replicates reality reasonably well, it provides a starting point for simulating the 
outcome of the policy scenarios examined in Chapter 6.  The second section examines the 
sensitivity of the model’s baseline solution to changes in the relative returns to 
agricultural commodities.  The sensitivity analyses are used to identify the economic 
factors that drive the model solution.  The results of these tests yield several important 
policy implications, in and of themselves.   
 
5.1.  The Baseline Model Solution  
 The MP model is solved using the BDMLP solver in the General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) software.  The baseline model consists of 150 rows, 413 
columns, and 3209 non-zero entries.  The initial model solution is based on the equation 
structure outlined in Chapter 3 and the technical coefficients of agricultural production 
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from Chapter 4.  If these parameters and equations are representative of reality, the model 
solution should correspond to observed patterns of production.  
 It was necessary to make one adjustment to the model structure, based on the 
initial model solution.  The producer price of alfalfa hay is high relative to its cost of 
production, making alfalfa by far the most profitable crop to sell on the market.  If alfalfa 
sales are unconstrained, the model assigns all crop acres to the six-year alfalfa rotation.  
The corn produced from the rotation is fed to hogs alone, so that all of the alfalfa 
produced, 1.41 million tons, can be sold on the market.  This quantity is greater than 15 
times the amount of alfalfa that was produced in 2002.  Because hay and forage crops are 
bulky and expensive to transport, their primary use is as an input into livestock 
production.  Based on the number of cattle produced in 2002 in the two counties and total 
alfalfa production, the estimated amount of alfalfa sales is 1,500 tons.  This figure is used 
to specify an upper bound on alfalfa sales.47     
 Table 5.1 presents the model’s baseline solution (with limited alfalfa sales) along 
with published data on observed production practices in Crawford and Shelby counties.  
The majority of the data used to describe current conditions are obtained for each county 
from the 2002 Census of Agriculture (National Agricultural Statistics Service [NASS]).  
The estimates for each county are summed to generate the figures presented for the study 
region.   
 In several cases, the unit of measure of the published estimates does not directly 
correspond with that used in the MP model.  The foremost discrepancy is in the 
description of the land use allocation.  The model allocates acres to specific management 
                                                 
47 Similarly, total sales of grass-legume hay are fixed at zero, although this limit is not binding in the 
baseline model solution. 
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practices, within which the proportion of crops produced is fixed.  The Census provides 
estimates of acres harvested by crop, not by rotation.  The number of acres by crop in the 
baseline model solution can be derived based on the number of acres allocated to each 
land use activity.  However, the relative proportions of crop acreages in the baseline 
model will likely not correspond to those reported in the Census.   
 The method of reporting government payments, and the profit indicator used by 
the Census, also differ from those used in the MP model.  The Census reports the total 
amount of Federal Farm Program (FFP) payments received by county producers, but does 
not disaggregate that amount by program at the county level.48  The total amount of FFP 
payments reported in the Census likely includes payments from programs other than 
those modeled.  However, the two dominant income support programs are direct and 
counter-cyclical payments, which accounted for 55.7 percent of total Farm Service 
Agency program payments in 2003 (NASS, 2004).  The contribution of other programs to 
total government payments received in the two counties is likely to be relatively minor.  
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to use the aggregate payment amount as a comparison.   
 The profit indicator also differs substantially between the baseline and the 
Census: the latter estimates total net cash farm income (NCFI) for all producers in each 
county.  The NCFI is defined as “the cash earnings realized within a calendar year from 
the sales of farm production and the conversion of assets, both inventories and capital 
consumption, into cash” (NASS, “2002 Census”).  The NCFI is intended to be a measure 
of liquidity, and therefore does not include non-cash costs, such as depreciation, which 
are included in the calculus of the net return to land and management.  There is no 
measure reported in the Census akin to the average return to land optimized in the MP 
                                                 
48 Estimates of spending by program are available at the national level (NASS, “2002 Census”). 
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model.  Data on the average cash rental rate for cropland between 1994 and 2002 is taken 
from an Iowa State University (ISU) Extension publication (ISU Extension, 2002).  The 
model objective value is therefore compared on the basis of two indicators.  The net 
return to land and management (the average return to land multiplied by the number of 
acres available) is compared to the NCFI, and the average return to land is compared to 
the median average cropland rental rate between 1994 and 2002.  Although the units of 
measure are not perfectly consistent, these estimates are the most reliable and readily 
available method of evaluating the performance of the baseline MP model. 
 The baseline model solution allocates 695,456 acres to the corn-soybean rotation, 
and 26,440 acres to the six-year alfalfa rotation.  The total crop acres allocated across 
these two rotations are reported in Table 5.1.  Both corn and soybean acreages, by far the 
dominant land uses across the two counties are reasonably close to those observed in 
reality, with errors of +7.3 and +17.7 percent, respectively.  However, the model does not 
perform as well, relative to current conditions, with the allocation of other crops.  Alfalfa 
acreage in the model solution is 44.9 percent less than the actual acreage observed, while 
oat acres are over twice their reported level.  The discrepancy between the ratio of oat 
and alfalfa acres observed in reality and that in the model solution is due to the model 
assumption that all alfalfa acres are grown with an oat leader crop.  An alfalfa crop can 
also be established using herbicide, an option that is not included in the model.   
 No pasture acres are assigned in the baseline model solution, which can be 
explained by the assumption of homogeneous land quality and by the non-optimality of 
pasture-based livestock enterprises.  In regard to the former, the exogenous supply of 
arable land in the model, derived from GIS images, cannot be differentiated based on its 
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suitability for cropping.  All arable land within one slope class is assumed to be 
homogeneous.  In reality, some land may be unsuitable for cropping but useful for 
pasture, such as land that is rocky.  Further, the baseline model solution does not include 
any livestock activities that require land for grazing.  Like alfalfa hay/forage, grass-
legume hay/pasture is primarily used locally as an intermediate input into livestock 
production.  In the absence of livestock, grass-legume pasture is not an economically 
rewarding land use activity. 
 Because they are intermediate inputs into livestock production, the allocation of 
land to alfalfa and grass-legume hay/pasture is driven by the optimal livestock allocation.  
Current estimates indicated that livestock are produced from each of the four 
representative enterprises.  However, the baseline model solution allocates livestock only 
to farrow-to-finish swine production and finishing beef cattle.  The optimal allocation 
does not include the production of cow-calf units, which require pasture and a greater 
amount of alfalfa feed than do finishing cattle.  The last column of Table 5.1 reports the 
model allocation when head of livestock marketed livestock are fixed at their current 
levels.49  In this case, the allocation of acres to alfalfa and grass-legume more closely 
reflects current conditions.  Oat acreage remains overstated because of the assumption 
that all alfalfa acres are grown with an oat leader crop. 
 It is useful to briefly summarize the model’s allocation of land use activities 
across the landscape.  Recall that terrain in the model is assumed homogeneous within a 
grade, but is heterogeneous across grades.  The profitability of each rotation is related to 
slope through a yield loss function.  The return to the intensive corn-soybean rotation 
declines more rapidly as slope increases than do the returns to the six-year rotations and 
                                                 
49 Based on estimates by Ed van Ouwerkerk, 2004 (I-FARM).  
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to continuous pasture.  The model is expected to allocate the most profitable land use 
activity, the corn-soybean rotation, starting on the lowest grades and moving up the 
landscape until another land use activity either becomes more profitable through the yield 
loss function, or until a constraint on the acreage allocation becomes binding. 
 The model allocates crop production to those grades on which land is most 
productive, with slopes ranging from zero to 17.  Ecoreserve acres occupy all land above 
that point.  This reflects that the return to CRP land is invariant with increases in slope, 
while the return to crop production is declining.  The optimal placement of livestock 
housing acres is on the 17 percent grade, which indicates that the model is reacting to the 
higher opportunity cost of converting or retiring “prime” cropland, i.e. land on lower 
slopes with a relatively greater per-acre crop yield potential.  The only seeming anomaly 
in the baseline allocation is that acres in the six-year alfalfa rotation are placed alongside 
acres in the corn-soybean rotation on land with a zero percent grade.  Because the crop 
yield from the six-year rotation declines less rapidly with slope than the corn-soybean 
rotation, the expectation is that the six-year rotation will optimally be placed on grades 
above the corn- soybean rotation.  However, the six-year rotation is allocated to the most 
productive cropland because of the relatively high return to alfalfa used in livestock 
production.    
 All livestock production in the baseline solution is allocated to two enterprises: 
farrow-to-finish confinement swine production, and finishing beef cattle in feedlots.  The 
total number of swine marketed in one year in the baseline model exceeds three million 
head, over three times the total number marketed according to the Census.  This excess in  
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Table 5.1.  Comparison of Current Conditions, as Published in the 2002 Census of Agriculture, to the Baseline Model Solution, 
and to the Solution when the Livestock Allocation is Fixed 
Current Conditions Model Baseline Fixed Livestock Allocation  
Crop Acres Crop Acres Crop Acres
Corn 332,185 Corn 356,533 Corn 326,580 
Soybean 299,092 Soybean 352,144 Soybean 318,794 
Land Allocation by Crop Oat 2,008 Oat 4,415 Oat 7,834 
Alfalfa 24,002 Alfalfa 13,220 Alfalfa 23,454 
Grassa 67,567 Grass-Legume  Grass-Legume 54,083 
Ecoreserve 22,526 Ecoreserve 22,526 Ecoreserve 22,526 
Total Head MarketedbLivestock Allocation Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive
Farrow-Finish 366,304 3,388,568  366,304  Swine Finishing 576,569   576,569  
Cow-Calf 21,633   21,633  Beef Finishing 44,865 82,909  44,865  
Government Payments ($m.)    
 Total DP,CCP 9.45 13.16 12.021 
 CRP 2.68 2.68 2.68 
Total Soil Erosion (m. tons)  6.65 4.26 
Net Return to Land and 
Management ($m.) 
c64.13 86.17 57.49 
dAverage Return to Land ($/acre) 111.00 115.53 77.09 
a: Census reports total land in pasture, which may not be a grass-legume mixture. 
b: Total marketed, may include both intensively and extensively produced livestock. 
c: Net cash farm income (NCFI) of operations.  Does not correspond directly to the net return to land and management (NRLM). 
d: Median cash rental rate for cropland, 1994-2002.  Median rental rate for pasture over the same period: $29.85 per acre. 
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hog production can be explained, in part, by the lack of a housing constraint in the model, 
and in part by the low producer price of corn.  By excluding a capital constraint, it is 
implicitly assumed that all physical (and human) capital is perfectly adjustable, such that, 
if the return to hog production were sufficiently high, farmers would instantaneously 
build more confinement facilities in order to capture positive returns on investment.   
 Imposing an upper bound on the amount of confinement swine produced tests the 
response of the model to a housing constraint.  When the amount of farrow-to-finish 
confinement swine operations is bounded in the model, surplus corn shifts into the next 
most profitable livestock production activity, finishing cattle.  The shift in livestock 
production is driven by the low producer price of grain corn.  Corn can either be sold on 
the market or it can be used as an input into livestock production.  In the baseline model 
solution, all of the corn produced in the two counties is fed to swine and beef cattle, 
which suggests that feeding corn to livestock is relatively more remunerative than 
allocating it to market sales.  When the producer price of corn is increased, such that 
selling corn is more profitable than channeling it into livestock production, swine are 
produced up to the maximum, and the remaining corn produced is sold.50
 The baseline swine result may be explained by the exclusion of several other 
factors from the model, namely cultural constraints (and rigidities), price endogeneity, 
and the benefits associated with risk diversification.  Cultural constraints could include 
issues surrounding odor and producer livestock production preferences.  In addition, the 
model assumes that commodity prices are exogenous and that there is a market for all 
livestock produced.  This assumption is likely unrealistic if hog production were 
expanded to such a degree. 
                                                 
50 This occurs when the corn price increases by 23 percent over the median price from 1994-2003. 
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 The number of beef cattle allocated by the model exceeds the total number of beef 
cattle marketed, according to the Census, by slightly less than 25 percent.  However, all 
beef cattle in the baseline solution are concentrated in feedlot finishing enterprises.  The 
optimal allocation suggests that the return to cattle produced in cow-calf units is less than 
finishing cattle.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that cow-calf enterprises are the choice 
enterprise of retired/leisure farmers.51  Therefore, cow-calf units may not be a profit-
maximizing activity, and would not be allocated by a model that assumes producers are 
strict profit maximizers.  Moreover, a cow-calf unit requires a substantial amount of 
pasture for production, about 2.5 acres per head of cattle marketed.  As previously 
mentioned, because the model assumes homogeneous land quality within a grade, the 
opportunity cost of allocating land to pasture is overstated for low-quality land that exists 
within a slope class.  By understating the relative return to pasture, the model also 
understates the relative return to cow-calf production. 
 The baseline amount of government payments received by producers in the two 
counties exceeds the amount reported in the Census.  It should be noted that initially all 
crop acres in the baseline model were assumed to be registered base acres (and were 
therefore eligible for direct and counter-cyclical payments).  However, this dramatically 
overstated the actual amount of payments received.  Based on the Census, only 56 
percent of all farms in the two counties received Federal Farm Program payments in 
2002.  To correct this discrepancy, payment base acres in the model are scaled down 
from the total amount of crop acres by a factor of 0.56.   
 Despite this correction, the total amount of government payments remains slightly 
greater in the baseline solution than in the Census because of the greater acreage 
                                                 
51 Based on a discussion with researchers and extension agents at Iowa State University.  
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allocation to program commodities (corn, soybeans, and oats).  A lower level of counter-
cyclical payments distributed in the model than in 2002 may mediate this overstatement.  
The median price of corn used to parameterize the model is $2.16 per bushel, which is 
$0.11 greater than the 2002 average price received in Iowa.  The counter-cyclical 
payment rate, based on the difference between the market and target prices, would be 
lower in the model than in actuality.  Assuming that the payment acres in the model and 
in reality are equal, the baseline model would under-predict the total amount of counter-
cyclical payments received. 
 The final bases of comparison for the baseline model allocation are the profit 
indicators used to measure the objective function.  Although the two measures differ, it is 
useful to establish that the baseline NRLM is in the same ballpark as the NCFI: the 
former exceeds the latter by slightly greater than $22 million, most likely due to the 
overstated livestock numbers.  When the livestock allocation is fixed, the NRLM more 
closely matches the reported NCFI.  Dividing the NRLM by the total number of 
productive acres in the model yields the average per-acre return to land.  Over the long 
run, the cash rental rate of cropland converges to the average return.52  Because the 
model solution represents a long-run equilibrium, the return to land is equivalent to the 
cash rental rate.  This is reported in the last row in Table 5.1.  The baseline model 
solution for the average return to land is reasonably close to, about four dollars per acre 
greater than, the published estimate.  It should be noted that the per-acre return to land in 
the model solution is averaged across all land uses.  When pasture acres are assigned, the 
average return to land reported in the model solution will be lower than that under an 
                                                 
52 However, the observed cropland rental rate likely does not perfectly correspond to the current return to 
cropland because of adjustment lags. 
 89 
 
allocation with no pasture (and will be less than the reported return to cropland).  This 
explains why the rental rate is higher in the baseline than under the solution with a fixed 
livestock allocation.   
 The model baseline solution does not perfectly replicate the results published in 
the Census, especially in the case of the livestock allocation.  However, the objective of 
this analysis is to examine the impact of policy on landscape-level land use patterns.  The 
baseline model land use allocation is reasonably close to observed acreages, especially in 
the case of the dominant crops produced within the study area.  Therefore, the baseline 
provides a reasonable starting point from which to simulate the impact of hypothetical 
policy instruments.  Before proceeding to the policy analysis in Chapter 6, it is useful to 
analyze the sensitivity of the model to changes in the initial commodity price parameters.  
Doing so will contribute to a better understanding of the economic factors driving the 
modeled land use allocation. 
 
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
This section presents a discussion of the sensitivity of the baseline model solution 
to changes in the initial parameters.  As a starting point, the reaction of the model to 
changes in commodity producer prices is explored.  The effects of price premia on 
pasture-farrowed hogs and grass-finished beef are also tested.  The final sub-section 
reports the model allocation with reduced levels of government payments.   
The relative commodity price changes are presented in Table 5.2 are the threshold 
values necessary to shift the baseline land use allocation.  Each value is expressed as the 
percent change from the median price between 1994 and 2003.  The table is organized as 
a matrix, with the modeled land use activities listed in the first row and the first column.  
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Those land use activities that are assigned zero acreage in the baseline model solution 
(six-year grass-legume and continuous pasture) are not included in the column listing.  
The table should be read as follows: starting from the corn-soybean rotation on the left, 
and moving to the right, the first square that contains text corresponds to the six-year 
alfalfa rotation.  This cell contains the commodity price changes that induce a reduction 
in acres assigned to the corn-soybean rotation and an increase in the acres assigned to the 
six-year alfalfa rotation.  Within this cell, each commodity that induces a shift in the land 
use assignment is listed, along with the direction and magnitude of the price change.   
Table 5.3 is a more detailed parallel to Table 5.2.  This table presents the acres 
assigned to each land use, the number of livestock allocated by the model, total soil 
erosion produced by the system, and the average return to land (ARL).  This information 
aids in the interpretation of the model response to each threshold value, the subject of the 
remainder of this section. 
  
 5.2.1.  Crop Price Changes 
 Because it is both the dominant cropping activity and the primary livestock feed, 
changes in the producer price of corn are expected to have the most noticeable impacts on 
the land use allocation.  When the corn price rises, it becomes more profitable to allocate 
land use acres to the more intensive corn-soybean rotation, as corn constitutes a greater 
proportion of the rotation than the six-year options.  The expected effect of an increase in 
the corn price is a shift out of more diversified cropping activities and into a more 
intensive production pattern.  If crop and livestock activities are optimally nonseparable, 
this would also be associated with a shift out of beef cattle production (which necessitates 
alfalfa) and into hog production (which relies only on corn).  This expectation is 
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supported by the results presented in Table 5.2.  With a rise in the corn price of 9 percent, 
land shifts out of the six-year rotation and cattle production, and into the corn-soybean 
rotation, with an increase in the number of hogs produced.   
As the producer price of corn rises further, it becomes relatively more profitable 
to sell corn than to allocate it to livestock feed.  With an increase of another 24 percent in 
the corn price (for a total of 33 percent), hogs are no longer produced.  All of the land in 
livestock housing shifts into the corn-soybean rotation, and all of the corn produced is 
sold.  With a total increase in the corn price of 59 percent, it is optimal for producers to 
remove land from ecoreserve (the Conservation Reserve Program), so that more corn can 
be produced and sold on the market.  This result follows from basic land use theory: with 
an increase in the return to corn, the opportunity cost of idle land increases, and marginal 
land is converted for use in crop production (“extensification”). 
Conversely, a decline in the corn price should be associated with a shift out of 
intensive row cropping, and into more diversified land use activities.  As the market corn 
price falls, its opportunity cost as a feed input also declines.  In addition, purchased grain 
corn (which is the producer price plus ten percent for storage and transportation) becomes 
less costly as an input into livestock production.  Both of these changes increase the 
relative profitability of livestock activities.  As shown in Table 5.2, the sensitivity results 
correspond to expectation.  At 21 percent below the median price, land shifts out of the 
corn-soybean rotation and into the six-year rotation.  At this point, no hogs are produced, 
the number of finishing cattle marketed increases, and corn is purchased for feed.  With 
an additional seven percent decrease in the corn price, the model pulls land out of 
ecoreserve for feed production and livestock housing.
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Table 5.2.  Minimum Percent Change in Commodity Prices Required to Shift the Land Use Allocation, Relative to the Model 
Baseline 
Land Use Entered 
Corn –  Six-Year  Six-Year Alfalfa Continuous 
Pasture 
Livestock 
Housing Soybean Rotation 
Grass-Legume  Ecoreserve Rotation Rotation Land Use Exited 
Corn: -21  
Corn –  Soybean: -56 
Soybean 
Rotation 
 Oat: +100    Corn: -21  
Cattle: +3  
Hogs: -1 
Corn: -56/+9 
Six Year – 
Alfalfa  
Soybean: +19 
Rotation 
Alfalfa: -36 
Cattle: -1 
Hogs: +1 
    Corn: -56/+9 Alfalfa: -36 
Corn: -28/+59  
Ecoreserve Cattle: +10 
Hogs: +8 
Corn: -28 
Cattle: +10    
Corn: -28 
Cattle: +10 
Hogs: +8 
Corn: +33 Soybean: -56 Livestock 
Housing 
Soybean: +19 Oat: +100     Cattle: -1 Cattle: +3 Hogs: +1 
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Table 5.3.  MP Model Solution with Select Threshold Price Changes, in Percent Deviation from the Median, from Table 5.2 
 
Crops Livestock 
 
Corn +9/ Swine +1/ 
Soybean +19 Corn -28 Soybean -56 Alfalfa -36 Cattle -1 Swine -1 Cattle +3 
Land Use Acres        
 Corn-Soybean Rotation 721,197 357,973 691,447 696,265 721,197 694,243 687,645 
 
Six Year – 
Alfalfa  716 367,192 30,451 25,630 716 27,654 34,256 
Rotation 
 Ecoreserve 22,526 19,045 22,526 22,526 22,526 22,526 22,526 
 Livestock Housing 1,355 1,584 1,370 1,373 1,355 1,372 1,367 
Head Livestock        
 Farrow-Finish Swine (m.) 3.65  3.37 3.39 3.65 3.38 3.35 
 Finishing Beef  1.14 m 86,184 82,607  83,900 89,290 Cattle 
Total Soil Erosion 
(m. tons) 6.67 6.03 6.39 6.65 6.67 6.63 5.75 
Average Return to 
Land ($/acre) 111.22/137.80 152.41 82.11 115.49 120.46/115.43 110.86 116.56 
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When the corn price declines by 56 percent, the land allocation begins to reverse 
its previous transition, shifting from the six-year rotation into corn-soybean production. 
At first glance, this result seems counterintuitive.  However, the result can be attributed to 
government payments.  Both counter-cyclical and loan-deficiency payments depend on 
the divergence between the corn market price and the pre-set price floor.  While there is 
an upper limit on the amount of payments each producer can collect in reality, there is no 
such limit imposed in the model.  With a decline in the corn price of 56 percent, direct, 
counter-cyclical, and loan-deficiency payments total $36.83 million, nearly three times 
the baseline amount.  At this point, the model begins to import hay to fulfill the cattle 
forage requirement and shifts land back into more intensive corn-soybean rotation to 
capture the increased return to program crops.   
The model allocation is far less sensitive to changes in the price of soybeans and 
oats than it is to fluctuations in the corn price.  Oats and soybeans are assumed to be sold 
by producers in the two counties for processing, and later purchased as a variable input 
into livestock production (e.g. soybean meal).  A decline in the soybean price, holding all 
else constant, decreases the relative profitability of the corn-soybean rotation because 
soybeans comprise a larger proportion of acreage in that land use activity.  Similarly, an 
increase in the oat price increases the relative profitability of the six-year alfalfa rotation.  
A decline the soybean price of 56 percent and an increase in the oat price of 100 percent 
cause a similar model response: land shifts land out of the corn-soybean rotation and into 
the six-year rotation, with a decrease in swine production and an increase in finishing 
cattle.  An increase in the soybean price of 19 percent causes the opposite response, 
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enhancing the profitability of the corn-soybean rotation.  However, no decline in the oat 
price alters the baseline land use allocation. 
Because the sale of alfalfa on the market is bounded in the model, an increase in 
the alfalfa price has no effect on the land use allocation.  However, a decrease in the 
alfalfa price reduces the relative profitability of the six-year alfalfa rotation.  When the 
price of alfalfa declines by 36 percent, there is only a small reduction in acreage in the 
six-year rotation, as alfalfa sales fall to zero.  Prior to that point, alfalfa sales rested on the 
upper bound of 1500 tons per year.  If the alfalfa price were to drop to by another seven 
percent, all land would shift out of the six-year alfalfa rotation and into the corn-soybean 
rotation.  Despite this shift, beef cattle production continues with purchased alfalfa used 
to satisfy the forage ration (because a decline in the producer price reduces the cost of 
purchased feed).   
Despite the fact that alfalfa and corn are both livestock feed crops, the model 
behaves differently to a decline in their producer prices: a reduction in the corn price 
encourages livestock production and the use of less intensive land use activities, while a 
decline in the alfalfa price causes the opposite to occur.  However, in both instances a fall 
in the producer price of the commodity drives the land use allocation away from the 
rotation that is more heavily weighted towards that commodity.  In the case of corn, the 
model allocation shifts towards the six-year alfalfa rotation and finishing beef cattle.  For 
a decline in the alfalfa price, the solution tends towards the two-year rotation and swine 
production.  The model behavior highlights that crop and livestock activities are 
optimally nonseparable.  A shift that increases the relative return to the corn-soybean 
rotation also increases the relative return to swine production because of the grain feed 
 96 
 
linkage.  Alternatively, an increase in the return to swine increases the value-added to the 
corn-soybean rotation as an intermediate input and the opportunity cost of selling corn on 
the market.  The same relationship holds true for the six-year alfalfa rotation and beef 
cattle. 
It is also worthwhile to interpret the blank cells in Table 5.2.  No change in 
commodity prices induces a shift into either the six-year grass-legume rotation (which 
includes two years of pasture) or into continuous pasture.  As previously discussed, this 
result is driven by the non-optimality of pasture-based livestock enterprises in the model 
solution, as well as the model’s inability to distinguish land heterogeneity within a grade 
(i.e. land that is suitable for pasture and not for crop production).  The land use allocation 
cannot shift further into ecoreserve than the baseline level because CRP enrollment is 
limited to its current level.  
The price sensitivity analysis suggests that the baseline land use allocation is 
largely insensitive to changes in commodity prices.  With the exception of the nine 
percent increase in the corn price, all of the other crop price changes are outside of the 
range of price fluctuations observed between 1994 and 2003.53  Also, because the model 
solution represents the long-run equilibrium, the relative price changes shown in Table 
5.2 would have to be sustained over a long period of time.  It is not outside of the realm 
of possibilities that prices could change to such a degree over the long run, but it would 
mark a substantial deviation from current conditions.   
The inelastic response of land use change to commodity prices found here echoes 
the findings of previous studies (Wu et al., 2004; Zhang, Horan, and Claassen, 2003; 
                                                 
53 Excluding the corn price in 1996, which reached $3.51, an increase over the median price of 63 percent, 
the maximum corn price over the period observed was $2.52 per bushel, a deviation from the median of 17 
percent. 
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Claassen and Tegene, 1999).  This supports Abler’s assertion that because the elasticities 
of supply of agricultural land, individual crops, and livestock products are low, while the 
elasticities of substitution between land and purchased inputs are high, “changes in 
agricultural output are accomplished primarily through changes in purchased inputs 
rather than changes in land” (2004, p. 11).  The policy implication is that instruments that 
target changes in land use activities directly are less likely to be successful than policies 
that attempt to motivate land use change indirectly by altering the prices of agricultural 
inputs.  Chapter 6 tests this hypothesis by increasing the cost of soil erosion as an input 
into commodity production. 
 
 5.2.2.  Livestock Price Changes 
Livestock price changes impact the land use allocation via feed linkages when the 
two production activities are optimally nonseparable.  A relative increase in the return to 
cattle is expected to increase the return to land into the six-year alfalfa rotation (to 
produce forage), while a relative increase in the return to swine is expected to shift land 
into the corn-soybean rotation (to produce grain).  The sensitivity results support this 
argument.  A three percent increase in the cattle price and a one percent decrease in the 
hog price shift livestock production out of hogs and into cattle.  Consequently, the land 
allocation shifts out of the corn-soybean rotation and into the six-year alfalfa rotation.  
Conversely, a one percent decrease (increase) in the cattle (hog) price drives cattle 
production to zero, increasing hog production and pushing land out of the six-year alfalfa 
rotation and into the corn-soybean land use activity.  With increases in the cattle and hog 
prices of 10 and eight percent, ecoreserve is pulled into feed crop production.  These 
results indicate that livestock product prices are important in determining the optimal 
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land use allocation because the focus of production in the study area is on feed crops.  
However, the impact of livestock price changes is overstated because of the lack of a 
capital constraint and the assumption of price exogeneity, as well as several other factors 
discussed in the first part of this chapter.  
  
 5.2.3.  Extensively-Produced Livestock Price Premia 
  In the baseline model solution, the price of livestock produced on pasture is 
assumed equal to the price of intensively produced livestock.  Because consumer markets 
for natural livestock products are beginning to develop, it is possible that, in the future, 
pasture-based livestock may earn a price premium.  The response of the model allocation 
to pasture premia on both hogs and cattle is tested.  One potential impact of a premium on 
extensively produced livestock is that it may induce a shift in the land use allocation from 
the crop rotations into continuous pasture.  By encouraging the conversion of cropland 
into pasture, increased premia on extensively produced livestock products may be an 
alternative means of obtaining environmental benefits.   
  The price premia required to induce a shift from intensive to extensive livestock 
production systems are 19 and four percent for cattle and hogs, respectively.  Literature 
examining consumers’ willingness to pay for natural livestock products suggest that a 
premium on the order of 10 to 20 percent is not unreasonable (Lusk, Feldkamp, and 
Schroeder, 2004; Grannis, Hooker, and Thilmany, 2000; Grannis and Thilmany, 1999).  
The threshold premium for hogs is low, relative to these estimates.  This is because the 
model allows hogs to be pasture-farrowed, but assumes that extensively farrowed piglets 
are finished in confinement.  In order to market a hog as extensively produced, it would 
likely have to be finished in a non-confinement system.  It is reasonable to assume that, 
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initially the cost of extensive finishing would exceed the costs of intensive finishing.  
Thus, the model understates the relative cost of extensively-produced hogs and therefore 
understates the producer price premium necessary to induce an expansion in pasture-
based swine enterprises.  Incorporating an extensive hog finishing operation into the 
model would improve this portion of the analysis. 
  
 5.2.4.  Changes in Government Payments 
  As discussed in Chapter 2, if different levels of negative environmental 
externalities are associated with different agricultural commodities, it may be possible to 
influence the level of externalities produced using a policy that reduces the return to more 
environmentally degrading commodities.  Therefore, it is logical to test the impact of 
current support payments on the land use allocation.  Because the intensive corn-soybean 
rotation receives a relatively larger support payment per acre, a decrease in the level of 
support should shift production out of this land use and into the less intensive six-year 
alfalfa rotation.54  The six-year rotations produce less soil erosion, which implies that 
reducing current commodity payments should improve the system’s performance with 
respect to this environmental indicator.   
In the baseline model, both direct payments and counter-cyclical payments are 
paid to Crawford and Shelby county producers.  However, the price of program 
commodities is not sufficiently low to allow producers to collect loan deficiency 
payments.  To test the sensitivity of the model to government payments, the amount of 
direct and counter-cyclical payments are reduced by an equal percentage across land use 
                                                 
54 Because corn, soybeans, and oats are the only program crops. 
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55activities.   The results for three payment changes are displayed in Table 5.4.  The first 
column to the right of the baseline allocation displays the model solution when all direct 
payments are removed while counter-cyclical payments are held constant (and the corn 
price is held at its median).  The second column shows the model solution when counter-
cyclical payments are removed while direct payments are held constant.  The last column 
presents the model allocation with the elimination of all direct and counter-cyclical 
government payments. 
A change in the level of direct payments, holding counter-cyclical payments constant, has 
no impact on the land allocation until the payment per acre falls to six percent of its 
current level.  At that point, a mere 1,214 acres (0.16% of total arable land) shifts from 
the two-year rotation into the six-year alfalfa rotation.  Total soil erosion produced by the 
system falls by only 0.02 million tons and the average return to land falls by $12.83 per 
acre. 
Reducing counter-cyclical payments to zero, with no change in direct payments, 
reduces the average return to land without impacting the land use allocation.  However, 
when counter-cyclical payments are dropped to zero with a full reduction in direct 
payments, there is an additional transfer of land from the corn-soybean rotation to the six-
year alfalfa rotation.  Dropping all payments reduces soil erosion by 0.9 million tons and 
reduces the return to land by $17.63 per acre relative to the baseline.
                                                 
55 The corn-soybean rotation receives a per-acre payment equal to the average of the corn and soybean 
payments per acre (which is the product of yield and the per-unit payment rate).  The six-year alfalfa 
rotation receives a per-acre payment equal to the average of the corn, soybean, and oat per-acre payment 
rate, which are weighted by 1/3, 1/6, and 1/6, respectively.  Therefore, an equal percentage reduction in the 
payments received for an acre in each land use activity does not translate into an equal reduction in the 
payment rate for each program crop. 
 101 
 
Table 5.4.  Model Allocation with Changes in Government Payment Parameters 
 Government Payment Changes 
 Zero Fixed Direct, Full 
Counter-Cyclical 
Full Fixed Direct, 
Zero Counter-Cyclical 
Zero Fixed Direct, 
Zero Counter-CyclicalBaseline 
Land Use Acres     
 Corn-Soybean Rotation 695,456 694,243 695,456 687,645 
 Six Year – Alfalfa Rotation 26,440 27,654 26,440 34,256 
 Ecoreserve 22,526 22,526 22,526 22,526 
 Livestock Housing 1,372 1,372 1,372 1,367 
Head Livestock     
 Farrow-Finish Swine (m.) 3.39 3.39 3.39 3.35 
 Finishing Cattle 82,909 83,900 82,909 89,290 
Government Payments ($m.)     
 Fixed Direct 9.57  9.57  
 Counter-Cyclical 3.59 3.58   
 Loan Deficiency     
 Conservation Reserve 2.68 2.68 2.68 2.68 
Total Soil Erosion (m. tons) 6.65 6.63 6.65 5.75 
Average Return to Land ($/acre) 115.53 102.70 110.72 97.90 
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Eliminating current support payments produces a slight change in the land use 
allocation and soil erosion production.  However, the results of this analysis demonstrate 
that a reduction in commodity payments has very little impact on the land use practices of 
producers in Crawford and Shelby counties.  This result can be attributed to the relative 
inelastic response of land use change to commodity prices.  Simply reducing the current 
level of income support payments is insufficient to attain significant environmental 
improvements.  To address the dual objectives of income support and environmental 
improvement therefore necessitates the design of an alternative policy instrument.  
Chapter 6 builds on this conclusion by formulating several hypothetical policy 
instruments designed to discourage the production of soil erosion on agricultural working 
lands.  By simulating these policy instruments, it is possible to evaluate whether, and to 
what degree, a single instrument can achieve environmental objectives while supporting 
producer welfare.
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CHAPTER 6 
GREEN POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 The sensitivity analyses of Chapter 5 indicate that reducing the level of current 
income support payments, holding the portfolio of program commodities constant, cannot 
significantly impact the land use allocation in the study area.  This result suggests that to 
encourage the provision of environmental benefits by agricultural commodity producers, 
it is necessary to consider alternative policy instruments.  This chapter develops and 
evaluates several hypothetical policy instruments and one established regulation on the 
basis of their efficiency in attaining an environmental standard.   
To begin, two command-and-control policy instruments are examined.  The first 
is a nitrogen fertilizer application standard that is currently enforced by the Iowa 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR).  It is possible to assess, ex-post, the cost of this 
regulation by simulating the land use allocation without the baseline nutrient balance.  
The second command-and-control scenario examines, ex-ante, the imposition of a soil 
erosion standard based on an environmental criterion.  Specifically, the rate of soil 
erosion production, dependent on crop rotation practices and slope, cannot exceed a pre-
defined tolerance value.   
The second section of this chapter examines two hypothetical incentive-based 
policy mechanisms intended to reduce soil erosion.  The first policy instrument is a per-
unit tax on soil erosion production above the predefined threshold value.  The second 
scenario analysis involves shifting current income support payments out of the relatively 
intensive corn-soybean rotation strategy, and administering a “green” payment to those 
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management practices that have greater erosion reduction properties.  From the scenario 
analyses, inferences are drawn about the extent to which policy can influence the tradeoff 
between private producer welfare and the reduction of negative environmental 
externalities.   
 
6.1.  Command-and-Control Regulatory Instruments 
  Each of the command-and-control policy instruments examined in this section 
limits the production of an environmental externality to an exogenous standard.  In both 
cases, that standard is set with the sole objective of improving environmental outcomes.  
For excess nitrogen applications and soil erosion, the unconstrained model solution is 
compared to the outcome under the standard.  In so doing, the cost to producers of 
imposing the standard, equivalent to the loss in the average return to land, can be 
estimated.  Using the results from the simulations and from the baseline, the tradeoff 
between producer welfare and reduced environmental externalities can be quantified and 
illustrated.  
   
 6.1.1.  An Excess Nitrogen Application Standard 
  In Chapter 3, the nutrient demand-supply balances for nitrogen, phosphate, and 
potash are written such that the demand for nutrients cannot exceed the supply from 
livestock and purchased fertilizer.  In the baseline model, there is an additional constraint 
that nitrogen supply must be in balance with crop nitrogen requirements.  Enforcing this 
constraint ensures that crop nutrient requirements are completely satisfied, but not 
exceeded, by purchased fertilizer inputs and applications of livestock manure.  Because 
livestock manure contains a greater amount of nitrogen than phosphate and potash, even 
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allowing for nitrogen losses in storage and application, the baseline model solution is 
constrained by the nitrogen demand-supply equality.  In other words, the model fully 
satisfies the crop nitrogen requirement with nitrogen from livestock manure, and fills in 
the corresponding phosphate and potash deficits with purchased fertilizer.56   
  The excess nitrogen constraint is specified in the baseline model because the Iowa 
DNR regulates the production and spreading of livestock manure based on a nitrogen 
standard.  The standard dictates that total cropland nitrogen applications must be less than 
or equal to the nitrogen requirement of crops grown on that land.  Livestock producers 
are required to submit a Manure Management Plan (MMP) documenting expected 
livestock manure production and details about the cropland on which the manure will be 
spread.  At present, phosphorous and potash applications are permitted to exceed crop 
requirements.  A phosphorous-based standard is currently under development for 
producers across Iowa.  However, the proposed phosphorous standard will not take effect 
until four years after the rule becomes effective, which has not yet occurred.  Moreover, 
the design of the standard is such that the majority of producers will still apply fertilizer 
and manure based on crop nitrogen requirements (Iowa Department of Natural Resources 
[DNR], 2004b). 57  While this analysis considers only the nitrogen standard, simulating 
the impact of a phosphorous standard is within the capabilities of the model used here 
and would be a useful future extension. 
                                                 
56 The option to sell livestock manure is not incorporated into the model.   
57 The phosphorous rule is enforced only for those plots that have a high phosphorous index (P-Index).  The 
P-Index was developed by Iowa State University, the National Soil and Tilth Laboratory at Iowa State 
University, and the Iowa Natural Resources Conservation Service.  It is based on a number of factors, such 
as gross erosion, distance from the center of the field to the nearest stream, soil type, recent soil P test 
results, the rate and method of P applications, and management practices.  For those plots that do not have 
an initially high P index, over-applications of P over time could eventually increase soil P concentrations, 
and therefore the plot’s P index.  While P applications may have to be tracked more carefully to guard 
against a rise in the P index that could lead to more careful regulation, the majority of producers could 
continue to use a nitrogen-based standard to determine manure application rates on their fields. 
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  Although this regulation is already in place, the effect of implementing the 
nitrogen-based standard can be examined by simulating the land use allocation when 
nutrient applications are unconstrained.  In the baseline model, where excess nitrogen 
applications are limited to zero, the model assigns the most profitable land use and 
livestock activities until that constraint becomes binding, at which point the next most 
profitable production activity that does not violate the constraint is allocated.  When this 
constraint is removed, the land use allocation should shift towards the more profitable 
alternative.   
  This expectation is validated by the model solution for the unconstrained and 
constrained cases and for two intermediate levels of excess nitrogen production, 
presented in Table 6.1.  As the excess nitrogen constraint is relaxed, the land use 
allocation shifts away from the six-year alfalfa rotation and into the intensive corn-
soybean rotation, with an increase in hog production and a decrease in finishing beef 
cattle.  When nutrient applications are unconstrained, producers apply 2.07 million 
pounds of nitrogen in excess of crop requirements to land in the two-county area.  In 
total, imposing the nitrogen standard reduces the average return to land by $1.25 per acre, 
or 1.07 percent. 
  It is also interesting, from a resource valuation perspective, to examine the 
shadow price of a unit of excess nitrogen.  The shadow price of the nutrient constraint is 
the increase (decrease) in the average return to land associated with an incremental 
relaxation (tightening) of the excess nitrogen constraint.  In the baseline model solution, 
the shadow price of a million pounds of excess nitrogen is an average of $0.94 per acre.   
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Table 6.1.  Model Solution with Constrained Application of Excess Nitrogen, Expressed as Percent of Unconstrained Level 
 Level of Excess Nitrogen Applications, Relative to Unconstrained Case 
0% (Baseline) 30% 70% 100% (Unconstrained) 
    Land Use Acres 
 Corn-Soybean Rotation 695,456 703,171 713,457 720,953 
 Six Year – Alfalfa Rotation 26,440 18,706 8,394 879 
 Ecoreserve 22,526 22,526 22,526 22,526 
 Livestock Housing 1,372 1,392 1,417 1,436 
Head Livestock     
 Farrow-Finish Swine (m.) 3.39 3.53 3.73 3.87 
 Finishing Cattle 82,909 57,983 24,748  
Government Payments ($m.)     
 Fixed Direct 9.57 9.62 9.68 9.72 
 Counter-Cyclical 3.59 3.60 3.62 3.63 
 Loan Deficiency     
 Conservation Reserve 2.68 2.68 2.68 2.68 
Excess Nitrogen (m. lbs) 0 0.62 1.45 2.07 
Total Soil Erosion (m. tons) 6.65 6.66 6.66 6.64 
Average Return to Land ($/acre) 115.53 115.91 116.41 116.78 
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Between the constrained and unconstrained levels of excess nitrogen applications, the 
shadow price of excess nitrogen declines as the resource becomes less scarce.58  
  It is worth noting that, while constraining excess nitrogen encourages 
diversification in the aggregate land use allocation, it does not simultaneously provide a 
reduction in soil erosion.  The six-year alfalfa rotation provides reductions in soil erosion 
relative to the corn-soybean rotation on higher slopes.  However, as explained in Chapter 
5, the optimal allocation of the six-year alfalfa rotation in the baseline is to cropland with 
a slope of zero degrees, on which the six-year rotation yields only slight reductions in soil 
erosion relative to the corn-soybean rotation.59  This suggests that reduced nitrogen 
applications and soil erosion are not complementary policy objectives.60  
  
 6.1.2.  A Soil Erosion Production Standard 
  The second command-and-control policy instrument is a soil erosion standard.  
The standard limits per-acre soil erosion to a threshold value of five tons per acre.  This 
value was chosen by members of the interdisciplinary team from Iowa State University, 
and constitutes a substantial reduction in soil erosion over current levels.  The regulatory 
constraint is constructed as follows: 
6.1        TVALUEYACRESTEROSION ynyn *≤
where 
                                                 
58 In Table 6.1, the loss in the average return to land (ARL) is $0.38 per acre when the nitrogen constraint is 
relaxed from zero to 30 percent of the unconstrained level.  When it is relaxed from 70 percent to 100 
percent of the unconstrained level, the loss in the ARL falls to $0.37 per acre.   
59 This land use allocation is driven by the relatively high value of feed produced in the six-year rotation.  
Because of the high return to alfalfa feed, this land use activity is placed on the most productive land, i.e. 
that for which the per-acre alfalfa yield is greatest. 
60 However, a nutrient application standard based on the P index would likely impact both environmental 
indicators, as soil erosion is an important determinant of the potential for phosphorous to runoff into 
surface water supplies (Iowa Natural Resources Conservation Service [NRCS], 2004). 
 109 
 
6.2  ynynyn TEROSIONEROSIONYACRES =*       
The variable YACRES is the number of acres assigned to each land use activity in each 
slope class.  The level of soil erosion in tons per acre by land use activity and grade, 
EROSION, is an exogenous parameter and is determined by regressing the annual level 
of per-acre soil erosion on slope grade, as described in Chapter 4.  TEROSION is total 
soil erosion, and is an endogenous variable, as it depends on the spatial allocation of land 
use activities.  TVALUE is the tolerance value for soil erosion defined above.  The soil 
erosion constraint is indexed over land use activity and grade, where land in ecoreserve 
and livestock housing produce no erosion.  There are a total of 196 separate constraints 
on the production of soil erosion. 
  Table 6.2 presents the detailed model solution for the baseline (unconstrained) 
and the constrained scenario, as well as for two intermediate levels of soil erosion 
production.  Constraining soil erosion encourages a shift in the model allocation away 
from the two-year corn-soybean rotation and hog production.  The land use allocation 
shifts towards a more diversified system of production, with an increase in six-year 
alfalfa rotation acres and increased beef cattle production.  In the fully constrained case, 
land is allocated to the six-year grass-legume rotation and to pasture, land use activities 
that are relatively less profitable than the corn-soybean and six-year alfalfa rotations. 
  The land use allocations for the command-and-control policy scenarios are 
represented visually in Figures 6.1 through 6.3.  Figure 6.1 illustrates the baseline model 
solution (where excess nitrogen applications are constrained and soil erosion is 
unconstrained).  The second map shows the simulated land use allocation when the
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Table 6.2.  Model Solution with Constrained Production of Soil Erosion, Expressed as Percent of Unconstrained Level 
 Level of Soil Erosion, Relative to Unconstrained Case 
24.7% (Constrained 
to T-Value) 30% 70% 100% (Baseline) 
    Land Use Acres 
 Corn-Soybean Rotation 302,837 344,439 630,039 695,456 
 Six Year – Alfalfa Rotation 340,377 377,296 91,838 26,440 
 Six Year – Grass Rotation 46,174    
 Pasture 32,435    
 Ecoreserve 22,526 22,526 22,526 22,526 
 Livestock Housing 1,444 1,533 1,391 1,372 
Head Livestock     
 Farrow-Finish Swine  92,844 2.82 (m.) 3.39 (m.) 
 Finishing Cattle 1.03 (m.) 1.08 (m.) 248,235 82,909 
 Pasture-Finished Cattle 19,125    
Government Payments ($m.)     
 Fixed Direct 6.99 7.49 9.18 9.57 
 Counter-Cyclical 2.82 3.00 3.48 3.59 
 Loan Deficiency     
 Conservation Reserve 2.68 2.68 2.68 2.68 
Excess Nitrogen (m. lbs) 0 0 0 0 
Total Soil Erosion (m. tons) 1.64 2.00 4.66 6.65 
Average Return to Land ($/acre) 103.66 107.77 114.22 115.53 
 111 
 
Figure 6.1.  Baseline Land Use Allocation, Constrained Excess Nitrogen Production, 
Unconstrained Soil Erosion Production 
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Figure 6.2.  Land Use Allocation, Unconstrained Excess Nitrogen Production 
(Unconstrained Soil Erosion Production) 
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Figure 6.3.  Land Use Allocation, Constrained Soil Erosion Production (Constrained 
Nitrogen Production) 
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excess nitrogen standard is removed.  Finally, Figure 6.3 shows the land use allocation 
for the constrained soil erosion scenario.    
  The maps in Figures 6.1 through 6.3 are created using ArcMAP software.  Recall 
that the MP model assigns land use activities by slope.  Combining a cropland raster data 
layer with a topography layer creates a base map in which each pixel of arable cropland 
has an associated degree of slope.  The model solution for acres of each land use activity, 
by slope class, is exported from GAMS into an Excel file.  There, each slope class is 
assigned an identification number that represents the land use activity assigned to that 
slope class.  For example, an ID of 1 indicates that all land in that slope class is in a corn-
soybean rotation, an ID of 2 indicates that land in that slope class is a combination of 
corn-soybean acreage and acres in the six-year alfalfa rotation, and so on.  The Excel file, 
which contains a unique identifier for land cover for each slope class, is converted to a 
Database file (.dbf) and imported into ArcMAP.  The Database file is then joined to the 
base map (by slope grade), and the map display is manipulated such that each land use 
activity is distinguished by a unique color.  A lighter shade of yellow represents land in a 
corn-soybean rotation.  Areas in darker orange are in the six-year alfalfa rotation, with 
gradations between the two representing a mix of the activities within one slope class.  
Shades of mauve and brown are used to visually display land in the six-year grass-legume 
rotation and continuous pasture.  Land in the Conservation Reserve Program is shown in 
dark green. 
  The series of maps illustrate what has already been described.  In the baseline 
model solution, the six-year alfalfa rotation, represented by a darker orange, is placed 
along with the corn-soybean rotation on land with a zero degree grade.  It is apparent 
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from the map that that land is located adjacent to waterways.  The corn-soybean rotation 
occupies all land between one and 17 degrees of slope, after which ecoreserve acres are 
assigned.  When excess nitrogen applications are unconstrained, shown in Figure 6.2, 
nearly all of the land up to 17 degrees is allocated to the intensive corn-soybean rotation.  
The map illustrates the increased homogeneity of the land use allocation.  Figure 6.3, the 
map of the constrained soil erosion scenario is the most visually striking.  Aside from the 
lowest grades that surround waterways, nearly all land is allocated to the longer-term 
rotations.  This is also the most divers land use pattern, with land in both six-year 
rotations and continuous pasture.  It is clear that limiting soil erosion has dramatic 
implications for the pattern of land use in Crawford and Shelby counties.   
  The total amount of soil erosion produced in the baseline is 6.65 million tons per 
year.  When limited to the tolerance value, the total level of soil erosion is 1.64 million 
tons per year.  The difference in the average return to land between the two cases is 
$11.87 per acre.  Figure 6.4 illustrates the tradeoff between reduced soil erosion and the 
average return to land.  It is apparent that the cost of soil erosion reductions increases at 
an increasing rate.  Moreover, the threshold value of soil erosion is attained before the 
cost curve enters the range over which the average return to land declines most steeply in 
response to further soil erosion reductions.     
  The shadow price of the soil erosion constraint when erosion is limited to the 
threshold value differs by land use activity and by grade.  For example, increasing the 
soil erosion constraint by one ton per acre for land in the corn-soybean rotation on a 
grade of six percent increases the average return to land more than increasing the soil 
erosion constraint for the six-year alfalfa rotation on a grade of 15 percent ($113.03 
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Figure 6.4.  Average Return to Land Associated with a Reduction in Total Soil 
Erosion, Relative to the Baseline 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent Soil Erosion
Baseline Total = 6.65 million tons
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
et
ur
n 
to
 L
an
d 
($
/a
cr
e)
Erosion ≤ T-Value 
(24.7% Baseline Erosion) 
 
 
61versus $74.62 across all acres).   For each land use activity, the shadow price of soil 
erosion above the threshold is decreasing as the grade increases, reflecting the decline in 
the profitability of each land use activity defined by the yield loss function. 
 
6.2.  Incentive-Based Policies to Reduce Soil Erosion 
  In the previous section, a command-and-control soil erosion policy instrument 
was specified using an ecological criterion.  By limiting the land area that each 
management practice may occupy, the standard achieves the desired soil erosion 
reduction at a cost of $11.87 per acre in the average return to land.  Economic theory 
predicts that this same soil erosion standard can be achieved at lower cost with an 
incentive-based policy instrument.  The foundation for this argument lies in the 
                                                 
61 These are the grades on which the soil erosion constraint becomes binding. 
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heterogeneity in soil erosion abatement costs between producers.  While a standard 
mandates an identical level of soil erosion reduction for each producer, an incentive-
based instrument specifies a total amount of soil erosion reduction for all producers.  The 
latter allows those producers with relatively lower abatement costs to reduce soil erosion 
by a greater amount than high abatement cost producers, reducing the total cost of 
attaining the standard.   
 This chapter analyzes the impact of two incentive-based policy mechanisms to 
reduce soil erosion.  The first instrument discussed is a per-unit tax on excess soil 
erosion.  The second policy alternative is a green payment for crop rotations that provide 
greater soil erosion reduction benefits than the predominant corn-soybean rotation.  The 
taxation and subsidy schemes differ in that the former punishes the use of more intensive 
production practices, while the latter rewards the expansion of more diversified land use 
activities.  They are, respectively, a “stick” and a “carrot” approach to regulating soil 
erosion.  The relative advantages and disadvantages of these two policy mechanisms, as 
well as a comparison to the regulatory standard, are discussed throughout. 
  
 6.2.1.  A Per-Unit Tax on Excess Soil Erosion 
  According to Baumol and Oates, a tax to attain a given standard is justified 
“where there is reason to believe that the existing situation imposes a high level of social 
costs and that these costs can be significantly reduced by feasible decreases in the levels 
of certain externality-generating activities” (1988, p. 174).  It is widely recognized that 
soil erosion imposes a social cost in the form of water degradation, both through 
sedimentation and nutrient runoff (Iowa DNR, 2004b).  Decreasing erosion is particularly 
beneficial in terms of improving local water quality, and may contribute to improvements 
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on a larger geographic scale (Wu et al., 2004).  Thus, a tax may be a viable and justified 
instrument to encourage the provision of environmental benefits by producers within the 
study area. 
  Under certain conditions, a tax instrument may also be a least-cost means of 
attaining a given environmental standard.  However, the conditions necessary for that 
result to hold are often violated.  For example, a per-unit tax on soil erosion must differ 
across producers to reflect heterogeneity in their marginal contribution to environmental 
damages.  Within the context of the model, that would necessitate a separate tax by slope 
class and land use activity.  Further, the tax rate must reflect the impact of erosion on 
social welfare, which may differ from the observed amount of soil erosion production.  
These conditions, among others, make it difficult to practically implement a least-cost tax 
mechanism. 
  While a per-unit tax on excess soil erosion may not be able to attain the soil 
erosion standard at least-cost, it may still be a more efficient policy option than a 
command-and-control standard.  The hypothetical tax instrument considered here is a 
homogeneous per-ton tax on soil erosion above the threshold value.  It achieves neither 
efficiency nor optimality in the economic sense, but is an administratively viable 
mechanism for reducing soil erosion production.  Holding all else constant, a tax rate of 
$113.00 per ton of excess soil erosion results in a land use pattern that attains the target 
level of soil erosion reduction.  This land and livestock allocation is identical to that 
reported in Table 6.2 when the soil erosion standard is enforced.   
  While the end results of the two policies are identical, the means by which the 
standard and the tax instrument attain that end differ.  The standard prohibits the 
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assignment of land use activities on grades on which they produce excess soil erosion but 
it does not affect the relative profitability of land use activities.  In contrast, the tax 
mechanism reduces the relative return to land use activities that produce excess soil 
erosion, which in turn drives a change in the land use allocation.  As the tax rate is 
increased from zero to $113.00 per ton, the land use allocation shifts such that the 
intensive corn-soybean rotation is progressively removed from the highest grades (those 
on which it produces the most excess erosion).  The land allocation ceases to shift when 
there is no excess soil erosion produced and no tax assessed.  As the two-year rotation 
becomes less profitable on higher grades, the six-year rotations, which produce less soil 
erosion, become relatively more profitable land use activities and are allocated to those 
grades.  Pasture, the least remunerative land use activity in the baseline, becomes 
profitable on the highest grades because it never produces erosion in excess of the 
threshold level.   
  Figure 6.5 graphs the net return to land and management (NRLM), total 
government payments (excluding CRP payments because they are constant), tax 
revenues, and total soil erosion against the excess soil erosion tax rate.  The line that 
charts the relationship between the tax rate and erosion can be thought of as the tax 
effectiveness curve.  This curve illustrates that the greatest reduction in soil erosion from 
the baseline is attained with a tax of $10 per ton of excess erosion.  This is also the tax 
rate that generates the largest reduction in government payments and the greatest loss in 
the NRLM, relative to the baseline.  These changes are caused by a shift from the corn-
soybean rotation into the six-year alfalfa rotation, which is less heavily weighted towards 
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Figure 6.5.  Soil Erosion, Net Return to Land and Management, Government 
Payments, and Tax Revenue for Various Excess Soil Erosion Tax Rates 
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Federal Farm Program crops.  Past this point, increasing the tax rate leads to modest and 
decreasing reductions in soil erosion, the net return to land, and subsidy payments.  Total 
tax revenue varies over the range of tax rates and is closely related to the land use 
allocation.  In the baseline case, when the tax rate is zero, and at a tax of $113 per ton, 
when excess erosion is equal to zero, no tax revenue is collected.  For intermediate tax 
rates, when the land use allocation shifts such that there is a large reduction in soil 
erosion, total tax revenue declines.  However, an increase in the tax rate that does not 
alter the land use allocation generates an increase in total tax revenue.  This is most 
clearly seen for taxes ranging from $40 to $80 per ton of excess erosion.  A tax rate could 
be specified to achieve a different objective than the target soil erosion reduction, i.e. to 
maximize tax revenues. 
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  The land use allocation with the $113/ton excess soil erosion tax and that with the 
standard are identical, as is the cost to producers (an $11.87 per acre decrease in the 
average return to land).  In the context of the model, the taxation instrument is no more 
cost-efficient in reducing soil erosion to the threshold level because producers have only 
one means of reducing soil erosion, a change in the land use allocation.  To reduce 
erosion to the threshold level, land use activities must be removed from those grades on 
which they produce excess erosion, the cost of which is equal across producers within a 
grade.  However, the tax and the standard differ in that the former generates revenue 
when excess soil erosion is produced.  In practice, tax revenues can be used to offset 
administrative costs, which may imply that a tax is preferable to a regulatory standard.  In 
addition, because producers have alternative methods of reducing soil erosion, aside from 
a land use change, an incentive-based instrument will likely be more efficient than a 
standard in attaining an environmental objective.  Examples of other remediation 
activities may include some combination of land retirement activities and conservation 
practices for working land. 
 
 6.2.2.  Green Payments for Reduced Soil Erosion 
  In the previous scenario analysis, the structure of government payments is held 
constant.  The consequence of the land use change mandated by the ecological standard is 
a decline in the average return to land of over ten percent relative to the baseline.  If the 
distribution of government payments were shifted towards non-program crops, it may be 
possible to reduce the total cost of imposing the soil erosion standard.  This scenario 
analysis investigates the change in the land use allocation and soil erosion that can be 
effected by shifting government payments away from the intensive corn-soybean rotation 
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and into the longer-term rotations and continuous pasture.  The green payment instrument 
examined in this section is similar in essence to the Conservation Security Program 
(CSP).  It is formulated as a payment for changing management practices on working 
lands.  The results of this analysis are therefore particularly relevant in terms of present 
policy issues. 
  The baseline total government payment per-acre for each land use activity is 
reported in Table 6.3.  Under current conditions, support payments favor the intensive 
corn-soybean rotation by slightly less than eight dollars per acre.  To begin the scenario 
analysis, fixed direct and counter-cyclical payments are eliminated.  The model allocation 
with no payments is that discussed in the sensitivity analysis of chapter 5, and is reported 
again in the first row of Table 6.4.  A per-acre payment, henceforth referred to as a 
Conservation Security Program (CSP) payment, is then applied to the two six-year 
rotations and pasture, and incrementally increased.  Throughout, ecoreserve acres are 
assumed to receive their current level of CRP payments.  The land and livestock 
allocations for various payment levels are reported in Table 6.4. 
  The land use allocation does not change until a payment rate of $30 per acre is 
applied to the six-year alfalfa, six-year grass-legume, and continuous pasture 
management practices.  At that point, the land allocation shifts out of the corn-soybean 
rotation and into the six-year alfalfa rotation and continuous pasture.  Optimal livestock 
production consists of a mixture of confinement swine, finishing cattle in feedlots, and 
cow-calf units finished on pasture.  The trend towards the six-year alfalfa rotation and 
continuous pasture continues with increases in the subsidy rate beyond $30 per acre.  
Each increase in the CSP payment rate shifts land out of the corn-soybean rotation on 
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Table 6.3.  Current Per-Acre Government Payment Rate, by Land Use Activity* 
 Land Use Activity 
Payment 
Instrument Corn-Soybean 
Six-Year 
Alfalfa 
Six-Year 
Grass-Legume 
Continuous 
Pasture 
Direct 13.475 7.555 7.426 - 
Counter-Cyclical 5.034 3.353 3.353 - 
Loan Deficiency - - - - 
Total 18.509 10.908 10.779 0.00 
*Assumes average county yield per acre for 1994-2003 (Iowa NASS), and that 47.6 percent of acreage in 
each land use activity is eligible to receive payments (56% of total land in farms is claimed as base 
acreage, and 85% of that is the total payment acreage). 
 
 
higher grades, placing the six-year alfalfa rotation on intermediate slopes and pasture on 
the most highly sloped terrain.   
 The land use allocation across CSP scenarios differs markedly from that under 
either the standard or tax.  Specifically, the land and livestock allocation with green 
payments is more heavily weighted towards pasture-based activities.  Eliminating 
payments for the corn-soybean rotation and administering a green payment for the long-
term rotations reduces the relative return to corn production and increases the return to 
forage and pasture production.  The green payment program therefore reduces the relative 
return to livestock that rely on a larger grain ration.  As a result, the livestock allocation 
shifts towards cow-calf units finished on pasture, which require less corn and more forage 
and pasture than other animals.  Figures 6.6 and 6.7 illustrate the land use allocation for 
two CSP payment rates.  These maps visually reinforce the expansion of pasture acreage 
(in shades of brown) incentivized by the green subsidy. 
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Table 6.4.  Model Solution with a Per-Acre Payment for the Six-Year Rotations and Continuous Pasture 
Land Use Activities (acres) Livestock Activities (head marketed) 
CSP 
Payment 
($/acre) 
Corn-
Soybean 
Six-
Year 
Alfalfa 
Six-
Year 
Grass 
Continuous 
Pasture 
Farrow-Finish 
Swine (C)*  
(m.) 
Finishing 
Cattle 
(C)* 
Cow-Calf 
Units  
(P)* 
Total CSP 
Payments 
($m.) 
Total 
Erosion 
(m. tons)
ARL 
($/acre)
0.00 687,645 34,256   3.35 89,290  0.00 5.75 97.90 
10.00 687,645 34,256   3.35 89,290  0.34 5.75 98.36 
20.00 687,645 34,256   3.35 89,290  0.69 5.75 98.82 
30.00 641,328 57,448  23,191 3.01 124,917 9,276 2.42 4.71 99.37 
35.00 528,974 112,354  80,801 2.17 211,091 32,321 6.76 2.95 100.27 
39.00 386,995 179,785  155,561 1.09 319,645 62,224 13.08 1.60 101.71 
40.00 302,837 218,881  200,752  383,844 80,301 16.79 1.09 102.17 
45.00 246,014 244,849  231,695  427,120 92,678 21.45 0.85 105.21 
50.00 246,014 244,849  231,695  427,120 92,678 23.82 0.85 108.41 
61.00 246,014 244,849  231,695  427,120 92,678 29.07 0.85 115.44 
*(C) and (P) indicate confinement and pasture-based production systems, respectively. 
 125 
 
Figure 6.6.  Land Use Allocation with Conservation Security Program Payment of 
$39 per Acre 
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Figure 6.7.  Land Use Allocation with Conservation Security Program Payment of 
$61 per Acre 
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 Figure 6.6 shows the land allocation with a CSP payment rate of $39 per acre.  In 
this scenario, the model allocation is such that total CSP payments, $13.08 million, are 
nearly identical to the baseline level of government payments, $13.16 million.62  At this 
payment level, total soil erosion production is slightly less than the level produced under 
the regulatory standard.  This scenario analysis can be thought of as approaching the 
problem from a Marshallian perspective, as in Callaway and McCarl (1996).  Holding 
total government expenditures constant, the cost to producers of providing soil erosion 
reduction is a decline in the average return to land of $13.82, approximately $2 per acre 
greater than the loss associated with the regulatory standard or tax.  This scenario 
suggests that solely shifting the current level of payments cannot attain the total soil 
erosion standard at less cost to producers. 
 While the CSP payment above limits total soil erosion to the level of the standard, 
it is important to note that erosion above the per-acre threshold is still produced on some 
land in the study area.  The land allocation is such that the corn-soybean rotation is 
placed on grades of zero to seven degrees.  Above five degrees, a corn-soybean rotation 
generates greater than five tons of erosion per acre.  However, pasture is allocated to 
grades of eleven to sixteen percent.  On those grades, pasture produces less than the 
threshold level of erosion per acre.  Therefore, the total erosion standard is attained 
despite the production of some excess erosion.  This is in contrast to the tax and 
regulatory standard, under which no per-acre excess erosion production is permitted 
within the study area.   
 
62 Excluding Conservation Reserve Program payments of $2.68 million. 
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 The subsidy transfer analysis can also be conducted from a Hicksian perspective, 
i.e. determining the payment rate that maintains current producer welfare, while allowing 
the level of total government payments to vary.  CSP payment rates between $45 and $61 
per acre do not alter the land use allocation, but simply increase the average return to 
land.  Administering a subsidy payment of $61 per acre for the six-year rotations and 
continuous pasture nearly attains the baseline average return to land ($115.44 per acre).  
The land allocation under this scenario is described in Table 6.4 and is illustrated in 
Figure 6.7.   
 To maintain the baseline return to producers, total government payments must be 
more than doubled relative to their current level.  However, note that in this scenario total 
soil erosion production is reduced to half of the target level.  This scenario therefore 
likely generates an increase in social welfare from increased environmental benefits.  
Without assessing both the social and private implications of land use change, the net 
impact of the government payment instrument cannot be determined, and a cost-benefit 
analysis cannot be conducted.  Overall, this analysis demonstrates that a green payment 
to reward conserving practices on working lands cannot attain environmental 
improvements with less private cost to producers. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The objective of this thesis is to analyze the role of public policy in influencing 
the provision of environmental benefits on agricultural working land.  Specifically of 
interest is the tradeoff between producer welfare, which currently depends on levels of 
commodity production, and social welfare, which is influenced by levels of 
environmental externalities produced.  As previously discussed, jointness in the 
production of commodity and environmental outputs has ramifications for the form of 
public policy that can affect this tradeoff.  If commodity and environmental services are 
linked in production, through either technical processes or shared inputs, a single 
instrument may more efficiently support both economic and environmental objectives 
than separate policy mechanisms.  This theoretical hypothesis provides the motivation 
behind this analysis.  Based on the results of Chapters 5 and 6, this section discusses the 
conclusions that can be drawn about the ability of green policies to support producer 
welfare while encouraging a reduction in environmental damages.   
 
7.1.  Policy Implications  
 To examine the tradeoff between producer welfare and the provision of 
environmental benefits, a spatially heterogeneous land use allocation model is formulated 
as a mathematical programming problem.  The model differs from those used in the 
existing literature in several formidable ways.  First, both crop and livestock production 
activities are explicitly modeled as either separable or nonseparable.  The advantage to 
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doing so is that it gives the model the flexibility to choose the optimal degree of 
integration between the two.  Another methodological advantage of the model is that it is 
closely coupled, i.e. it includes a shared set of exogenous and endogenous variables that 
determine both economic and environmental outcomes.  Closely coupling the 
interdisciplinary elements is expected to improve the predictive ability of the model 
relative to analyses that maintain a separation between economic and ecological 
elements.  Finally, the study area chosen is an intermediate scale relative to previous 
analyses, and therefore contributes a new perspective to the literature.  
 At the outset of this analysis, three policy objectives were specified.  The first was 
to identify the economic factors that influence production practices in the study area.  The 
sensitivity analyses presented in Chapter 5 address this objective.  The results suggest 
that the land use allocation in the study area is insensitive to changes in commodity 
prices.  This is evident in the large commodity changes necessary to influence land use 
patterns, and echoes the conclusions of several previous analyses (Abler, 2004; Wu et al., 
2004).  The primary policy implication is that it may be more efficient to encourage the 
provision of environmental benefits with policies that target productive inputs rather than 
commodity outputs.   
 The second objective was to evaluate the tradeoffs between commodity 
production and reduced production of environmental externalities.  The command-and-
control policy scenarios illustrate the tradeoff between producer welfare and attaining an 
environmental standard, holding subsidy payments constant.  Prohibiting excess nitrogen 
applications and excess soil erosion production decreases the average return to land by 
one and ten percent, respectively.  These estimates can be interpreted as the value of 
 132 
 
excess soil erosion and nitrogen applications as commodity inputs.  In either case, for 
reductions between the baseline and the standard, the marginal costs of abatement 
increase at an increasing rate.  Therefore, initial reductions can be obtained at lower cost 
to producers than further reductions.  The analysis also demonstrates that limiting 
nutrient contamination and reducing soil erosion are not complementary environmental 
objectives.  Therefore, jointness between multifunctional outputs is not uniform and 
separate policy instruments may be necessary to ensure the provision of different 
environmental benefits.  
 The final objective was to examine the relative efficiency of various public policy 
instruments in attaining economic and environmental objectives.  Because the model does 
not incorporate heterogeneity in abatement technologies, a standard to reduce soil erosion 
is no more efficient than a tax to attain the same standard.  In reality, the availability of 
alternative erosion reduction technologies, such as no-till corn and soybean production or 
the use of CRP practices, implies that a tax can likely attain the erosion standard at lower 
cost to producers than the results suggest.  Moreover, a tax instrument generates 
government revenues that may be used to offset the administrative costs of the policy.  
For these reasons, a tax may be preferred to a standard in practice.  The last policy 
scenario of Chapter 6 examines the use of green payments to encourage less erosive 
management practices.  Holding total government payments constant, a program of green 
payments cannot attain erosion reductions at less cost to producers than either a tax or the 
standard.  Within the context of this analysis, it is not possible to attain the given 
environmental standard and simultaneously maintain producer welfare at its current level: 
there is no win-win situation.   
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7.2.  Weaknesses of the Current Study and Directions for Future Research 
 The primary weaknesses of the current study are its assumption of commodity 
price exogeneity and the lack of a capital constraint in livestock production.  Although 
the study area is relatively small, the market likely could not absorb the increased 
production of livestock in many of the model simulations without endogenous price 
effects.  Maintaining these two assumptions causes the model to overstate the response of 
the system to changes in the relative return to livestock products.  Consequently, the 
model may overstate the average return to land under various scenarios and 
underestimate the tradeoff between economic and environmental objectives.  
Incorporating price response functions and a livestock capital constraint into the 
programming model would improve its predictive ability.  In addition, accounting for 
price endogeneity would increase the model’s usefulness as a policy analysis tool.  The 
model could be expanded to consider the impact of policies administered on a state, 
regional, or watershed scale. 
 It would also be useful to incorporate more production options into the model.  
Limiting the set of available crop production activities may tend to overstate the 
inelasticity of land use activities with respect to commodity policies.  In addition, limiting 
the means available to producers to abate environmental damages also understates the 
efficiency of incentive-based policy instruments relative to regulatory standards.  Other 
means of reducing soil erosion may include combining CRP practices with practices for 
working lands (i.e. incorporating grass filter strips on harvested cropland).  Thus, 
introducing a broader set of land use production technologies and conservation practices 
may alter the outcome of the green policy simulation.   
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 There are numerous multifunctional outputs associated with commodity 
production that are not considered within the context of this model.  Targeting soil 
erosion reductions may have unintended consequences not only for other environmental 
indicators, but also for multifunctional outputs of the public goods type.  The results 
highlight the importance of prioritizing the objectives of agricultural policy: 
…there may be impacts on agricultural functions outside of those addressed by 
the policy objectives that conflict with social preferences.  For example, 
regulatory requirements designed to reduce soil erosion and water pollution may 
inadvertently make the preservation of family farms more difficult by increasing 
production costs.  Ideally, the objectives emphasized by ‘multifunctional’ policies 
should reflect social preferences across all functions of agriculture.  (Goodhue, 
Gruere, and Klonsky, 2002)  
 
This analysis examines only two environmental indicators because they were those for 
which data was most readily available and because they are the most pertinent policy 
concerns in the study area at present.  The model could be expanded in the future to 
consider the impacts of policies on other multifunctional outputs.  However, doing so 
may be limited because of the difficulties associated with identifying and measuring non-
market products. 
 Finally, this study considers neither the transaction costs nor the distributional 
impacts of the hypothetical policy instruments analyzed.  Transaction costs may be 
particularly important in determining the relative efficiency of using one or many policy 
instruments to address multiple objectives (Abler, 2004).  Absent transaction costs, it 
may be more efficient to use separate mechanisms to attain different goals.  However, in 
practice, using a single program may reduce administrative costs.  Moreover, transaction 
costs may influence the type of program chosen.  Although a commodity-based policy 
may not be most effective in attaining environmental objectives, it may be preferable if 
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the cost of administering an agri-environmental program is relatively high (Ibid.).  
Subsidy targeting may also play an important role in determining overall transaction 
costs.  If environmental improvements are targeted via commodity policy, transactions 
costs apply to all producers, regardless of the level of environmental benefits provided by 
each.  On the other hand, targeting programs to reflect producer heterogeneity may 
increase the administrative costs of the program. 
 Distributional impacts are also important to the political and social palatability of 
implementing an alternative policy instrument.  If payments are administered on the basis 
of environmental benefits provided, the geographic distribution of payments will likely 
not correspond to the current pattern of commodity program payments.  For example, the 
green payment program examined in this analysis would transfer income from farmers 
producing a corn-soybean rotation on lower grades to those producing longer-term 
rotations on higher grades.  The overall impact on the income distribution would depend 
on farm location.  On a national scale, shifting to a system of green payments would 
imply an income transfer from the most intensive commodity production regions, such as 
the Midwest, to areas of the country that are more environmental sensitive, i.e. the Mid-
Atlantic (Batie, 1999).  While the equity implications are not explicitly considered in this 
analysis, they are important to consider in any evaluation because of the political 
implications. 
 In the future, the model could be constructed to reflect the dynamics of 
transforming land use patterns in the study area.  The model here is static, and therefore 
solves for the long-run equilibrium given that the set of exogenous conditions, including 
commodity prices, remain constant.  By using a static framework, important aspects of 
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the land use transition cannot be examined.  For example, there may be capital rigidities 
that create lags in the adjustment of the land use allocation.  Moreover, there are a host of 
unconsidered factors that may influence the land use transition, such as the development 
of social capital under a new system of production.  This analysis examines land use 
change from a purely economic perspective, and therefore addresses only one small 
portion of a larger, interdisciplinary problem. 
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APPENDIX 
 
MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING CODE 
  
The code for the mathematical programming model is included in full so that the 
analysis can be replicated.  Explanatory text is included in italics. 
 
Option solprint = off; 
Option limrow = 0; 
Option limcol = 0; 
 
********************************************************************* 
SETS 
********************************************************************* 
Sets 
y  landuse activities  /2yr, 6yr_a, 6yr_g, pasture, ecoreserve, livestock/ 
*6yr_a: alfalfa rotation; 6yr_g: grass/legume rotation. 
 
c crops  /corn, soybean, oat, alfalfa, hay, grasslg, cgrasslg/ 
*Cgrasslg is continuous grass-legume pasture.  Grasslg denotes grass-legume 
*pasture in rotation. 
 
feed(c) feed inputs and outputs  /corn, alfalfa, hay, grasslg, cgrasslg/ 
 
ration livestock feed ration  /grain, forage, graze/ 
 
feedration(ration,feed) livestock feed-ration mapping 
/grain.   (corn) 
 forage.  (alfalfa,hay) 
 graze.   (grasslg,cgrasslg)/ 
 
lvstock  livestock activities  /hogs, bfcattle/ 
 
type  livestock activity types  /domestic, finishing/ 
 
production  livestock production systems  /confine, pasture/ 
 
lpp(lvstock,type,production) livestock-type-production mapping 
/hogs.      (domestic).    (confine,pasture) 
 hogs.      (finishing).    (confine) 
 bfcattle.  (domestic).    (confine,pasture) 
 bfcattle.  (finishing).    (confine,pasture)/ 
 
io  inputs and outputs in crop and livestock production  /land, labor, N, P, K, piglet, calf, 
othervar, ownership, erosion/ 
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*Pasture as an input into livestock production is grazed only. 
 
env(io) environmental inputs  /erosion/ 
 
fert(io) fertilizer inputs and outputs  /N, P, K/ 
 
other(io) other inputs and outputs  /land, labor, piglet, calf, othervar, ownership/ 
 
grade  slope gradient  /0*49/ 
 
cropgrade(grade) crop grades - for C&C erosion constraint  /0*16/ 
 
********************************************************************* 
PRICE PARAMETERS 
********************************************************************* 
Parameters 
cprice(c) base crop producer prices ($ per unit)  /corn 2.16, soybean 5.79, oat 1.58, alfalfa 
87.63, hay 84.75, grasslg 0, cgrasslg 0/ 
*Alfalfa, hay in tons; grasslg, cgrasslg in acres; all else in bushels. 
*Median prices from USDA NASS Agricultural Statistics Database, 1994-2003, for IA. 
 
pinputs(io) base input prices ($ per unit)  /labor 9.5, othervar 1, piglet 41, calf 431, 
ownership 1, land 0, erosion 0/ 
*Labor in hrs; othervar, piglet, calf, ownership in $.  Median calf price 
*from IA NASS, 1994-2003; assumes 500lb feeder.  Piglet price from IAState 
*Livestock Enterprise Budgets, 2004. 
 
pmanure(fert) price of nutrients in livestock waste-reflective of disposal cost   
/N 0, P 0, K 0/ 
 
pimnutr(fert) price of purchased nutrient inputs ($ per lb) 
/N .25, P .28, K .15/ 
*Fertilizer prices from IAState Livestock Enterprise Budgets, 2004. 
 
plocalfeed(feed) incremental price of feed grown within county above COP 
/corn 0, alfalfa 0, hay 0, grasslg 0, cgrasslg 0/ 
 
Scalar 
feedpremium premium on purchased feed above crop producer price /1.10/; 
*Assume 10% above producer price for transportation/storage costs. 
 
Parameter 
pimfeed(feed) price of purchased feed inputs ($ per lb-ton or acre); 
pimfeed(feed) = cprice(feed)*feedpremium; 
pimfeed('grasslg') = 52; 
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pimfeed('cgrasslg') = 52; 
 
Table lprice(lvstock,production)  base livestock producer prices ($ per lb.) 
                   confine      pasture 
hogs             .4110        .4110 
bfcattle         .6405        .6405 ; 
*Livestock median prices from Iowa NASS, 1994-2003. 
 
Parameter 
grasspremium(lvstock) price premium for grass-fed livestock  /hogs 1.0, bfcattle 1.0/; 
lprice(lvstock,'pasture') = lprice(lvstock,'pasture')*grasspremium(lvstock); 
 
*********************************************************************  
CROP PRODUCTION PARAMETERS 
********************************************************************* 
Table rotation(y,c) proportion of each acre of land use activity in each crop 
                 corn    soybean     oat         alfalfa     hay      grasslg    cgrasslg 
2yr            0.5        0.5 
6yr_a         0.333    0.167      0.167       0.5 
6yr_g         0.333    0.167                      0.167     0.333 
pasture                                                                1.0 
ecoreserve 
livestock                                                      ; 
*6yr_a consists of a C-S-C-A/O-A-A rotation, where A/O is alfalfa 
*established with an oat leader crop.  Alfalfa is used for forage in all 
*three years (harvested, not grazed). 
*6yr_g consists of a C-S-C-H-P-P rotation, where H is hay (harvested grass/ 
*legume pasture), and P is grass/legume pasture.  Hay is used for forage, 
*pasture acres are used for grazing in the final two years. 
*Pasture acres in rotation differ from continuous pasture because of the 
*length of the production cycle (continuous pasture is grown in a five year 
*cycle).  Note that acreage proportions in 6yr_a do not sum to one because oat 
*and alfalfa are double-cropped in alfalfa's establishment year. 
 
Parameters 
rotation6yr(c) proportion of an acre of 6yr_a rotation in each crop 
/corn 0.333, soybean 0.167, oat 0.167, alfalfa 0.333/ 
*This ensures that proportions sum to one in the 6-year rotation, and is used 
*to prevent double counting when assigning the cost of production to this 
*land use activity. 
 
avgyield(c) county average yields 1994-2002 (units per acre)  /corn 132.2, soybean 44.55, 
oat 67.62, alfalfa 3.75, hay 3.52, grasslg 1, cgrasslg 1/ 
*County average yields from Iowa NASS. 
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*Yield data compiled from ISPAID soils database, modified by Burkart & James. 
*Yield estimated as a linear function of slope degree, for 0-30 degree slope. 
*Assumes that relationship holds for slopes of greater than 30 degrees. 
baseyield(c) base yield - intercept (units per acre)   
/corn 134.58, soybean 45.17, oat 74.03, alfalfa 4.19, hay 3.92, grasslg 1, cgrasslg 1/ 
 
yieldloss(c) yield loss coefficient (units per acre per grade) 
/corn 1.3861, soybean 0.4645, oat 0.7626, alfalfa 0.0458, hay 0.0370, grasslg 0,  
cgrasslg 0/ 
 
slope(grade) slope of land in each grade 
/1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4 4, 5 5, 6 6, 7 7, 8 8, 9 9, 10 10, 11 11, 12 12, 13 13, 14 14, 
15 15, 16 16, 17 17, 18 18, 19 19, 20 20, 21 21, 22 22, 23 23, 24 24, 25 25, 
26 26, 27 27, 28 28, 29 29, 30 30, 31 31, 32 32, 33 33, 34 34, 35 35, 36 36, 
37 37, 38 38, 39 39, 40 40, 41 41, 42 42, 43 43, 44 44, 45 45, 46 46, 47 47, 
48 48, 49 49/ 
 
cyield(c,grade) crop yield as a function of slope (units per acre) 
yield(y,c,grade) crop yield by land use activity and slope (units per acre); 
cyield(c,grade) = baseyield(c)-(yieldloss(c)*slope(grade)); 
yield(y,c,grade) = rotation(y,c)*cyield(c,grade); 
 
Table nutruse(c,fert) crop nutrient requirements (lbs per unit) 
                     N                  P               K 
corn             1.1             0.375          0.3 
soybean                        0.8              1.5 
oat               0.75            0.4             1.0 
alfalfa                          12.5             40 
hay                              13.625          61 
grasslg                         13.625          61 
cgrasslg                       13.625          61   ; 
*Assumes that hay, grasslg, and cgrasslg are 25% alfalfa, 75% orchardgrass. 
*Source: IA DNR Manure Management Plan Form Appendices A5 & A6 (2004).  Corn 
*N usage rate is that for Zone 2, which contains Crawford and Shelby counties. 
 
Parameter 
legumeNcredit(y) N credit from legume crops (lbs per acre)  /6yr_a 28.333, 6yr_g 9.167/ 
*Legume credit is 140 lbs per acre for alfalfa, 55 lbs per acre for grass- 
*legume mix in preceeding year.  Legume credit is 30 lbs per acre for alfalfa 
*2 years prior.  Therefore, for 6yr_a, the legume credit earned for the first 
*year of corn is (1/6)*per acre N credit for preceeding year's alfalfa + 
*(1/6)*per acre N credit for two-years ago alfalfa. For 6yr_g, the legume 
*credit earned for the first year of corn is (1/6)*per acre N credit for 
*preceeding year's grass-legume mix. 
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Scalar soyN N credit from soybeans (lbs per bu)  /1/; 
*Soy N credit is one pound per bushel soybean production in the previous year. 
*Cannot exceed 50 lbs/acre. 
 
Parameters 
soyNcredit(y,grade) N credit from previous year's soybean crop (lbs per acre) 
totalNcredit(y,grade) total N credit for rotation (lbs per acre); 
soyNcredit(y,grade) = 50; 
soyNcredit(y,grade)$(yield(y,'soybean',grade)<50) = soyN*yield(y,'soybean',grade); 
totalNcredit(y,grade) = soyNcredit(y,grade)+legumeNcredit(y); 
 
Parameters 
nutrreq(y,c,grade,fert) nutrient requirement (lbs per acre) 
nutrneed(y,grade,fert) nutrient requirement by land use (lbs per acre); 
nutrreq(y,c,grade,fert) = yield(y,c,grade)*nutruse(c,fert); 
nutrreq(y,'corn',grade,'N') = (nutrreq(y,'corn',grade,'N')- 
totalNcredit(y,grade))$(nutrreq(y,'corn',grade,'N')>totalNcredit(y,grade)); 
nutrneed(y,grade,fert) = SUM(c, nutrreq(y,c,grade,fert)); 
 
*Erosion data generated by Burkart & James using NRI data points for 17 
*counties encompassing the 26 watersheds affected by production in Crawford 
*and Shelby counties. Erosion estimated as a quadratic function of slope 
*degree, for 0-30 degree slope. Assumes that relationship holds for slopes of 
*greater than 30 degrees. 
Parameters 
intc(y) regression intercept  /2yr 0.9289, (6yr_a,6yr_g) 0.2713, pasture 0.0507/ 
 
slpcoeff(y) slope coefficient  /2yr -0.0115, (6yr_a,6yr_g) 0.0507, pasture 0.0042/ 
 
slp2coeff(y) slope squared coefficient  /2yr 0.1304, (6yr_a,6yr_g) 0.0194, pasture 0.001/ 
 
envinput(y,grade,env) erosion (tons per acre per year); 
envinput(y,grade,env) = intc(y) + slpcoeff(y)*slope(grade) + 
slp2coeff(y)*(slope(grade)**2); 
 
*Tolerance soil loss value defined by Burkart & James. 
Scalar tvalue tolerable soil loss (tons per acre per year)  /5.0/; 
 
Parameter 
exerosion(y,grade,env) erosion above 5 tons per acre per year; 
exerosion(y,grade,env) = (envinput(y,grade,env) - 
tvalue)$(envinput(y,grade,env)>tvalue); 
Display exerosion; 
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Table cinputs(c,other)  crop production inputs and costs (per acre) 
                        labor       othervar      ownership         land 
corn                  2.6         129.49          39.78             1 
soybean            2.45         84.92          27.04             1 
oat                    4               51.70          40.86            1 
alfalfa               1.33         27.65          72.79            1 
hay                   4.85          46.08          35.15            1 
grasslg              1.5             2.55          39.30            1 
cgrasslg            1.57          5.38          22.04             1 ; 
*Corn, soybean costs of production for conventional till.  "Oat" COP is the 
*cost of producing alfalfa with an oat leader, alfalfa is the cost of producing 
*alfalfa once it is established.  The establishment costs for alfalfa are 
*prorated over 3 years, with a real interest rate = 4.7%.  "Hay" COP is the 
*cost of producing grass/legume pasture for forage in its establishment year, 
*grasslg is the cost of maintaining grass/legume pasture for grazing once it is 
*established.  The establishment costs for hay/grasslg are prorated over 3 years. 
*The cost of producing cgrasslg is the cost of renovating/establishing pasture, 
*and the cost of maintaining that pasture for the following four years.  The 
*establishment costs for cgrasslg are prorated over 5 years at the same interest 
*rate.  The COP for cgrasslg is a weighted average of the COP in the 
*establishment and maintenance years (1/5 in est, 4/5 in maint). 
*Assume alfalfa, hay harvested in large round bales, 2 cuttings/yr, target 
*yield of 4 tons/acre. 
*Labor in hours; land in acres; othervar, ownership in $. 
*By zeroing out the price of land, the model calcualtes the net return to 
*land and management (NRLM). 
 
Parameter yinputs(y,other) land use production inputs and costs (per acre); 
yinputs(y,other) = SUM(c, rotation(y,c)*cinputs(c,other)); 
yinputs('6yr_a',other) = SUM(c, rotation6yr(c)*cinputs(c,other)); 
 
Parameter 
tland(grade)  available land in each slope class (acres) 
/0=56776, 1=43684, 2=53042, 3=55145, 4=56843, 5=58504, 6=59827, 
7=60827, 8=57208, 9=54471, 10=50050, 11=43289, 12=36466, 13=29105, 
14=22314, 15=16844, 16=12449, 17=8983, 18=6354, 19=4508, 20=3298, 
21=2327, 22=1641, 23=1142, 24=819, 25=575, 26=421, 27=293, 
28=194, 29=144, 30=97, 31=72, 32=55, 33=36, 34=26, 35=18, 
36=12, 37=11, 38=9, 39=5, 40=3, 41=2, 42=2, 43=1, 44=2, 
45=1, 46=1, 47=0, 48=1, 49=0/; 
tland(grade) = .9347*tland(grade); 
 
Parameter 
totalland total land available for allocation (acres); 
totalland = SUM(grade, tland(grade)); 
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Display totalland; 
*The above adjustment to the total amount of land available is made to account 
*for land that is not in production, i.e. land on which crops failed or were 
*abandoned, land in house lots, ponds, roads, and wasteland.  It is assumed 
*that this land is evenly distributed across the landscape. 
 
Parameter clu(c)  current land allocation (acres) 
/corn          332185 
soybean      299092 
oat                  2008 
alfalfa           24002 
hay               13484 
cgrasslg        27115 
grasslg          26968/ 
*From the 2002 Census of Agriculture. 
 
Parameters 
pcland(c) land prices for different crops ($ per acre) 
/(corn,soybean) 140, (alfalfa,oat) 78, (hay,grasslg,cgrasslg) 52/ 
 
pland(y) land prices for different land uses; 
pland(y) = SUM(c, rotation(y,c)*pcland(c)); 
pland('6yr_a') = SUM(c, rotation6yr(c)*pcland(c)); 
pland('ecoreserve') = 52; 
pland('livestock') = 140; 
 
********************************************************************* 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION PARAMETERS 
********************************************************************* 
Parameter lb(lvstock)  livestock weight at time of sale (lbs per head)   
/hogs 250, bfcattle 1150/ 
*Beef cattle raised on pasture differentiated from those raised in feedlot by 
*length of production cycle. 
 
Table feedreq(lvstock,type,production,ration) feed requirements (units per head) 
                                                   grain    forage    graze 
hogs.      domestic.   confine       11.67 
hogs.      domestic.   pasture       12.13                   0.025 
hogs.      finishing.  confine          9.6 
bfcattle.  domestic.   confine       64   2.5           2.5 
bfcattle.  domestic.   pasture         4          2.118       2.5 
bfcattle.  finishing.  confine        61        0.65 
bfcattle.  finishing.  pasture                        0.018       2.5 ; 
*Corn in bu; alfalfa in tons; pasture in acres. 
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Table lvinputs(lvstock,type,production,io)  livestock production inputs (per head) 
                                                  labor      land          othervar    ownership 
hogs.     domestic.   confine        1.22      .000371       42.98         19.85 
hogs.     domestic.   pasture        1.625    .000273       46.21         12.63 
hogs.     finishing.  confine         0.5        .000202       31.87         13.04 
bfcattle. domestic.   confine       10         .002016      130.41        152.70 
bfcattle. domestic.   pasture       12.69    .00126       134.81        168.80 
bfcattle. finishing.  confine        3           .00139        79.28          21.00 
bfcattle. finishing.  pasture         0.625    .00063        56.29          21.00 
 
         +                                          piglet     calf 
hogs.      domestic.   confine 
hogs.      domestic.   pasture 
hogs.      finishing.  confine        1 
bfcattle.  domestic.   confine 
bfcattle.  domestic.   pasture 
bfcattle.  finishing.  confine                    1 
bfcattle.  finishing.  pasture                    1   ; 
*Labor in hrs; land in acres; othervar, pig, calf, ownership in $. 
*Land/housing requirement - pasture finished cattle require 25 sq.ft. barn 
*space, cattle finished in feedlot require 55 sq.ft. barn and lot space, 
*cow-calf unit requires 25 sq.ft. barn space + space for finishing 
*cattle-either pasture or feedlot; hogs finished in confinement require 
*8 sq.ft. space, farrowing sows 35 sq.ft., nursery pigs 2.85 sq.ft.  Housing 
*requirement for pasture-farrowed hogs consists only of nursery pig and 
*finishing hog space.  Housing for farrowing is included as a pasture req. 
*All square footages multiplied by 1.1 to account for non-occupied 
*space in and around buildings.  Conversion factor: 1acre=43,650sq.ft. 
 
Table lvoutputs(lvstock,type,production,fert) livestock manure outputs (lbs per head 
marketed) 
                                                       N             P              K 
hogs.      domestic.   confine         12.86         2.39          6.00 
hogs.      domestic.   pasture          13.10         2.46          6.15 
hogs.      finishing.  confine           10              1.70          4.40 
bfcattle.  domestic.   confine        141.66       26.48       98.70 
bfcattle.  domestic.   pasture        157.72       28.61       109.79 
bfcattle.  finishing.  confine           55.00         7.30        38.00 
bfcattle.  finishing.  pasture           71.06         9.43        49.09 ; 
*Manure nutrient coefficients taken from ASAE publication D384.1, Manure 
*Production and Characteristics, typical as-excreted manure characteristics. 
*See manure.xls for details on computation of statistics by head marketed. 
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Table storage(lvstock,production,fert) proportion manure nutrient content available after 
storage (lbs) 
                                      N                P               K 
hogs.       confine          0.75           1.0             1.0 
hogs.       pasture          0.65           1.0             1.0 
bfcattle.   confine          0.55           1.0             1.0 
bfcattle.   pasture          0.55           1.0             1.0 ; 
*Assumes that confinement hog manure is stored in a pit (25% N lost), 
*pasture-farrowed manure nutrient loss is a weighted average of losses when 
*manure is excreted on pasture, for 172 days of total production cycle 
*(45% N lost), and pit storage, for last 161 days of total production cycle 
*(25% N lost).  For cow-calf units and finishing cattle, 45% is lost either 
*on pasture or in feedlot.  Manure loss coefficients obtained from I-FARM. 
 
Table apply(lvstock,type,production,fert) proportion manure nutrient content available 
after spreading (lbs) 
                                                                       N          P         K 
hogs.      (domestic,finishing).   confine      0.98       1.0       1.0 
hogs.      (domestic,finishing).   pasture      0.99       1.0       1.0 
bfcattle.  domestic.                    confine      0.89       1.0       1.0 
bfcattle.  domestic.                    pasture       1.0         1.0       1.0 
bfcattle.  finishing.                    confine       0.70       1.0       1.0 
bfcattle.  finishing.                    pasture       1.0         1.0       1.0 ; 
*Assumes that hog manure is spread using liquid injection (2% N lost), pasture- 
*farrowed manure nutrient loss is a weighted average of losses when manure is 
*excreted on pasture (0% additional losses), and when it is injected.  For 
*beef cattle on pasture, no additional N losses.  For confinement produced 
*cattle, manure is spread using dry broadcast, which results in a loss of 
*another 30% N.  Cow-Calf units finished in confinement is a weighted average 
*of time on pasture (158+70 days) with 0% application losses, and time in 
*feedlot (137 days) with 30% application losses. 
 
Table clva(lvstock,type,production)  livestock marketed in 2002 (head) 
                                       confine 
hogs.        domestic         366304 
hogs.        finishing         576569 
bfcattle.    domestic          21633 
bfcattle.    finishing          44865  ; 
*From the 2002 Census of Agriculture. 
*Number of farrow-finish and finishing swine derived as follows: 
*Farrow-finish hogs = (# breeding sows)(1.8 litters/yr)(7.8 piglets/litter). 
*Finishing hogs = Total head marketed - Farrow-finish hogs - (0.28)(# breeding sows). 
*The second term accounts for the total number of piglets born within the 
*two counties, including a death rate of 0.2 head per litter, and the third 
*term deducts the sale of cull sows, which is not explicitly considered as a 
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*source of revenue in the model. 
*Number of calves from cow-calf units and finishing cattle derived as follows: 
*Cow-Calf Calves = (# breeding cows)(.777 calf/year) 
*Finishing cattle = Total head marketed - Cow-Calf Calves - 
*(0.123)(# breeding cows). 
*The second term accounts for the total number of calves born within the two 
*counties, including a death rate of 4%, unsuccessful insemination rate of 4%, 
*and replacement of cows with heifers every 7 years, with an additional death 
*rate of 2% (or 0.143 head per cow-calf unit).  The third term deducts the sale 
*of cull cows (every 7 years), which is not explicitly considered as a source 
*of revenue in the model. 
 
********************************************************************* 
GOVERNMENT PAYMENT PARAMETERS 
********************************************************************* 
Scalars 
CRP      CRP payment rate ($ per acre)   /119/ 
enroll   CRP enrolled acres (as of 7-03)   /22526/ 
payacre  payment acres (proportion)   /0.85/ 
base     base acres as proportion of total acres   /0.56/; 
*Base scalar used to scale down total government payments to more accurately 
*reflect current amount of payments distributed. 
 
Parameters 
dpay(c) direct payment rates for program crops ($ per bu.) 
/corn .28, soybean .44, oat .024/ 
*2002-2007 direct payment rates, USDA (2003). 
 
bsyld(c) direct payment base yields (bu per acre per year); 
bsyld(c) = avgyield(c); 
 
Parameter 
dpayac(y) direct payment rate by land use ($ per acre); 
dpayac(y) = SUM(c, rotation(y,c)*bsyld(c)*dpay(c)); 
*Assumes that acres in each crop receive their respective payment (corn acres 
*eligible for corn payments, etc.). 
 
Parameters 
target(c) target rate for counter-cyclical payments ($ per bu) 
/corn 2.60, soybean 5.80, oat 1.40/ 
 
loanr(c) national loan rate for c-c payments ($ per bu) 
/corn 1.98, soybean 5.00, oat 1.35/ 
*2002-2003 target and loan rates, USDA (2003).  2004-2007 rates differ slightly. 
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efp(c) effective price for c-cps ($ per bu.); 
efp(c) = dpay(c)+cprice(c); 
efp(c)$(loanr(c)>cprice(c)) = dpay(c)+loanr(c); 
 
Parameter 
ccpayac(y) counter-cyclical payment rate by land use ($ per acre); 
ccpayac(y) = SUM(c, rotation(y,c)*bsyld(c)*(target(c)-efp(c))$(target(c)>efp(c))); 
 
Parameter 
ldppayr(c) loan deficiency payment rate ($ per unit) 
ldpayac(y,c,grade) loan deficiency payment rate ($ per acre); 
ldppayr(c) = (loanr(c)-cprice(c))$(loanr(c)>cprice(c)); 
ldpayac(y,c,grade) = yield(y,c,grade)*ldppayr(c); 
*Maximum amount of ldps that could be collected given that the commodity price 
*falls below the national loan rate. 
 
Scalar 
erosiontax tax on excess soil erosion ($ per ton)  /0.00/; 
 
Parameter 
taxloss(y,grade,env) total tax by land use and grade ($); 
taxloss(y,grade,env) = erosiontax*exerosion(y,grade,env); 
 
Parameter 
csppayac(y) CSP payment ($ per acre) 
/(6yr_a,6yr_g,pasture) 0.00/; 
 
********************************************************************* 
VARIABLES, BOUNDS, AND EQUATIONS 
********************************************************************* 
Positive Variables 
yacres(y,grade)                  land use activity (acres) 
landuse(y)                          land allocation 
cacres(y,c)                          crop acres by land use activity 
tcacres(c)                            total crop acres 
csales(c)                             crop sales 
cfeeds(c)                            crop feed supply (units) 
head(lvstock,type,production)   livestock activity (head) 
purfeed(feed)                      purchased feed inputs (units) 
lsnutrs(fert)                         livestock nutrient supply (lbs) 
purnutr(fert)                        purchased nutrient inputs (lbs) 
exerode(y,grade,env)          soil erosion in excess of tvalue (tons) 
exN                                     excess nitrogen produced (lbs) 
revenue                               revenue ($) 
dp(y)                                   direct payments ($) 
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ccp(y)                           counter-cyclical payments ($) 
ldp(y)                           loan deficiency payments ($) 
conspay                          CRP payments ($) 
erodetax                         total erosion tax ($) 
csp(y)                           CSP payments ($) 
tcfeed                           total cost for purchased feed 
ncost                             nutrient costs 
envcost                          erosion costs 
lcost                             total land cost 
tcost                             variable-labor-ownership costs ($); 
 
Variable 
profit                            producer surplus ($m) ; 
 
*VARIABLE BOUNDS 
*head.fx(lvstock,type,production)=clva(lvstock,type,production); 
csales.up('alfalfa')=1500; 
csales.fx('hay')=0; 
csales.fx('grasslg')=0; 
csales.fx('cgrasslg')=0; 
cfeeds.fx('soybean')=0; 
cfeeds.fx('oat')=0; 
purfeed.fx('grasslg')=0; 
purfeed.fx('cgrasslg')=0; 
landuse.up('ecoreserve')=enroll; 
 
Equations 
*ALLOCATION SUMMARY EQUATIONS 
benchmark(y)                   land use acreage allocation 
cropacres(y,c)                 acres in each crop by land use activity 
tcropacres(c)                 total acres by crop 
*ALLOCATION CONSTRAINTS 
landcon(grade)                 land use constraint 
housedensity                   livestock housing balance 
grazedensity                   pasture grazing requirement 
*LANDUSE-LIVESTOCK BALANCES 
cropusebal(c)                  crop demand-supply balances 
feedbal(ration)                livestock feed balance 
lsnutrsup(fert)                livestock nutrient production identity 
nutrientbal                    unconstrained nutrient demand-supply balance 
excessN                        excess nitrogen produced by livestock 
Nconstraint                    IADNR constraint - excess N equal to zero 
*COMMAND & CONTROL LAND USE CONSTRAINT - SOIL EROSION 
excesserosion(y,grade,env)     excess erosion over t-value 
erosioncon(y,grade,env)        soil erosion constraint 
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ecocon                          constrain ecoreserve acres to highest grades 
*ACCOUNTING EQUATIONS - REVENUE AND GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS 
arev                            crop revenue accounting 
drpay(y)                       direct payment accounting 
ccppay(y)                      counter-cyclical payment accounting 
ldppay(y)                      loan deficiency payment accounting 
crppay                          CRP payment accounting 
*INCENTIVE POLICY ACCOUNTING EQUATIONS - EROSION TAX AND CSP 
PAYMENTS 
erosion                         total erosion tax accounting 
csppay(y)                      CSP payment accounting 
*ACCOUNTING EQUATIONS - COSTS 
feedcost                       feed cost accounting 
nutrcost                        nutrient cost accounting 
envircost                       erosion cost accounting 
landcost                        land cost accounting 
totalcost                       variable-labor-ownership costs 
*OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS 
surplus                         producer surplus 
surplustax                     producer surplus with erosion tax 
surpluscsp                     producer surplus with CSP payments; 
 
********************************************************************* 
BENCHMARKING AND LAND USE SUMMARY CONSTRAINT 
********************************************************************* 
**Acres by land use 
benchmark(y).. SUM(grade, yacres(y,grade)) =e= landuse(y); 
 
**Acres by land use and by crop 
cropacres(y,c).. SUM(grade, yacres(y,grade)*rotation(y,c)) =e= cacres(y,c); 
 
**Acres by crop (greater than land use acres because of oat/alfalfa double 
**cropping) 
tcropacres(c).. SUM(y, cacres(y,c)) =e= tcacres(c); 
 
********************************************************************* 
LAND USE AND ROTATION CONSTRAINTS 
********************************************************************* 
**Land demanded is less than supply 
landcon(grade).. SUM(y, yacres(y,grade)) =l= tland(grade); 
 
**Livestock housing land allocation constraint 
housedensity.. SUM((lvstock,type,production)$lpp(lvstock,type,production), 
head(lvstock,type,production)* 
lvinputs(lvstock,type,production,'land')) =l= landuse('livestock'); 
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**Livestock pasture land allocation constraint 
grazedensity.. SUM((lvstock,type,production)$lpp(lvstock,type,production), 
head(lvstock,type,production)* 
feedreq(lvstock,type,production,'graze')) =l= landuse('pasture')+tcacres('grasslg'); 
 
********************************************************************* 
**LAND USE - LIVESTOCK BALANCES 
********************************************************************* 
**Crop usage balance: crops sold plus crops fed to livestock LE total produced 
cropusebal(c).. csales(c)+cfeeds(c) =l= SUM((y,grade), 
yacres(y,grade)*yield(y,c,grade)); 
 
**Feed usage balance: feed supplied by crop production plus purchased feed GE 
**feed demanded for livestock production 
feedbal(ration).. SUM(feed$feedration(ration,feed), cfeeds(feed)+purfeed(feed)) =g= 
SUM((lvstock,type,production),head(lvstock,type,production)* 
feedreq(lvstock,type,production,ration)); 
 
**The 3 constraints below are used to evaluate the cost of limiting excess 
**nitrogen applications.  The first balance, alone, constitutes the 
**unlimited case: manure applications can exceed crop requirements by whatever 
**amount is optimal.  By manipulating the third equation, intermediate cases 
**between the completely constrained and unconstrained cases can be simulated. 
 
lsnutrsup(fert).. SUM((lvstock,type,production)$lpp(lvstock,type,production), 
head(lvstock,type,production)*lvoutputs(lvstock,type,production,fert)* 
storage(lvstock,production,fert)*apply(lvstock,type,production,fert)) =e= 
lsnutrs(fert); 
 
**Nutrient usage balance: nutrients needed for crop production GE less than 
**or equal to amount supplied by livestock manure plus total purchased 
nutrientbal(fert).. SUM((y,grade), yacres(y,grade)*nutrneed(y,grade,fert)) =l= 
purnutr(fert) + lsnutrs(fert); 
 
**Excess nitrogen applications identity 
excessN.. lsnutrs('N') - SUM((y,grade), yacres(y,grade)*nutrneed(y,grade,'N')) =e= exN; 
 
**Baseline: nitrogen supplied by livestock cannot exceed crop requirements. 
Nconstraint.. exN =e= 0; 
 
********************************************************************* 
COMMAND & CONTROL SOIL EROSION CONSTRAINTS 
********************************************************************* 
**Excess soil erosion identity by land use and grade 
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excesserosion(y,grade,env).. yacres(y,grade)*exerosion(y,grade,env) =e= 
exerode(y,grade,env); 
 
**Soil erosion constraint: total erosion by land use and grade cannot exceed 
**the tolerance value of 5 tons per acre 
erosioncon(y,grade,env).. exerode(y,grade,env) =e= 0; 
 
**Requires model to assign ecoreserve acres on the highest grades 
ecocon..  SUM(cropgrade, yacres('ecoreserve',cropgrade)) =e= 0; 
 
********************************************************************* 
REVENUE ACCOUNTING IDENTITIES 
********************************************************************* 
**Revenue summation 
arev.. SUM(c, csales(c)*cprice(c)) + 
SUM((lvstock,type,production)$lpp(lvstock,type,production), 
head(lvstock,type,production)*lb(lvstock)*lprice(lvstock,production)) =e= revenue; 
 
**Government payments calculations 
**Direct payment calculation 
drpay(y).. SUM(grade, base*payacre*yacres(y,grade)*dpayac(y)) =e= dp(y); 
 
**Counter-cyclical payment calculation 
ccppay(y).. SUM(grade, base*payacre*yacres(y,grade)*ccpayac(y)) =e= ccp(y); 
 
**Loan deficiency payment calculation 
ldppay(y).. SUM((c,grade), base*yacres(y,grade)*ldpayac(y,c,grade)) =e= ldp(y); 
 
**Conservation Reserve Program payment calculation 
crppay.. SUM(grade, yacres('ecoreserve',grade)*CRP) =e= conspay; 
 
********************************************************************* 
INCENTIVE-BASED SOIL EROSION REGULATION 
********************************************************************* 
**Total erosion tax 
erosion.. SUM((y,grade,env), yacres(y,grade)*taxloss(y,grade,env)) =e= erodetax; 
 
**Government payment function for reductions in soil erosion 
csppay(y).. SUM((grade,env), yacres(y,grade)*csppayac(y)) =e= csp(y); 
 
********************************************************************* 
COST ACCOUNTING IDENTITIES 
********************************************************************* 
*Feed cost summation 
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feedcost.. SUM(feed, cfeeds(feed)*plocalfeed(feed)+purfeed(feed)*pimfeed(feed)) =e= 
tcfeed; 
 
*Fertilizer cost summation 
nutrcost.. SUM(fert, lsnutrs(fert)*pmanure(fert) + purnutr(fert)*pimnutr(fert)) =e= ncost; 
 
*Erosion cost summation 
envircost.. SUM((y,grade,env)$(envinput(y,grade,env)>tvalue), 
yacres(y,grade)*envinput(y,grade,env)*pinputs(env)) =e= envcost; 
 
*Explicit cropland cost summation 
landcost.. SUM(y, landuse(y)*pland(y)) =e= lcost; 
 
********************************************************************* 
TOTAL COST SUMMATION 
********************************************************************* 
**Crop production costs: other variable, ownership, erosion and nutrient 
totalcost.. SUM((y,grade,other), yacres(y,grade)*yinputs(y,other)*pinputs(other))+ 
envcost+ 
ncost+ 
 
**Livestock costs: other variable, ownership, land in housing and feed 
SUM((lvstock,type,production,other)$lpp(lvstock,type,production), 
head(lvstock,type,production)*lvinputs(lvstock,type,production,other)*pinputs(other))+ 
landuse('livestock')*pland('livestock')+ 
tcfeed =e= tcost; 
 
**Producer surplus accounting: objective function 
surplus.. (revenue+SUM(y, dp(y)+ccp(y)+ldp(y))+conspay-tcost)/1000000 =e= profit; 
 
**Producer surplus accounting: erosion tax scenario 
surplustax.. (revenue+SUM(y, dp(y)+ccp(y)+ldp(y))+conspay-erodetax-tcost)/1000000 
=e= profit; 
 
**Producer surplus accounting: CSP payments scenario 
surpluscsp.. (revenue+SUM(y, csp(y))+conspay-tcost)/1000000 =e= profit; 
 
********************************************************************* 
**MODEL STATEMENTS 
********************************************************************* 
Model 
iowa   baseline model - flexible land allocation 
*land allocation constraints 
/benchmark,cropacres,tcropacres,landcon,housedensity,grazedensity,cropusebal, 
*nutrient and feed balances (crop-livestock interaction) 
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feedbal,lsnutrsup,nutrientbal,excessN,Nconstraint, 
*revenue and cost summations 
arev,drpay,ccppay,ldppay,crppay,feedcost,nutrcost,envircost,totalcost, 
*objective function 
surplus/ 
 
currentlv  livestock production fixed at current levels 
*land allocation constraints 
/benchmark,cropacres,tcropacres,landcon,housedensity,grazedensity,cropusebal, 
*nutrient and feed balances (crop-livestock interaction) 
feedbal,lsnutrsup,nutrientbal, 
*revenue and cost summations 
arev,drpay,ccppay,ldppay,crppay,feedcost,nutrcost,envircost,totalcost, 
*objective function 
surplus/ 
 
iowaccs  command & control standard for soil erosion 
*land allocation constraints 
/benchmark,cropacres,tcropacres,landcon,housedensity,grazedensity,cropusebal, 
*nutrient and feed balances (crop-livestock interaction) 
feedbal,lsnutrsup,nutrientbal,excessN,Nconstraint, 
*erosion constraint (not to exceed t-value) 
excesserosion,erosioncon,ecocon, 
*revenue and cost summations 
arev,drpay,ccppay,ldppay,crppay,feedcost,nutrcost,envircost,totalcost, 
*objective function 
surplus/ 
 
iowaN  unconstrained nitrogen production 
*land allocation constraints 
/benchmark,cropacres,tcropacres,landcon,housedensity,grazedensity,cropusebal, 
*nutrient and feed balances (crop-livestock interaction) 
feedbal,lsnutrsup,nutrientbal,excessN, 
*revenue and cost summations 
arev,drpay,ccppay,ldppay,crppay,feedcost,nutrcost,envircost,totalcost, 
*objective function 
surplus/ 
 
iowatax  tax for excess soil erosion 
*land allocation constraints 
/benchmark,cropacres,tcropacres,landcon,housedensity,grazedensity,cropusebal, 
*nutrient and feed balances (crop-livestock interaction) 
feedbal,lsnutrsup,nutrientbal,excessN,Nconstraint, 
*tax incentive 
erosion, 
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*revenue and cost summations 
arev,drpay,ccppay,ldppay,crppay,feedcost,nutrcost,envircost,totalcost, 
*objective function 
surplustax/ 
 
iowaincentive  green payments for soil erosion 
*land allocation constraints 
/benchmark,cropacres,tcropacres,landcon,housedensity,grazedensity,cropusebal, 
*nutrient and feed balances (crop-livestock interaction) 
feedbal,lsnutrsup,nutrientbal,excessN,Nconstraint, 
*incentive payments 
csppay, 
*revenue and cost summations 
arev,crppay,feedcost,nutrcost,envircost,totalcost, 
*objective function 
surpluscsp/ ; 
 
**Model solve statement 
Solve iowa using lp maximize profit; 
 
**Post-optimal parameters 
Parameter 
nutrientdemand(fert) nutrients demanded for crop production 
totalsoilloss soil loss (tons per year) 
laboruse total labor use (hours per year); 
nutrientdemand(fert) = SUM((y,grade), yacres.l(y,grade)*nutrneed(y,grade,fert)); 
totalsoilloss = SUM((y,grade,env), yacres.l(y,grade)*envinput(y,grade,env)); 
laboruse = SUM(y, landuse.l(y)*yinputs(y,'labor')) + SUM((lvstock,type,production), 
head.l(lvstock,type,production)*lvinputs(lvstock,type,production,'labor')); 
 
 
**Land use/livestock allocations 
Display landuse.l, tcacres.l, head.l; 
**Feed supply and demand 
Display csales.l, cfeeds.l, purfeed.l; 
**Nutrient supply and demand 
Display nutrientdemand, lsnutrs.l, purnutr.l; 
**Soil erosion, labor use 
Display totalsoilloss, laboruse; 
**Government payments 
Display conspay.l; 
Display dp.l, ccp.l, ldp.l; 
**Producer surplus 
Display profit.l; 
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**Scenario Variables 
*Display exerode.l; 
*Display erodetax.l; 
*Display csp.l; 
 
**Output files to Excel spreadsheets: 2 files, first is summary of results, 
**second is summary of land use allocation by slope class, used to create 
**maps of land use allocation using ArcGIS software. 
File IOUT /RESULTS.XLS/ 
Put IOUT; 
IOUT.PC=5; 
**Create column names 
Put 'LANDUSE' 'ACRES' Put/; 
**Output values 
Loop(y, Put y.tl, landuse.l(y):6:0 Put/); 
Put #9 
Put 'CROP' 'ACRES' 'SALES' 'FEEDS' Put/; 
Loop(c, Put c.tl, tcacres.l(c):8:0, csales.l(c):8:0, cfeeds.l(c):8:0 Put/); 
Put #18 
Put 'FEEDCROP' 'PURFEED' Put/; 
Loop(feed, Put feed.tl, purfeed.l(feed):8:0 Put/); 
Put #25 
Put 'LIVESTOCK' 'TYPE' 'SYSTEM' 'ANIMALS' Put/; 
Loop((lvstock,type,production), Put lvstock.tl, type.tl, production.tl, 
head.l(lvstock,type,production):7:0 Put/); 
Put #35 
Put 'FERTILIZER' 'PURFERT' Put/; 
Loop(fert, Put fert.tl, purnutr.l(fert):8:0 Put/); 
Put #40 
Put 'LANDUSE' 'DIRECT' 'COUNTERCYCLICAL' 'LOANDEF' Put/; 
Loop(y, Put y.tl, dp.l(y):8:0, ccp.l(y):8:0, ldp.l(y):8:0 Put/); 
Put #48 
Put 'CONSPAY' 'EROSION' 'TAX' 'LABOR' 'NRLM' Put/; 
Put conspay.l:8:0, totalsoilloss:8:0, erosiontax:5:0, laboruse:8:0, profit.l:6:3 Put/; 
 
File ISLPOUT /SLPRESULTS.XLS/ 
Put ISLPOUT; 
ISLPOUT.PC=5; 
Put 'LANDUSE' 'GRADE' 'YACRES' Put/; 
Loop((y,grade), Put y.tl, grade.tl, yacres.l(y,grade):8:0 Put/); 
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